WAAS error, integrity and availability modeling for GPS based aircraft landing system. by Mu, Guangwei.
NOTE TO USERS
This reproduction is the best copy available.
UMI

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
WAAS Error, Integrity and Availability Modeling 
for GPS based Aircraft Landing System
A Dissertation 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
In partial fulfillment o f the requirements for the 
Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
B y
Guangwei Mu 
Norman, Oklahoma 
2004
UMI Number: 3122312
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
UMI Microform 3122312  
Copyright 2004 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
c Copyright by Guangwei Mu 2004 
All Rights Reserved.
WAAS Error, Integrity and Availability Modeling 
for GPS based Aircraft Landing System
A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE 
SCHOOL OF ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING
By
Dr. Jarnes Sluss
Joe Havlicek
Dr. John Fagan
Dr. M onte Tull 
Dr. J. David Baldwin
Acknowledgements
First and foremost I would like to thank Professor John Fagan, His contributions to this 
thesis are extensive and pervasive and this work could not have been possible without 
him. Professor Fagan has an infectious enthusiasm that allows his advice to generate 
exceptional motivation in his students, including myself. It has been an honor and 
privilege to work with him over the past few years. His leadership and resourcefulness 
makes it fun and exciting to work with. My daily interaction with Professor Fagan has 
allowed this research to develop in ways that I had not originally envisioned. This 
interaction enabled this dissertation and underlying research to achieve a higher quality 
and depth.
The Co-Chairs o f my advisory committee, Professor Joe Havlicek and Professor James 
Sluss have also played a major role in this work and my academic development.
Professor Joe Havlicek and Professor Sluss helped steer my early academic career at 
University o f Oklahoma and offered concise criticism o f my work during its development 
to improve the clarity of my research and this thêsis. Dr. Joe Havlicek has had a 
substantial impact on this work. His review and critique o f this thesis proved invaluable 
and timely. His patience, kindness, always being positive and attention to details will 
always be my model in my future life and work.
The other members o f my advisory committee. Professor Monte Tull and Professor J. 
David Baldwin have also played a major role in this work and my academic development. 
I appreciate their advice, input and time very much.
IV
The Federal Aviation Administration is the sponsor for this work. Their funding has 
provided an environment at University of Oklahoma that has enabled true innovation that 
will contribute to the future o f aviation. Without a doubt, this work would not be possible 
without their support. Also collaboration and discussion with Gerry McCartor o f FAA 
tech center at Oklahoma City proved valuable to the research as well.
This acknowledgement list would not be complete without recognition o f my peers.
These include my fellow grad students from the OU EVRI and GPS Lab. Most notably 
HengQing Wen, Walter Ross, Ben Mohr, Scott Graham, Ben Blevins, Andy Archinal, 
Peter Huang, Charles Thurmarm, John Dyer, Chad Sherrel, Brian Birk, Nick Cannon and 
Brad Taylor. You guys made my study and work here quite an enjoyment. And I can 
never thank you guys enough for all the help.
I would like to thank my parents. Ting Yu Mu and QinFen Zhang, who supported my 
every effort growing up and taught me that nothing is impossible given adequate 
dedication and time.
Last but certainly not least, the long hours o f effort have been bearable only because I 
have someone special to share my time-off. That someone is Qin, my lovely wife. Her 
lasting support and understanding has made all o f the work worthwhile. Thank you, 
sweetheart!
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................... iv
Table of Contents...................................................................................................................vi
List of Tables........................................................................................................................viii
List of Illustrations..................................................................................................................x
Abstract................................................................................................................................ xiv
Chapter 1 1
Introduction..............................................................................................................................1
1.1 GPS based navigation system.............................................................................. 1
1.2 The outline of this thesis and original Contributions...................................... 4
Chapter 2 7
Background on GPS and Differential GPS (DGPS)......................................................... 7
2.1 How GPS works..................................................................................................... 8
2.2 GPS error sources................................................................................................ 11
2.3 Differential GPS (DGPS).......................................................................................19
2.3.1 LAAS..............................................................................................................20
2.3.2 WAAS.............................................................................................................21
2.3 GPS measurement equations................................................................................23
2.3 Error Probability Density Functions (PDFs)..................................................27
2.5 Position Solution.................................................................................................... 31
2.6 Confidence Bounds................................................................................................ 34
Chapter 3 37
WAAS static Error, integrity and availability monitoring and analysis.................... 37
3.1 Necessary WAAS Data collection....................................................................... 37
3.2 The way the data is classified...............................................................................39
3.3 Define WAAS performance metrics...................................................................43
3.4 WAAS Signal in Space (SIS) general performance.........................................47
3.5 VPL and VPE (Vertical Position Error) performance over time
comparison......................................................................................................................... 58
3.6 A new and better metric of VPL and its performance....................................65
Chapter 4 72
Algorithm to improve WAAS based navigation modeling.............................................72
4.1 Chaotic nature of WAAS VPL and VPE...........................................................73
4.2 Rationale for Multiplicative modeling of the VPL........................................... 76
4.3 Position Domain Approach to improve the WAAS availability
performance....................................................................................................................... 83
4.4 Kalman Filter smoothing..........................................................................................89
4.4.1 The discret Kalman filter introduction and notation to be used................ 90
4.4.2 Using a - p  Kalman filter to filter V PL........................................................ 93
4.5 Fault prevention and error correction in this VPL algorithm.................... 103
VI
4.6 Fault-proofing the VPE solution......................................................................104
Chapter 5 106
Results and Conclusions.................................................................................................... 106
5.1 Results of the pseudo-VPL algorithm.............................................................106
Case 1:12/01/1999: Before and after filtering.................................................... 107
Case 2: 04/28/2000: Before and after filtering.................................................... 108
Case 3:11/27/2000: Before and after... filtering.................................................... 109
Case 4: 05/01/2001: Before and after filtering.................................................... 110
Case 5:11/12/2001: Before and after filtering.................................................... I l l
Case 6: 05/02/2002: Before and after filtering.................................................... 112
Case 7: 10/12/2002: Before and after filtering.....................................................113
Case 8: 10/28/2002: Before and after filtering.....................................................114
Case 9: 03/14/2003: Before and after filtering.................................................... 115
Case 10: 05/29/2003: Before and after filtering..................................................... 116
5.2 Performance of the pseudo- VPL algorithm after altitude smoothing 117
Case 1: Dec. 1*‘, 1999.................................................................................................. 119
Case 2: Apr. 28th, 2000.............................................................................................. 123
Case 3: Nov. 27th, 2000.............................................................................................. 127
Case 4: May. 1st, 2001...............................................................................................131
Case 5: Nov. 12th, 2001.............................................................................................. 135
Case 6: May. 2nd, 2002.............................................................................................. 139
Case 7: Oct. 12th, 2002.............................................................................................. 143
Case 8: Oct. 28th, 2002.............................................................................................. 147
Case 9: Mar. 14th, 2003............................................................................................. 151
Case 10: May. 29th, 2003........................................................................................... 155
5.3 Conclusions..........................................................................................................160
Chapter 6 162
Lessons learned and Future Research............................................................................ 162
Appendix A:......................................................................................................................... 174
A new position domain algorithm to improve WAAS availability and continuity
while maintaining
integrity................................................................................................................................174
Appendix B:......................................................................................................................... 174
Acronyms Frequently used in Navigation Research..................................................... 174
Bibliography........................................................................................................................ 183
vii
List of Tables
Table 2. 1 Standard error model - LI C/A (no SA) [6]..................................................... 16
Table 2. 2 Standard error model - LI C/A (with SA) [6].................................................. 17
Table 2. 3 Precise error model, dual-frequency, P(Y) code..............................................18
Table 2. 4 Confidence bounds for varying Probabilities for the three PDFs. The bounds 
are on x/cr and a - ^ i s  set................................................................................................ 30
Table 4. 1 Satellite elevation and azimuth angles, confidence bounds and projection
matrix values both for the all-in-view solution and for a solution without PRN 8 . . .  84
Table 5. I Case 1 Cat I Availability Performance comparison........................................... 119
Table 5. 2 Case 1 Un-Availability Performance comparison............................................. 120
Table 5. 3 Case 1 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison..................... 121
Table 5. 4 Case 1 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
 122
Table 5. 5 Case 2 Cat I Availability Performance comparison........................................... 123
Table 5. 6 Case 2 Un-Availability Performance comparison.............................................124
Table 5. 7 Case 2 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison..................... 125
Table 5. 8 Case 2 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
 126
Table 5. 9 Case 3 Cat I Availability Performance comparison........................................... 127
Table 5.10 Case 3 Un-Availability Performance comparison...........................................128
Table 5.11 Case 3 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison...................129
Table 5. 12 Case 3 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
................................................................................................................................................ 130
Table 5.13 Case 4 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.........................................131
Table 5.14  Case 4 Un-Availability Performance comparison...........................................132
Table 5. 15 Case 4 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison...................133
Table 5. 16 Case 4 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
................................................................................................................................................134
Table 5.17 Case 5 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.........................................135
Table 5. 18 Case 5 Un-Availability Performance comparison...........................................136
Table 5.19 Case 5 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison...................137
Table 5. 20 Case 5 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
................................................................................................................................................ 138
Table 5. 21 Case 6 Cat I Availability Performance comparison......................................... 139
Table 5. 22 Case 6 Un-Availability Performance comparison...........................................140
Table 5. 23 Case 6 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison...................141
V lll
Table 5. 24 Case 6 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
................................................................................................................................................142
Table 5. 25 Case 7 Cat I Availability Performance comparison........................................143
Table 5. 26 Case 7 Un-Availability Performance comparison.......................................... 144
Table 5. 27 Case 7 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison...................145
Table 5. 28 Case 7 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
................................................................................................................... 146
Table 5. 29 Case 8 Cat I Availability Performance comparison........................................147
Table 5. 30 Case 8 Un-Availability Performance comparison.......................................... 148
Table 5. 31 Case 8 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison...................149
Table 5. 32 Case 8 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
................................................................................................................................................ 150
Table 5. 33 Case 9 Cat I Availability Performance comparison........................................151
Table 5. 34 Case 9 Un-Availability Performance comparison...........................................152
Table 5. 35 Case 9 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison...................153
Table 5. 36 Case 9 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
................................................................................................................................................154
Table 5. 37 Case 10 Cat I Availability Performance comparison..................................... 155
Table 5. 38 Case 10 Un-Availability Performance comparison........................................ 156
Table 5. 39 Case 10 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison................ 157
Table 5. 40 Case 10 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance
comparison........................................................................................................................... 158
Table 1- 1 Case 1 Cat I Availability Performance comparison for 11/27/2000 Data.... 171 
Table 1- 2 Case 1 Un-Availability Performance comparison for 11/27/2000 Data 172
Table 2- 1 Case 2 Cat I Availability Performance comparison for 03/14/2003 Data.... 172 
Table 2- 2 Case 2 Un-Availability Performance comparison for 03/14/2003 Data 172
IX
List of Illustrations
Figure 2. 1 Standard GPS Triangulation [9]...............................................................................9
Figure 2. 2 Error Sources [9].......................................................................................................12
Figure 2. 3 LAAS Anatomy [9]................................................................................................. 20
Figure 2. 4 WAAS System Overview [18]...............................................................................21
Figure 2. 5 (a) i th element o f Observing Matrix G . (b) Pseudorange measurement
equation.................................................................................................................................. 25
Figure 2. 6 Three PDFs plotted as functions of x /cr..............................................................30
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3.
WAAS performance classification, vertical part [27]........................................40
WAAS performance classification, horizontal part [27]................................... 41
.48
50
51
52
53
54
55 
,56 
,56 
,57
WAAS performance on 12/01/99........
WAAS performance on 04/28/00........
WAAS performance on 11/27/00........
WAAS performance on 05/01/01........
WAAS performance on 11/12/01........
8 WAAS performance on 05/02/02........
9 WAAS performance on 10/12/02........
10 WAAS performance o n l0/28/02.......
11 WAAS performance on 03/14/03......
12 WAAS performance on 05/29/03......
13 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 12/01/99................................ 60
14 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 04/28/00................................ 60
15 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 11/27/00................................ 61
16 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 05/01/01................................ 61
17 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 11/12/01................................ 62
18 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 05/02/02................................ 63
19 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 10/12/02................................ 63
20 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 10/28/02................................ 64
21 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 03/14/03................................ 64
22 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 05/29/03................................ 65
23 12/01/99 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l)..........................................................66
24 04/28/00 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l)..........................................................67
25 11/27/00 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l)..........................................................67
26 05/01/01 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l)..........................................................68
27 11/12/01 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l)..........................................................68
28 05/02/02 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l)..........................................................69
29 10/12/02 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l)..........................................................69
30 10/28/02 Log(VPE+l) vs.....Log(VPL+l)..........................................................70
31 03/14/03 Log(VPE+l) vs.....Log(VPL+l)..........................................................70
32 05/29/03 Log(VPE+l) vs.....Log(VPL+l)..........................................................71
Figure 4. 1 (12/01/99) NonLinearity{VPL-VPE) =7.43221...................................................... 79
Figure 4. 2 (12/01/99) NonLinearity{LVPL- L V P E )^  0 . 2 1 1 4 1 .................................................. 80
Figure 4. 3 (11/27/00) N onLinearity(yPL~VPE)=  9.00821........................................................80
Figure 4. 4 (11/27/00) NonLinearity{LVPL -  LVPE) = 0.30773.................................................. 81
Figure 4. 5 NonLinearity(VPL-VPE)=  0.46412.......................................................................... 81
Figure 4. 6 (05/01/01) NonLinearity{LVPL-LVPE)=0.2%7>92................................................. 82
Figure 4. 7 Satellite elevation and azimuth values for a standard skyplot. PRN 8 is a low 
elevation satellite that if not included in the solution dramatically changes the
influence o f PRN 6............................................................................................................... 85
Figure 4. 8 The triangle plot for all-in-view solutions including one biased satellite in 
each is shown. Here each bias is de-weighted by the other satellites. No obvious
problems are evident in this chart [32].............................................................................. 88
Figure 4. 9 The triangle plot for the subset solutions that expose each biased satellite is 
shown. Here the biases are exposed as being hazardous for the user. This 
demonstrates the importance o f checking each subset or in the range domain [32]. 88 
Figure 4. 10 Kalman filter block diagram................................................................................ 93
Figure 5. 1 Case 1: 12/01/1999: Before and after filtering..........................................107
Figure 5. 2 Case 2: 04/28/2000: Before and after filtering...................................................108
Figure 5. 3 Case 3: 11/27/2000: Before and after filtering...................................................109
Figure 5. 4 Case 4: 05/01/2001 : Before and after the filtering............................................ 110
Figure 5. 5 Case 5: 11/12/2001 : Before and after filtering................................................... I l l
Figure 5. 6 Case 6: 05/02/2002: Before and after filtering........................................112
Figure 5. 7 Case 7: 10/12/2002: Before and after filtering...................................................113
Figure 5. 8 Case 8: 10/28/2002: Before and after filtering........................................114
Figure 5. 9 Case 9: 03/14/2003: Before and after filtering..........................................115
Figure 5 .1 0  Case 10: 05/29/2003: Before and after filtering............................................... 116
Figure 5 .11  Case 1 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 119
Figure 5. 12 Case 1 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
 120
Figure 5 .1 3  Case 1 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.............................................................................................................................121
Figure 5. 14 Case 1 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red)
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 122
Figure 5 .1 5  Case 2 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 123 
Figure 5. 16 Case 2 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
......................................................................................................................................................124
Figure 5 .1 7  Case 2 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing............................................................................................................................. 125
Figure 5 .18  Case 2 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red)
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 126
Figure 5. 19 Case 3 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 127 
Figure 5. 20 Case 3 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 
 128
XI
Figure 5. 21 Case 3 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.............................................................................................................................129
Figure 5. 22 Case 3 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red)
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 130
Figure 5. 23 Case 4 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 131 
Figure 5. 24 Case 4 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
................................................................................................................................................132
Figure 5. 25 Case 4 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.............................................................................................................................133
Figure 5. 26 Case 4 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red)
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 134
Figure 5. 27 Case 5 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 135 
Figure 5. 28 Case 5 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
................................................................................................................................................ 136
Figure 5. 29 Case 5 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.............................................................................................................................137
Figure 5. 30 Case 5 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red)
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 138
Figure 5.31 Case 6 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 139 
Figure 5. 32 Case 6 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
................................................................................................................................................140
Figure 5. 33 Case 6 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing............................................................................................................................. 141
Figure 5. 34 Case 6 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red)
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 142
Figure 5. 35 Case 7 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 143 
Figure 5. 36 Case 7 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
................................................................................................................................................ 144
Figure 5. 37 Case 7 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.............................................................................................................................145
Figure 5. 38 Case 7 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red)
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 146
Figure 5. 39 Case 8 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 147 
Figure 5. 40 Case 8 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
................................................................................................................................................148
Figure 5.41 Case 8 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.............................................................................................................................149
Figure 5. 42 Case 8 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red)
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 150
Figure 5. 43 Case 9 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing. 151 
Figure 5. 44 Case 9 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
................................................................................................................................................ 152
Figure 5. 45 Case 9 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.............................................................................................................................153
Figure 5. 46 Case 9 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) 
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 154
X ll
Figure 5. 47 Case 10 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
................................................................................................................................................155
Figure 5. 48 Case 10 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
................................................................................................................................................156
Figure 5. 49 Case 10 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after
(green) processing............................................................................................................... 157
Figure 5. 50 Case 10 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) 
and after (green) processing.............................................................................................. 158
Figure 1 WAAS performance classification, vertical part [4]........................................ 166
Figure 2 11/27/2000 WAAS performance.......................................................................... 166
Figure 3 03/14/03 WAAS performance............................................................................. 166
Figure 4 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 11/27/00................................  166
Figure 5 11/27/00 LVPE vs. LVPL.....................................................................................167
Figure 6 03/14/03 LVPE vs. LVPL.....................................................................................167
Figure 7 (11/27/00) Nonlinearity of (VPL -  V PE):..........................................................168
Figure 8 (11/27/00) Nonlinearity o f (LVPL -  LVPE ) : ................................................... 169
Figure 9 Kalman filtering recursion..................................................................................... 170
Figure 10 11/27/2000: Before and after the filtering...........................................................171
Figure 11 03/14/2003: Before and after the filtering.......................................................... 172
X lll
Abstract
From its initial conception to deployment, the Wide Area Augmentation System 
(WAAS) was hailed as revolutionary for the navigation industry. However, the WAAS 
deployment effort has suffered significant delays and budget overruns. The reason for 
these misfortunes lies in the demanding mandates on the performance o f the WAAS 
system. The critical performance metrics for WAAS include accuracy, integrity, 
availability and continuity. In the long process o f getting WAAS commissioned, 
availability has always been the metric that holds the system back from achieving the 
promised capability. To date WAAS performs well, but not well enough to meet its 
original objectives. The inherent tradeoff between integrity and availability is the major 
reason that the VPL and HPL algorithms need to be improved.
The integrity algorithms are well defined in the WAAS Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards (MOPS). However, our experimental data clearly indicate that the 
MOPS VPL and HPL algorithms are over-conservative, at least from a practical point of 
view. As a result, the confidence bounds are sufficiently large to cover the correction 
error and hence to some extent guarantee the integrity. However, this lack of 
compactness from the MOPS introduces urmecessary epochs o f the system being 
unavailable. To improve the system performance, the intuitive approach is through the 
range/correction domain since these factors can be observed, controlled and manipulated 
to improve the system performance in individual cases. However, we need a better error 
model and better understanding o f the threat model, i.e. we need to know more about the 
nature o f all error sources and the threats the WAAS faces, which is very difficult to
XIV
accomplish due to the stochastic natures o f these sources. Therefore, it is unlikely that a 
range/correction domain solution can be applied to a wide range o f applications while 
having significant improvement for the system performance. Besides, it is still subject to 
the hindrance that the WAAS message structure might need to be changed or adjusted to 
take advantage o f the new development.
In this dissertation, a new position domain algorithm is presented to improve the 
MOPS integrity methodology in hopes of improving the overall system performance. The 
information needed to do this is already in the WAAS messages. Therefore, this new 
algorithm will not require any change o f the existing correction messaging.
The new VPL and HPL measure developed in this dissertation is based on the 
MOPS algorithms and improves upon them. The new VPL and HPL algorithms are 
developed by taking advantage of the WAAS correction error’s stochastic characteristics 
and Kalman filtering. The algorithm has been tested using real static and dynamic data 
collected by our Enhanced Miniature Advanced GPS Receiver (EMAGR) used in 
conjunction with the OU flight test program. This methodology shows significant 
improvement over the standardized MOPS algorithms. It improves the system availability 
and continuity without penalizing integrity.
XV
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 GPS based navigation system
The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) is a very attractive solution for various 
stages of air flight. One o f the major setbacks for the WAAS project has been a lack of 
system availability suitable for aviation use. This dissertation will demonstrate this is 
mostly due to the fact that the WAAS Protection Level (PL) algorithm is unnecessarily 
over-conservative. This dissertation will present the results of research done on the 
nature o f this problem, a new algorithm for PL will be presented, and its promises of 
improved system performance, including integrity and availability will be shown. This 
will help promote the use of WAAS as a landing aid by improving the WAAS SIS 
performance significantly. The new PL algorithm takes advantage o f the intrinsic 
looseness o f the current VPL and HPL algorithm and uses Kalman filtering to reduce the 
false alarm rate o f the PL. Linearization transformation was used to better model the PL.
Landing has always being the most challenging stage o f commercial flight. 
Weather often prevents timely and safe landing, which is the foremost reason for 
common airline delays. Any means to improve this would improve airport efficiency and 
airline quality o f service. To achieve these improvements, a Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) was developed. The backbone of GNSS is the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) in the United States. Since GPS was first commissioned, improvements 
have been researched to make the system more accurate and safer. Differential GPS
systems are the main projects that have offered the possibility o f benefiting most users. 
O f possible candidates, the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) and the Wide 
Area Augmentation System (WAAS) are the options best suited for takeoffs and 
landings [1]. This report o f research will study WAAS as the choice for Category I 
aircraft landing.
WAAS is a GPS based navigation system developed and being tested in the 
United States by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). WAAS provides correction 
signals to aviation users equipped with a WAAS-capable GPS receiver. The correction 
signal improves the positioning solution by supplying more accurate GPS clock, satellite 
ephemeris, and delay times for the GPS in its correction signal as it passes through the 
ionosphere and troposphere. These corrections are broadcast for use by virtually all users 
with WAAS capability in North America via geostationary satellites. A master station 
and a network o f monitoring ground stations are needed to collect information, generate 
these correction messages and upload them to the geo-synchronized WAAS satellite. 
WAAS provides improvements in four metrics over standard GPS: accuracy, integrity, 
availability and continuity [2].
In the FAA’s Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for phase I 
WAAS, it was required that WAAS provide an aviation signal with sufficient accuracy, 
integrity, availability and continuity to safely guide category I landing through instrument 
aid. The specific accuracy requirement was for a vertical error o f less than 12 meters and 
a horizontal error o f less than 30 meters. In addition, the system integrity requirement 
specified that the probability of errors in the GPS solution falling below the Vertical 
Protection Limit ( VPL ) and the Horizontal Protection Limit {HPL ) must be more than
99.99999% (in other words the rate o f occurrence o f hazardously misleading information 
must be less than 10”’ every approach), while the availability requirement specified that 
the system must be available at least 99.9% of the time [3].
While these numbers seems unreachably stringent, the concepts will later be 
clarified, and these numbers will be shown to be based on a stochastic process instead of 
averaging o f real collected data. The definition will be used to show the result o f the new 
algorithm developed as a result o f the dissertation effort on the system availability and 
integrity.
One interesting point that needs to be stressed is that the Selective Availability 
(SA) has been disabled per presidential order on May 2"‘*, 2000 [4]. However, in this 
research SA is treated as if  it is still a factor. This is for two reasons:
1. Although the SA has been turned off, there is still chance that the SA could be 
turned back on in the future if  national security considerations motivate this 
action.
2. A substantial amount o f the data collected and analyzed in the proposed 
research was acquired prior to the SA being turned off. This put us in a great 
position to study how the SA contributes to the total error o f WAAS system.
In Section 4.1 some primary results on integrity and availability will be shown. 
What the system can achieve in a static configuration will be calculated and compared to 
the requirements from the MOPS. Suggestions will be made to improve the performance 
o f the system.
The research presented here is based on the recognition that high quality error, 
integrity, and availability models are crucial factors that will determine the success of 
differential GPS as a viable aircraft instrument landing system.
An accepted integrity model has been previously developed [3], [5]. Evaluating 
its performance is one o f the research tasks addressed in this dissertation. Availability 
modeling is less mature, depends on environmental conditions, and doesn’t seem to have 
a clear pattern from which to draw conclusions. However, it is informative to study 
integrity and availability together in order to gain useful insights into the expected 
performance o f differential GPS landing systems. Continuity is o f relatively less concern. 
This is due to the fact that a differential GPS system can only coast for a limited period of 
time when signal integrity is absent in hope o f quick recovery when signal integrity 
returns. Any long lasting absence o f a “good” signal will result in a flag o f “NOT TO 
USE” being issued. Therefore, continuity doesn’t concern us as much as integrity and 
availability. However, eontinuity is an important parameter indicating how well the 
differential GPS system is performing.
One o f the major setbacks for the WAAS project has been a lack o f system 
availability suitable for aviation use. This dissertation will demonstrate that most o f this 
is due to the WAAS Protection Level (PL) algorithm being unnecessarily over­
conservative. This dissertation will present the results o f research done on the nature of 
this problem. A new algorithm for PL will be presented and its promises for improved 
system performance, including integrity and availability, will be shown.
1.2 The outline of this thesis and original Contributions
In this dissertation a number o f issues about the position domain solution to the 
WAAS SIS availability are addressed. Among them the following contributions are 
original and significant:
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background for the GPS and WAAS error 
performance analysis. It builds the foundation for the later chapters.
In Chapter 3, real WAAS data collected through the lifetime o f WAAS is 
analyzed and the results show that WAAS SIS has consistent problem o f  not reaching 
the required availability performance criteria. The conclusion that the VPL algorithm 
has a problem with over-conservative nature is established. By observing VPL -  VPE 
performance over GPS time, I conclude that a new metric about VPL and VPE needs to 
be devised. Then in 3.6 the new and better L VPL andL  VPE are devised and the 
transformations between VPL and LVPL, VPE and LVPE are proposed and defined. 
Preliminary analysis and observation indicate that the new LVPL and LVPE are better 
metrics to study the WAAS performance.
Chapter 4 establishes the new WAAS integrity-availability algorithm. The 
multiplicative modeling o f  the VPL is justified. Le. the superior linearity o f  the LVPL- 
LVPE is verified. The VPE false alert situations are disctissed and an approach to solve 
them is proposed. In Section 4.4, the Kalman filter is introduced and applied to the 
WAAS integrity and availability modeling. The LVPL is modeled as a one-dimensional 
tracking problem and the a -  f i Kalman filter is applied to it. Fault prevention and error 
correcton in the VPL algorithm are discussed. Then, in 4.6, fault proofing o f the VPE is 
discussed. Without leaving the position-domain solution, a simple lowpass filter is 
recommended for fault proofing.
In Chapter 5 the results of the pseudo- VPL algorithm are studied. The conclusion 
that emerges is that the new algorithm developed in this dissertation tightens up the 
VPL in a desirable way by removing unnecessary over-conservatism in the previously 
existing algorithm. In ordinary cases the pseudo-VPL reduces the VPL magnitude by 
3dB. This helps tremendously to increase the system availability.
This pseudo- VPL algorithm has different effects on the system integrity. For 
good WAAS data it improves the availability without harming the integrity. For lower 
quality data sets the effects vary. The performance o f  the pseudo-VPL algorithm 
depends on the data type to which it is applied. But fo r  ordinary WAAS data it achieves 
the research goal. Le. it significantly improves the system availability and continuity 
without penalizing the system integrity.
Chapter 6 discusses the future research possibilities on this topic and some 
candidate approaches are proposed.
Chapter 2 
Background on GPS and Differential GPS (DGPS)
The ordinary GPS system was developed by the Department o f Defense and has 
gradually become a civil-military dual use system. The objective o f the GPS system is to 
provide an omnipresent positioning mechanism for those who need accurate positioning. 
One of the most important applications o f GPS is aviation. Unfortunately, aviation 
requires more precise positioning information than many other GPS applications such as 
consumer automobile navigation and route selection. For example, in an automotive 
navigation service, performance is acceptable as long as the right moving map shows up 
and vehicle position is determined within a reasonable time and error bound, usually in 
tens of meters. By contrast, aviation applications depend on the system working in almost 
real time when the aviator needs it. Moreover, the error has to be very small so that the 
plane doesn’t crash or fail to find the airport.
The accuracy o f standard GPS alone is not sufficient to guarantee successful 
landings for category I approaches. When one talks about accuracy, it must be 
remembered that there is always a stochastic element present because this positioning 
operation is such a complex procedure with all elements involved considered. Before SA 
was turned off, the range of vertical accuracy was only about 100 meters with a 
probability o f 95%, which means that for no less than 95% of the time users could expect 
a range error o f less than 100 meters. After the SA was off, the vertical accuracy 
improved to within 10 meters, which is comparable to that o f WAAS [6]. Despite this 
fact, WAAS rather than standard GPS is still preferred for takeoff and landing navigation
because WAAS generally provides better position estimates and also provides continuous 
monitoring o f the signal quality, thereby providing integrity and availability o f the 
aviation system as well as the position information.
In the following sections, I will briefly introduce the basic concepts o f GPS and 
differential GPS systems, with the emphasis being placed on WAAS.
2.1 How GPS works
GPS is a Satellite Navigation System, funded by and controlled by the U.S. 
Department o f Defense (D.O.D). The system is made up o f 27 space-home satellites 
(Space Vehicles, or SVs) that orbit the earth in 12 hours and a number o f ground stations 
that monitor the SVs. While there are thousands o f civil users o f GPS worldwide, the 
system was designed for and is operated by the United States D.O.D. [7].
GPS provides specially coded satellite signals that can be processed in a GPS 
receiver, enabling the receiver to compute its position, velocity and the time. Signals 
from at least four GPS satellites are used to compute positions in three dimensions as 
well as the time offset in the receiver clock.
Essentially GPS uses the known positions o f the satellites to locate the precise 
position o f the working GPS receiver. Following is a step-by-step description of how 
GPS works:
1. To use the satellites as the reference, one needs to know exactly where the satellites 
are in space. Relative high orbits and careful monitoring of the satellites provides the 
solution. Orbits are high and hence are not affected significantly by lower atmosphere 
and earth bound phenomena. The orbits are well modeled and can be predetermined 
to a close degree o f approximation [8], with the master station monitoring and
controlling the orbits. User receivers get clock, ephemeris and almanac information 
through decoding pseudocode broadcast of the SVs.
From perspective o f one satellite (b) From perspective o f two satellites
(c) Triangulation
5 seconds 
(wrong time)
7 seconds
(wrong time)3®
(d) Uncertainty
Figure 2.1 Standard GPS Triangulation [9j.
A GPS receiver measures distance using the travel time of radio signals. The signals 
transmitted from the satellites are pseudo-noise codes that are unique to the GPS 
system. The receivers are able to pick these signals out o f the background noise and 
calculate the travel time by measuring the phase shift o f the carrier o f the pseudo­
noise codes between when they are sent and when they are received. Note that the 
clock error o f the receiver is included in this step, and thus the range estimate o f this 
measurement is called pseudorange. Now the positioning process is equivalent to
solving a system o f three equations for longitude, latitude and altitude. The three 
equations are determined by measuring the distances from three different satellites to 
the receiver. Fig. 2.1(a) to Fig. 2.1(c) demonstrates the process by which the position 
of the user is determined.
Travel time o f the GPS signal from one specific satellite is illustrated in Fig. 
2.1(a). The distance between the receiver in space and this specific GPS satellite is 
determined as the product o f the speed of light and the travel time o f the GPS signal. 
One can be sure that the receiver is located somewhere on the surface o f a sphere 
centered at the GPS satellite and with a radius equal to the distance that the signal 
traversed (Fig. 2.1(a)). Once the distances to two satellites have been determined, 
then the position is known to be somewhere on the circle that forms the intersection 
of the two corresponding spheres. This is shown in Fig. 2.1(b). Once the distance to a 
third satellite is also determined, the locus of the possible solutions for the position is 
reduced to just two points, as shown in Fig. 2.1(c). This process is called 
“Triangulation”. The question o f which one o f those two points is the correct solution 
can be answered easily. Usually one solution is so absurd that it is negative or 
thousands o f miles away from the expected position, and thus is excluded.
3. In step 2, the clock error o f the receiver was introduced into the pseudorange.
Satellites keep precise timing by using ultra-accurate atomic clocks, which cost a few 
hundred thousand dollars each. Individual receivers would not be able to afford such 
clocks. To precisely measure travel time, GPS needs very accurate timing, which it 
achieves by incorporating a fourth satellite to generate precise timing. By using four 
satellites the original problem of three equations in three unknowns is transformed
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into a system o f four equations in four unknowns, where the receiver clock error is 
the fourth unknown. Therefore, an atomic clock is not needed in the user receiver. 
Only a fourth visible satellite is needed, whose atomic clock can be utilized.
4. Finally, any delays the radio signals experience as they travel through the atmosphere 
must be corrected for. By studying these signals, the errors may be reduced to 
acceptable magnitude. Fig. 2.1(d) shows how the actual position o f the receiver is 
blurred by the uncertainty o f the of travel delays of the satellite signals. The nature of 
these delays is o f interest since it can provide insight to reduce delay and hence 
improve the GPS performance. The following section gives an overview o f the major 
contributing sources o f the GPS errors.
2.2 GPS error sources
Ranging errors are grouped into the six following classes: satellite clocks, 
selective availability, ephemeris, atmospheric delays, multipath and receiver clock errors. 
Each class is briefly discussed in the following sections. Representative values for these 
errors are shown in Table 2.1 and 2.2. Fig. 2.2 illustrates how the error sources are 
grouped into six sources according to when they occur in the process o f computing the 
GPS position solution. For civilian users, there used to be intentional errors added to 
degrade the quality o f position solution that could be obtained without using special 
military equipment. This policy of injecting intentional errors was known as Selective- 
Availability or SA. SA is limited by DOD to within 100 meters 2-D RMS [10], and is 
considered mostly a clock perturbation [11], [12]. For reasons to be stated later, the SA 
will be treated like it is still part o f the GPS signal in this dissertation. The atmospheric
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delays are divided into ionospheric and tropospheric errors since each o f these are 
modeled differently and contribute differently to the overall error o f the final GPS 
position solution.
Ephemeris errors result when the GPS message does not convey the correct 
satellite location. Kalman filtering has to be implemented in the receiver to reduce this 
error. Because satellite errors reflect a position prediction, they tend to grow with time 
from the last control station upload. It is also possible that a portion o f the deliberate SA 
error is added to the ephemeris data [11]. However, the predictions are long smooth arcs, 
so all errors in the ephemeris tend to be slow with time. Therefore, their utility in SA is 
quite limited and rarely used. The contribution of ephemeris error to the ranging error is 
believed to be within a few meters [12].
Figure 2 .2  Error Sources [9].
Satellite clock—Errors in the transmitted clock, including SA, are fundamental 
since GPS is a one-way ranging that ultimately depends on satellite clock predictability.
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Satellite cloek errors affect both civilian C/A and military P-code users in the same way. 
This effect is also independent o f satellite direction, which is important when the 
technique o f differential corrections is used. All differential stations and users measure an 
identical satellite clock error. A major source o f apparent clock error is SA, which is 
varied so as to be unpredictable over periods longer than about 10 minutes [10]-[12]. The 
root mean square value o f SA is typically about 20 meters. More interesting is the 
underlying accuracy o f the system with SA off. The ability to predict clock behavior is a 
measure o f cloek quality. GPS uses atomic clocks (cesium and rubidium oscillators), 
which have stabilities o f about 1 part in 10'^ over a day. If  a clock can be predicted to this 
accuracy, its error in a day (-10^ seconds) will be about 10"* seconds or about 3.5 m [6].
Errors in the corrections o f pseudorange caused by ionospheric effects are another 
source o f position error. Because o f free electrons in the ionosphere, GPS signals do not 
travel at the vacuum speed o f light as they transit to the receiver. The modulation on the 
signal is delayed in proportion to the number o f free electrons encountered and is also (to 
first order) proportional to the inverse of the carrier frequency squared ( 1 / /  ^  ). The phase 
o f the radio frequency carrier is advanced by the same amount because o f these effects. 
Carrier-smoothed receivers take this into account in the design o f their filters [13], [14]. 
The ionosphere is usually reasonably well behaved and stable in the temperate zones; 
however, near the equator or magnetic poles it can fluctuate considerably. As will be later 
shown, the differential GPS is a very good solution to reduce this error factor.
All users correet the raw pseudoranges for the ionospheric delay. The simplest 
correction is the use o f an internal diurnal model o f these delays. The parameters can be 
updated using information in the GPS communications message. The effective accuracy
13
of this modeling is about two to five meters for users in the temperate zones. A second 
technique is the use o f dual-frequency P-code receivers to measure the signal at both 
frequencies and directly solve for the delay. The difference between the LI frequency 
band and the L2 frequency band arrival times allows a direct algebraic solution o f the 
delay. This dual-frequency technique provides one to two meters accuracy, due to the 
ionosphere, for a well-calibrated receiver [15]. Although this P-code is usually only 
available to military users, since this technique only requires carrier measuring, some 
civil user also have utilized this dual carrier method.
A third technique is to rely on a near real-time update. An example would be the 
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). This should produce corrections with 
accuracies o f one to two meters or better in the temperate zones o f the world. This is the 
subject o f this research.
Errors in the correction of the raw pseudoranges are also caused by tropospheric 
effects. Deviation from the vacuum speed of light in the troposphere causes these effects. 
Variations in temperature, pressure, and humidity all contribute to variations in the 
propagation speed o f radio waves [14]. Both the code and carrier will have the same 
delays. For most users and circumstances, a simple model is accurate to about 1 meter or 
better [15].
Multipath—Errors caused by reflected signals entering the receiver antenna is the 
most prominent form o f surface error. Multipath is the error caused by reflected signals 
entering the front end o f the receiver and masking a real correlation peak. These effects 
tend to be more pronounced in a static receiver near large reflecting surfaces, where 15 m 
of error can be found in some extreme cases [16]. The first line o f defense against
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multipath is the use o f antenna cut-off angle and antenna location that minimizes this 
problem. A second approach is to use a "narrow correlator” receiver which tends to 
minimize the impact o f multipath on range tracking accuracies. With proper antenna 
selection and positioning, the net impact to a moving user should be less than 1 m under 
most circumstances.
Errors in the receiver's measurement o f range caused by thermal noise, software 
accuracy, and interchannel biases represent additional sources o f position error.
Initially most GPS commercial receivers were sequential in that one or two 
tracking channels shared the burden o f locking on to four or more satellites. With 
advances in modem chip technology, it is common today to place three or more tracking 
channels on a single inexpensive chip. As the size and cost have diminished, techniques 
have improved and five- or six-channel receivers are becoming common. Most modem 
receivers use a reconstmcted carrier to aid the code tracking loops. This produces a 
precision o f better than 0.3 m. Interchannel bias is minimized with digital sampling in all- 
digital designs. Table 2.1 - 2.3 have been generated from actual measurements made by 
NOAA [6]. The error sources have been broken down into the six classes enumerated 
above. These three tables describe how each error source contributes to the total error. In 
this dissertation, it was assumed that all the error sources are independent o f one another. 
Therefore, the total error is the mean square root o f the contributing factors.
Table 2.1 assumes that SA is not operating. Consequently, the residual satellite 
clock error, at 2.1 m, is not the dominant error; in fact, the largest error is expected to be 
the mismodeling o f the ionosphere, at 4.0 m. Thus, the worldwide civilian positioning 
error for GPS is potentially about 10 m (horizontal), as shown in Table 1.1. The data in
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Table 2.1 - 2.3 are from actual measurements. The bias and random components are 
analogous to the AC and DC components of common electrical signals and are assumed 
to be statistically orthogonal to each other, which is reasonable since their sources are 
independent to one another. Therefore, the expected total error is the mean square root of 
the bias and random components. DGPS represents the differential GPS data under the 
same circumstance. Similarly, different contributions o f these components are considered 
independent and thus the User Equivalent Range Error (UERE) is the mean square root of 
the contributions. The filtered UERE is a smoothed version of the UERE [6]. The 
Vertical Dilution O f Precision (VDOP) and Horizontal Dilution O f Precision (HDOP) are 
the vertical and horizontal components for Geometric
Table 2.1 Standard error model - LI C/A (no SA) [6]
One-sigma error, m
Error source Bias Random Total DGPS
Ephemeris data 2 .1 0.0 2 .1 0.0
Satellite clock 2.0 0.7 2.1 0.0
Ionosphere 4 . 0 0.5 4 . 0 0.4
Troposphere 0 . 5 0.5 0.7 0.2
Multipath 1.0 1.0 1. 4 1.4
Receiver measurement 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.5
User equivalent range
error (UERE), rms 5.1 1.4 5.3 1.6
Filtered UERE, rms 5.1 0.4 5.1 1.5
Vertical one-sigma errors--VDOP= 2.5 12.8 3.9
Horizontal one-sigma errors--HDOP= 2.0 10.2 3.1
Dilution O f Precision (GDOP), a quantity that describes the quality o f the visible satellite 
constellation from the receiver. GDOP is computed from the geometric relationships 
between the receiver position and the positions o f the visible satellites that the receiver is
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using for navigation. GDOP is often computed from almanacs and an estimated receiver 
position. Estimated GDOP does not take into account obstacles that block the line-of- 
sight from the position to the satellites. The products of the Filtered UERE and VDOP 
and HDOP represent the total estimated vertical and horizontal error.
Table 2 .2  Standard error model - LI C/A (with SA) [6]
One-sigma error, m
Error source Bias Random Total DGPS
Ephemeris data 2 .1 0.0 2.1 0.0
Satellite clock (dither) 2 0 . 0 0.7 20.0 0.0
Ionosphere 4.0 0.5 4.0 0.4
Troposphere 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.2
Multipath 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4
Receiver measurement 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.5
User equivalent range
error (UERE), rms 2 0 . 5 1.4 2 0 . 6 1.6
Filtered UERE, rms 2 0 . 5 0.4 2 0 . 5 1.5
Vertical one-sigma errors --- VDOP:= 2.5 51.4 3.9
Horizontal one-sigma errors— HDOP= 2.0 41.1 3.1
A second example shows the impact o f SA on these errors. Because the 
deliberately mismodeled clock so dominates the ranging error, all other effects can be 
safely ignored in the error budget. The results o f Table 2.2 have been repeatedly 
corroborated by actual measurements. Note that SA is listed as a bias because it cannot be 
averaged to zero with a one second (or less) filter. Selective Availability (SA) is expected 
to be zero mean, but only when averaged over many hours or perhaps days. O f course, 
such averaging is not practical for a dynamic user who only sees the satellite for a portion 
o f the orbit. If  differential corrections are used, they will eliminate the SA error entirely 
(if corrections are passed to the navigation receivers at a sufficiently high data rate).
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Table 2.3 Precise error model, dual-frequency, P(Y) code
Error source Bias
One-sigma
Random
error, m
Total DGPS
Ephemeris data 2 .1 0.0 2.1 0.0
Satellite clock 2.0 0.7 2.1 0.0
Ionosphere 1. 0 0.5 1.2 0.1
Troposphere 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.1
Multipath 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4
Receiver measurement 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.5
User equivalent range
error (UERE), rms 3.3 1. 5 3.6 1.5
Filtered UERE, rms 3.3 0.4 3.3 1.4
Vertical one-sigma errors--VDOP= 2.5 8.3 3.7
Horizontal one-sigma errors--HDOP= 2.0 6.6 3.0
The errors for dual-frequency PN code are similar to those already presented 
except that SA errors are eliminated because the authorized user can decode the nature of 
the induced error as part o f a classified message. The expected horizontal error is less 
than 10 m. The ionosphere error is reduced to a 1-m bias and about 0.7 m o f noise by the 
dual-frequency measurement. The dominant error sources are the satellite ephemeris and 
clock errors. This is illustrated in Table 2.3.
From this discussion, it is seen that standard GPS is subject to many error sources, 
and DGPS is able to improve on the error performance. All data presented here is from a 
NOAA source o f measurements taken at one o f the Continuously Operating Reference 
Stations (CORS) operated by the NCAD Corp. at Erlanger, Kentucky. On May 2, 2000, 
SA was set to zero [4]. The measurements show that SA causes 95% of the points to fall 
within a radius o f 45.0 meters. Without SA, 95% of the points fall within a radius o f 6.3 
meters [6].
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As an illustration, consider a football stadium. With SA on, you only know if  you 
are on the field or in the stands at that football stadium; with SA switched off, you know 
around which yard marker you are standing on.
Even though standard non-SA GPS alone can be quite accurate, there are inherent 
problems with it. The error can vary over a wide range. Standard GPS doesn’t have the 
capability o f continuous monitoring o f the signal quality. This can result in considerable 
danger to the aviation user in the rare case that hazardously misleading information is 
provided by the system without warning the user. This could lead to serious misfortune. 
Therefore, differential GPS was introduced.
2.3 Differential GPS (DGPS)
Although GPS generally provides good resolution (since the removal o f SA), 
standard GPS suffers from at least one limitation: it provides no performance guarantee, 
and hence no protection against transient losses in accuracy that could prove catastrophic 
in aviation applications. It would have been prohibitively expensive to resolve this 
limitation by starting over from scratch with a new system. Instead, differential GPS 
(DGPS) was developed to address the problem.
What DGPS does is establish well-surveyed positions as reference stations that 
are able to receive a GPS signal and to transmit a correction signal. Within a reasonable 
range o f distance from a given reference station, the corrections are almost constant and 
this is the basis o f differential GPS.
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2.3.1 LAAS
<5y>J
Error correction message
Figure 2. 3 LAAS Anatomy [9].
When the reference station for a DGPS applicationis established in a local area, it 
is called LAAS (Local Area Augmentation System). Fig. 2.3 illustrates how the local 
DGPS is implemented. The reference station receives standard GPS signals and 
calculates the correction, then broadcasts it. LAAS users receive both standard GPS 
signals from GPS satellites and the correction signal from a reference station. By 
combining results from the decoded standard GPS signals with the correction signal from 
a reference station, the user receivers obtain an improved position solution. LAAS is 
capable o f providing accurate corrections to users at ranges o f up to a few tens of miles 
from the reference station. On top of that, LAAS provides the signal integrity monitoring 
capability. Therefore, a pilot within the valid area using the LAAS signal will be able to 
tell how good the signal quality is and to what degree the error o f positioning solution is
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bounded [17]. However, LAAS only covers an area with a radius o f about 25 to 50 miles 
with reasonable accuracy. Beyond that, the accuracy can no longer be guaranteed. Thus, 
if  highly accurate positioning is needed in an area that is not within 25 to 50 miles radius 
o f an existing LAAS reference station, then one must be constructed and maintained. 
This effort can cost a few hundred thousand dollars.
2.3.2 WAAS
T h o  W . ' \ A S  If .  h . '- . r - d  r ,n  n r F . - v v n ik  . i p p r o »  i i r . - r n i y  ?f: i n t r '-T ' i m  F . t . i r io - i
U l ü t  L U V - L T ' . -  J  V t j r - y  k l l  y c  v i c e  L U C U .  y  I K 1 1 U  I  L .  f ' O r - l  I c I l l l C l -  V C  C C C  V ' C ' j
w i d e  ü r c ü  q r o . - i f i l .  r c ^ u r c - r r c c  i l u l  c r ' >  ( W H S t s ) .
Figure 2 .4  WAAS System Overview [18].
Fig. 2.4 demonstrates the overview o f the Wide Area Augmentation System 
(WAAS). To serve a wider area, for instance the continental U.S., without having to set 
up countless LAAS base stations, the FAA sponsored development o f a new 
augmentation system called the “Wide Area Augmentation System”, or WAAS, to 
improve upon LAAS system. The basic idea was the same as for LAAS, but with ‘base’
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stations that could broadcast a correction signal that would work better and cover bigger 
area. One approach for WAAS is to build a more powerful base station and put it at a 
high elevation, so that it covers a larger area. How big this area should be and how high 
the station should be put is a real engineering problem. Experience suggested that the best 
solution would be the use o f a Geo-Synchronous satellite that is powerful enough to 
broadcast accurate correction signals to as many users as possible and sensitive enough to 
know its exact position. To design and launch a new special Geo-Synchronous GPS 
satellite is a complicated and expensive undertaking. The geostationary satellites provide 
correction signals over a wide area; hence they are called Wide Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS) satellites. A minimum of three WAAS satellites is required to cover the 
whole globe and achieve universal coverage. In addition to broadcasting GPS correction 
signals, these satellites are also able to broadcast the ordinary GPS pseudorange signal, 
which improves the availability o f the normal GPS system, since one o f these WAAS 
satellites will always be over at least one third o f the earth’s surface and hence can 
provide a pseudorange signal for that area.
The issues o f WAAS are more complex than those o f LAAS since Geo- 
Synchronous satellites are involved. In LAAS, the base station is built at a well-surveyed 
position on the surface of the earth, while in WAAS, the base station is located in 
geostationary orbit above the earth and it is difficult to know the spacecraft locations with 
high accuracy at all times. Any unexpected force could affect the satellite position. Other 
incidents can influence the WAAS service as well. For example, when solar spot activity 
became too active during late April 2001, the WAAS signal was occasionally lost. 
Although this represents an extreme, at any given moment solar wind, gravity o f some
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celestial body passing by or a host o f other factors can change the position o f the WAAS 
satellite and hence affect the performance o f the whole WAAS system. It is normal to see 
the WAAS satellite’s altitude varying by as much as 50 to 100 kilometers [8]. Various 
techniques have been used to model as many o f the geostationary satellite factors as 
possible [8],
WAAS provides a signal integrity monitoring capability [2]. Unlike LAAS, where 
one base station serves only the limited surrounding area, hence guaranteeing the 
integrity information validity for the served community, WAAS has to serve a huge area, 
which can vary significantly in geography, weather and ionospheric conditions [19], [5], 
To make the correction and integrity information available to receivers all around the 
continental US, the broadcasting must have all the local flavors included. The 25 ground 
stations serve as the providers of the signal integrity monitor in addition to the correction 
generator. It then is the task o f the individual WAAS receivers to take the needed 
information out of the broadcast signal to produce the positioning solution and integrity 
implementation.
All these elements, together with the standard GPS and WAAS satellite orbiting 
above, are ready to work. What still needs to be done is to determine the math behind the 
system to make sure it will function as desired. The next section describes the error 
modeling and integrity modeling for the GPS and WAAS system.
2.3 GPS measurement equations
The objective o f WAAS error modeling is to determine the Probability 
Distribution Functions (PDFs) for the position and time errors through analysis of
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pseudorange errors, which is the only data source available to users. The pseudorange has 
to be connected to the actual position in order for the user to relate the pseudorange errors 
to the actual position and time errors.
Assuming there are N satellites (or as they are usually called, Space Vehicles, or 
SVs), clearly the only thing one has a hand on is the measurement. It is not clear at this 
point how exactly the measurements will work into positioning. Neither are the stochastic 
characteristics o f the measurement and how they behave under various circumstances 
well understood. To form the reverse relation from measurement o f pseudorange errors to 
position errors, a localized reference system is established.
Usually, in GPS applications the Earth Centered Earth Fixed (ECEF) coordinate 
frame is used. But when a receiver is involved, a localized reference frame with (North, 
East and Elevation) is preferred. The “North” axis is directed from the receiver to the 
North Pole, tangent to the earth surface; the “Elevation” axis is normal to the surface of 
the earth; the “East” axis is directed to form orthogonal RHS with the “North” and 
“Elevation” axes.
Define an observing matrix G , which consists o f the unit vectors from SVs in 
view to the receiver. Fig. 2.5(a) shows the /th row o f the observing matrix G , which 
corresponds to the unit vector from the ith SV, SVi in view to the receiver. In terms of 
elevation angle E/,. and azimuth angle Am^  , the /th row of the observing matrix G is
written as:
G,. = -[cosjF/,. cosyfw,. cos Elf sin Anil sinE’/, -1 ] (2.1)
And this is the unit vector in the direction from the SVi to the receiver.
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Figure 2. 5 (a) i th element of Observing Matrix G . (b) Pseudorange measurement equation.
The true 4-dimensional position o f SVi is denoted by X ,, which is the vector from
the center o f earth to the /th SV in view, as shown in Fig. 2.5(b). X,. is known from the 
GPS ephemeris data, which specify the SV in the ECEF coordinate frame. Therefore, it 
needs to be translated into the localized coordinate frame, based on the receiver, a s x .
S  is the N-dimensional vector that tells about the position and clock state o f each 
SV in use. The elements in vector S are given by
= . (12 ) 
The measurement pseudorange ÿ , an N x 1 vector, the true 4-dimensional
position vector x (North, East, Elevation and Time), the observing matrix G , an N x 4 
matrix containing information about 4-dimensional position for each o f the SVs, and the 
N-dimensional noise term fj telling measurement error are related through the linearized 
equation
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ÿ  = S + G -x  + f] . (2.3)
Fig. 2.5(b) illustrates the mechanics of equation (2.3).
Since G depends on x , this problem is nonlinear and is complicated to solve. 
Fortunately, it is possible to do some linearization that is sufficiently accurate. One 
wishes to represent the error o f this estimate in terms o f observation error. With estimates 
for the user’s and the satellites’ positions and the time, one can generate estimates for 
G, y  and .9, denoted as G, y  and S . Then, by subtracting the estimate o f ÿ  from the 
actual measurements, assuming x , the estimate of x is sufficiently accurate such 
that G = G , one has
Ay = G-Ax + s  , (2.4)
where Ay = y - y , Ax = x - x ,  and g is the observation error including measurement, 
satellite position, and clock errors:
£ = S — S + Î] . (2.5)
Equation (2.4) defines the linear transformation o f PDFs for Ax into PDFs for A ÿ. 
However, what is needed is the inverse of this. The PDFs o f Ax need to be derived from 
the PDFs o f A ÿ. In general, the number o f measurements N exceeds 4, since the GPS 
constellation guarantees there are more than 4 SVs in view over continental US at any 
moment. Hence, the solution is over determined and optimal inversion depends on the 
PDFs o f f .
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2.3 Error Probability Density Functions (PDFs)
As previously mentioned, the PDFs for g cannot take arbitrary form if  there is to 
be even a slim hope o f solving this problem. Fortunately, past experience suggests that 
GPS measurement errors are generally well behaved [19], which means they have a 
greater likelihood of being small than o f being large. Errors can be traced from 
measurements made at the reference stations, through the various algorithms, all the way 
to the pseudorange observation. Along the way many different error sources are 
combined and averaged, biases are calibrated or estimated and removed, and outliers are 
detected and removed. The central limit theorem says that as a large number of 
independent error sources are combined, the PDF o f the resulting error tends to become 
more and more Gaussian [20]. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that the PDF for s  
is approximately Gaussian. In fact, since the master station also implements fault 
detection and exclusion algorithms, which discard overly large errors, it is quite likely 
that the tail o f the actual error distribution will be clipped. Therefore, it is likely that a 
Gaussian distribution is already over-conservative compared to the true error. An ideal 
approach is to consider distributions other than Gaussian so that the model doesn’t rely 
too heavily on the Gaussian assumption. What one desires is a model that is robust for a 
wide class o f PDFs. However, since human lives are at stake, being conservative is 
essential. In Chapter 4, an algorithm to improved performance over that based on the 
Gaussian assumption will be provided.
The approach outlined so far relies on covariance propagation, making use o f the 
central limit theorem to predict the Gaussian distribution. Another means for reducing 
errors is the threshold method [21]. This method exploits independent redundant
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measurements. I f  the measurements agree with one another to within a pre-specified 
threshold, the data is treated as if  it is accurate to a level on the same order as the 
threshold. Otherwise, it is treated as less accurate or invalid. Provided the measurements 
are independent and the occurrence o f bad data is sufficiently infrequent, this method 
should constrain the errors within an upper and lower bound.
Another error source worth investigation is that introduced by the constraint o f the 
correction data link. The master station is not able to convey all o f its knowledge to the 
users due to the limited bandwidth. This requires that the proposed error model and 
algorithm be sufficiently adaptive to minimize the average errors and provide confidence 
levels that reflect errors a user might experience along with model uncertainty.
Several possible PDFs for observation errors have been investigated [21]. All of 
these PDFs have zero mean, which is appropriate because biases in individual 
measurements and corrections usually can be estimated and removed. Thus, the 
covariance propagation method favors a zero mean Gaussian distribution given by
1n{x) - ■—ir: e , (2.6)
crv2;r
where cr  ^is the variance o f the distribution.
The threshold approach favors either a clipped Gaussian or a uniformly 
distributed variable whose PDF is given by
'  1
u{x) = 2a , (27 )
0 Otherwise
where a is the resulting bound on the error. A more conservative view o f the threshold 
approach is that since the error can take any value up to a , it must be assumed that the
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user has the worst case error. This view is particularly applicable for the errors induced 
by the bandwidth constraint, which is due to the fact the WAAS Geo-synchronous 
satellite can broadcast correction data only to grid points with spatial distance o f no finer 
than 5 degrees. Since some users will have errors as large as the bound, for the sake of 
safety, even though the uniform distribution more accurately describes the PDF for users 
scattered within the service area, for modeling integrity the more conservative 
distribution given by
d{x) = ^{ô{x  + à) + S { x - d ) \  (2.8)
must be used to ensure there is zero chance o f integrity breach, where 0(x)  is the Dirac 
distribution. This density function places all o f the probability mass right at the thresholds.
There are many other approaches that could be taken in describing the PDFs of 
the measurement errors. However, for any fault free measurement with no equipment or 
human fault, errors can be combined to create a reasonable bounding PDF. For modeling 
integrity, consider each element o f s  to be composed o f the sum o f two independent 
random errors, one with the conservative distribution (2.8) and one with the normal 
distribution. This new random variable has the distribution
A ( x ) =  ^
2 a 4 2 n
(x+af (x-af
(2 9)
The expected distribution for the ensemble airspace would be the sum o f the Gaussian 
with the uniform  in place o f  the conservative distribution. Its PDF takes the form
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These two distributions that will be considered in this research are shown for similar 
conditions in Fig. 2.6, where erf{x)is  defined as
erf{x) = ^ { e ~ ‘"dt 
\in:
( 1 1 1 )
and the parameters are set as cr = 1, a  = 3cr.
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Figure 2. 6 Three PDFs plotted as functions of x/cr.
Table 2 .4  Confidence bounds for varying Probabilities for the three PDFs. The bounds are on x/cr
and a  = (7 is set.
Dist/Pr 1.000E-02 1.000E-03 1.000E-04 1.000E-05 1.000E-06 1.000E-07 1.000E-08 1.000E-09
n(x) 2.576 3.291 3.891 4.417 4.892 5.327 5.731 6.109
f i(x ) 3.327 4.090 4.719 5.265 5.795 6.199 6.612 6.998
f2(x) 2.938 3.718 4.363 4.924 5.425 5.882 6.305 6.699
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Knowing the full PDFs for the errors allows us to specify containment bounds for 
arbitrary error probabilities. The bounds are found by integrating the PDFs from minus to 
plus corresponding bound, which integrates to the desired confidence level. Table 2.4 
lists some confidence bounds o f x/cr for various probabilities. For the distributions given 
by /  and f^, a = g  is set. For example, to reach integrity o f 10"’ , which is the 
requirement for WAAS based landing system, the x/cr value is 5.327 for« ,6.199 for yj 
and 5.882 for , respectively. It shows in these three distributions is the most 
conservative one while n is the least conservative one. However, even the difference 
between f  ^ and n is not too significant, meaning ti can be a close replacement for the
approximating . O f course, one has less confidence in the knowledge o f the true PDF
for the lower probabilities. However, one can still hope the fault detection and isolation 
mechanism, which discards overly large errors, works to remove outliers. This would 
result in a true PDF which is bounded by (2.9) and (2.10). Notice that f, (x/cr) is the most 
conservative distribution for large x. Despite this fact, the zero mean constraint creates 
smaller confidence bounds than would be expected from a biased Gaussian. The latter 
case results in bounds given by b = a + /c(Pr)cr , where /c(Pr) corresponds to the values 
listed in Table 2.4 for the Gaussian distribution.
2.5 Position Solution
The next step towards finding the confidence bounds in the position domain is to 
determine the best method to estimate the position. If  the errors were Gaussian in nature, 
then the maximum likelihood estimate would coincide with weighted least squares
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solution. Given (2.9) and (2.10), it is possible to devise a maximum likelihood estimator 
specific to each distribution. However, provided a is not much greater than cr, neither of 
these distributions is significantly distinct from Gaussian. An estimator optimized to one 
o f these bounding functions would not yield a large improvement over weighted least 
squares, even if  the errors truly were distributed according to (2.9) or (2.10). An 
advantage o f the weighted least squares method is that it is easily solved. Other 
estimators require non-linear techniques, which are not necessarily guaranteed to 
converge. Weighted least squares is simple, fast and sufficiently accurate [22]. The 
weighted least squares solution requires only the variances o f the measurement errors. 
The variance o f f , , the error element due to the /th SV, are defined as;
and the covariance  ^between the measurement errors associated with SV,. and SV^
= ( k  -  (4 )\^i  -  {^J})) > (2-13)
where the angle brackets < > about an object denote its expected value. All the PDFs 
considered are zero mean, which again is a necessary result of well designed correction 
algorithms and receivers. The equivalent variances for the conservative and expected 
distributions f, and fj are given in terms o f a Gussian distribution parameter cr by [19]
£ 7 ' = c r ' + o ' ,  (2.14)
The weighted least squares estimator minimizes the cost function given by
A f  , (2.16)
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where the weighting matrix W is the inverse o f the measurement error covariance matrix
W -I
< ■ • ■ K .
< • •
K .  ■ • •
(2 17)
If  one had no knowledge about correlation between measurement errors, then the off- 
diagonal elements of the covariance matrix would be zero in order to form a position 
solution. O f course, the off-diagonal elements would be helpful in improving the position 
solution. However, it is unlikely that they would be available to an aircraft receiver or 
pilot in real time. A naive solution is to let them all be zero and hope that this works. In 
[5], this assumption was made and tested by Monte-Carlo simulation and proved to work 
reasonably well. Therefore, the cross-correlation terms will be set to zero, simplifying the
procedure for finding the position estimate. It has been shown that further simplification
can be obtained by setting the covariance matrix to a constant multiplying the identity 
matrix. This approach still delivers a reasonable non-weighted position solution [23].
Given an initial estimate for position and an estimate for the weighting matrix, the 
weighted least squares inverse of (2.4) can be performed to improve the position estimate. 
The solution is given by [22], [24]
Ax = (G^ W-G)-' -G^-W -Ay = K - A y  , (2.18)
where K is defined as
K  = (G^ W-G)-' -G^ - W . (2.19)
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As mentioned above, the solution may need to be iterated, updating x, G, S and y  at 
each step. The best estimate for position x is obtained when Ax is driven to 0 and the 
cost function (2. 16) is at a minimum.
Notice that the definition for K  has the weighting in both its denominator and 
numerator. If  all variance estimates were uniformly scaled up or down, it would have no 
impact on the position solution. The best estimate o f x depends only on the relative 
confidence between the measurements and not on their absolute values. The same is not 
true for the confidence bounds on the position estimate. In fact, the bounds have been 
shown to be very dependent on the overall scaling o f the measurement variances [19].
2.6 Confidence Bounds
Finding the confidence bound is not as simple as finding the position estimate. 
Since there are human lives at stake, extra care must be taken. One way to formulate a 
bound is to find worst-case bounds in each step o f the position calculation and sum them 
up. This approach works for any distribution and is always safe. However, it is so safe 
that it practically kills any application based on it since the individual errors will never be 
available in a practical system.
Luckily, the stochastic nature o f these error sources dictates that the worst cases 
don’t happen all the time. In fact, the worst cases are low-probability cases, therefore, 
their contribution to the overall PDF is very limited. And, even if  they do, the errors don’t 
come in a worst possible combination, i.e. they usually cancel each other instead of 
building up through positive reinforcement, which is an extremely low probability 
situation. The covariance propagation method makes better sense for providing high 
integrity while maintaining availability most o f the time. The final PDF for position error
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would be given by the convolution o f the elements • £■,., where ATj, is the i th element
along the third row o f i n  (2.19). The resulting distribution approaches a Gaussian as N 
becomes sufficiently large [25]. The mean and variance o f this distribution are 
determined respectively by the sums o f the means and variances o f original variables,
A"). • £.. Thus, e.g., the second moment o f the vertical estimate can be written as
■ P.20)
We can define the Vertical Protection Limit ( VPL ) by using (2.20). The assumption that 
the position error is bounded by a Gaussian with variance (2.20) and confidence bounds 
from Table 2.4 results in a less conservative VPL :
VPL^=K{?ï)-a,^ . (2.21)
Still there is space to improve. It has been shown in [19] that it is reasonable to further 
simplify (2.21) as
= /£r(Pr)- C T j ,  ,  (2.22)
where the variance o f the vertical position estimate is given by the third diagonal element 
o f the position estimate covariance matrix
CTy = . (2.23)
3,3
For integrity purposes, W could either be the same diagonal weighting matrix 
used to form the position estimate, or it can include bounds on cross-correlation terms. 
While these bounds are unlikely to improve our position estimate, they will most likely 
make the expected integrity bounds more conservative, by properly accounting for
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correlations between measurement errors. These off-diagonal elements should be applied 
only when they are actually known.
All o f the Integrity and availability modeling in this dissertation will be based on 
the above equations and assumptions.
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Chapter 3
WAAS static Error, integrity and availability monitoring and
analysis
In the preceding chapters, the theoretical fundamentals about GPS and WAAS 
have been presented. The WAAS integrity algorithm is overly conservative. This is good 
and bad at the same time. It is good because being conservative guarantees to keep the 
system safe, which is the main concern when airplanes and aviation are involved. 
However, as will be shown in this chapter, being overly conservative generates the 
problem o f low availability. It is okay to lose the service o f the system for seconds here 
and there during the En Route stage o f flight. At the final landing stage, however, this can 
mean a missed approach, which is just the opposite o f what the WAAS based landing 
system was developed for.
In order to develop a practical algorithm regarding WAAS protection level, the 
actual data has to be analyzed while appropriately incorporating aviation concerns.
3.1 Necessary WAAS Data collection
In order to validate the new VPL algorithm, all o f the system software was tested 
with actual WAAS data to show the improvement over the old algorithm. In this section, 
the equipment and tools used in the data collection and processing are listed.
The GPS research group at the University of Oklahoma has been taking 
observations o f the WAAS signal in both static and dynamic settings. The devices used 
include the Rockwell EMAGR (Enhanced Miniature Aviation GPS Receiver) WAAS
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capable GPS receiver, the Ashtech Z12 GPS receiver, Rockwell BBCOM software and 
post processing software, and the Ashtech Prism post processing software. In addition, 
we use two personal computers for these tasks, one for data acquisition miming BBCOM 
version K (formerly version J) and one for Ashtech data post processing and other data 
processing and analysis. Additional tools used in the research include Matlab and 
Microsoft Visual C++.
The analysis here focuses on WAAS static data, which is used to formulate new 
Error, Integrity, and Availability algorithm. WAAS static data is the major object of 
study, upon which most analysis and discussion will be performed. Static Data is a good 
starting point for the ease o f getting the ground tmth. For moving aircraft, only small 
adjustments need to be made.
In order to carry out these tasks, ground tmth was required. In this regard, the 
project team has performed a series of surveys to determine the tme positions o f a few 
stable sites that have good satellite visibility and relatively easy access for installation o f 
antennae. Two antennae were installed on the roofs o f buildings at the University of 
Oklahoma (OU). One is on building 210 o f the OU north research campus, located 
coincidentally with Max Westheimer Airport. The other is on the Carson Engineering 
Center building on the main OU campus. Both antenna sites were accurately surveyed in 
longitude, latitude and altitude. In addition, both are maintained to ensure quality of 
satellite signal reception.
The research effort uses a second redundant EMAGR WAAS receiver to make 
sure that any unexpected results are not due to malfunctioning on the part o f the WAAS 
receiver. Preliminary results indicate that the Rockwell EMAGR works reliably and
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doesn’t seem to be an error source [9], It was concluded that the observed errors originate 
from the quality o f the Signal In Space (SIS), which is maintained by Raytheon. For the 
proposed research, it will be assumed that the receiver is working to specification, and 
only an analysis o f the signal in space is required.
3.2 The way the data is classified
This research project is specifically designed to improve the navigation system 
performance. Therefore, the navigation requirements have to be understood to do a good 
job of upgrading the system integrity and availability. The definitions o f some concepts 
that are to be used extensively are [3]:
Accuracy: The difference between the measured position and the actual (or the true) 
position is referred to as accuracy.
Integrity: The capability o f the system to broadcast timely warnings to all its users that 
the SIS is not fit for navigation or to shut itself down when it should not be used for 
navigation is the Integrity.
Availability: The fraction or percentage o f time that the system service is capable of 
providing SIS with integrity is the availability.
Continuity: If  the system supports the required accuracy and integrity throughout a 
maneuver, then the continuity is achieved.
For a navigation system to provide some specific capability, which is usually set 
by a government agency after extensive research on safety and economy, some system 
performance metrics are to be set as the standard. Minimum system performance has to 
be at least on par with the standards, i.e. the accuracy, integrity, availability and
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continuity needs to perform at or above a set standard. For precision landing, the 
requirements are as follows:
1. A severe bandwidth limitation o f 250 bits per second.
2. Stringent user integrity: less than 10"’ chance o f receiving Hazardously 
Misleading Information (HMI) per approach.
3. Six second time to alarm for any failure that could lead to HMI.
4. High availability: the system should be usable in more than 99.9% of the time.
5. Support for global or near global coverage.
6. Flexibility to support different service providers [26].
The standard can be devised in different ways, according to different agencies and 
different purposes. Most notable in the list above are the integrity requirement o f less 
than 10”’ chance of receiving HMI per approach and the availability requirement that the 
system should be usable more than 99.9% of the time. For the requirement in Category I 
airplane Precision Landing, the standard for classification o f the data points are shown in 
Fig. 3.1 and 3.2.
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Figure 3 .1  WAAS performance classification, vertical part [27].
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Figure 3. 2 WAAS performance classification, horizontal part [27].
These diagrams, Fig. 3.1 and 3.2, use triangle charts with real data on a better day 
for the WAAS signal in space (SIS) to demonstrate the division o f the sample space of 
the performance classification. Both vertical and horizontal charts are shown. In the 
original specifications, the above triangle charts were used. However, the updated 
technical target and corresponding new procedure for Lateral Navigation/Vertical 
Navigation (LNAV/VNAV) is a bit different and will be addressed later. This dissertation 
will address only the vertical performance because it is the most important. This is not to 
minimize the importance o f horizontal integrity. The horizontal integrity and vertical 
integrity are independent of each other and exhibit similar behaviors and characteristics.
The most stringent applications for WAAS will be Category 1 precision approach 
(CAT I) and the instrument approach with vertical guidance (IPV). These operations have 
a Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) of 12 and 20 meters, respectively. Thus, based on the 
navigation requirements, the whole absolute VPL -  VPE space will be broken into the 
seven color-coded parts so that it’s easier to track historical performance [28]. From the 
lower-left comer and going clockwise, the whole VPL -  VPE plane is divided into 7 areas:
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1. VPL > VPE; VPL < 12; Available, for CAT I operation.
2. VPL > VPE; VPL < 1 9 ; Available, for instrument approach with vertical 
guidance (IPV) operation.
3. VPL > VPE; VPL > 19; System Unavailable.
4. VPL < VPE; VPL > 19; Misleading Information (MI-1).
5. VPL < VPE; 12 < VPL < 19, 12 < VPL < 19; Misleading Information (MI-2).
6. VPL < VPE; VPL <12, VPE <12; Misleading Information (MI-3).
7. VPL < VPE; all the remaining area; Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI). 
O f these sections in the triangle charts, case 1 represents the requirement for CAT
I precision approach, with the Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) as 12 meters.
Case 2 represents the requirement for IPV precision approach, with the Vertical 
Alert Limit (VAL) as 19 meters.
Case 3 is the unavailable area where VPL is too large to support the desired 
navigation procedure.
Case 4, 5 and 6 are the cases when the error exceeds the VPL and provides 
Misleading Information (MI). Operationally, these regions are not necessarily hazardous. 
However, it should be remembered that in normal operation mobile users do not have 
access to the actual error. They are entirely dependent on the accuracy o f the VPL 
estimate. Therefore, this definition only makes sense in post analysis o f altitude data.
Case 7 is an unsafe region where the VPL supports the operation but the error is 
large enough to create Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI). It is the part o f the 
VPL-VPE space that we are most concerned about, since it indicates the system’s failure
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to inform users o f a breach of integrity and, therefore, can potentially cause fatal 
consequence.
In the unavailable region, the procedure will not be flown since the VPL exceeds 
the VAL, while in the usable region the error is small enough to keep the aircraft within 
the obstacle clearance region. Despite these operational considerations, from a systems 
standpoint, the master station and/or integrity equation have failed to protect the 
navigation solution if  the error becomes larger than the VPL. Thus, all points should be 
above the diagonal line.
3.3 Define WAAS performance metrics
The objective of SIS integrity monitoring is to ensure that the probability of 
Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI), both vertical and horizontal, being provided 
to the aircraft by the navigation system is sufficiently low. The original definition o f the 
WAAS performance metrics and how they are used in this dissertation is listed as 
followed:
Accuracy: The difference between the measured position and the actual (or the true) 
position is referred to as accuracy. In this dissertation only vertical error is researched. 
When Vertical Position Error (VPE) is within a pre-set bound, called the Vertical Alarm 
Limit (VAL) for a specific application, the system achieves sufficient accuracy. 
Integrity: The capability of the system to broadcast timely warnings to all its users that 
the SIS is not fit for navigation or to shut itself down when it should not be used for 
navigation is the Integrity. In our case, as long as the VPL and HPL are large enough to 
bound vertical and lateral errors, integrity is achieved.
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Availability: The fraction or percentage o f time that the system service is capable of 
providing SIS with integrity is the availability. In our triangle charts, this means the 
percentage o f time that the data fall into the available region o f a specific application, 
which means VPL must be greater than the vertical limit and VPL must be less than the 
respective Vertical Alarm Limit (VAL).
Continuity: I f  the system supports the required accuracy and integrity throughout a 
maneuver then continuity is achieved.
In the latest update to the WAAS specification, the FAA replaced the original 
technical target of Category 1 capability (Decision height o f 200 feet with visibility of 
one-half mile) with a certified Lateral NavigatioiW ertical Navigation (LNAVAHSJAV) 
capability (decision height o f 350 feet with visibility of one-half mile). It is expected in 
late 2003 that the FAA will publish a new procedure for the full capability o f WAAS, 
resulting in approaches down to 250 feet above the runway in %-mile visibility. These 
changes are partially due to the difficulty of achieving the original requirements [29]. 
Regardless o f the updates, the classification o f performance in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2 still makes 
a lot o f sense.
The calculation o f availability is special and needs some explanation before 
proceeding. As proposed in [2], [26] and defined in the MOPS [3], the WAAS integrity 
requirement for precision approach is 10“’ HMI per approaeh. This means the probability 
o f an instance when the system error surpasses the system protection level is less than 
10“’ over the time o f final approach, which lasts around 3 minutes. This makes sense 
since the average yearly number o f landings in the US is about 10’ . Most o f these 
landings are visual flight rule (VFR) landings. This stringent requirement guarantees that
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WAAS would be at least comparable, if  not much better than, the current existing 
aviation infrastructure.
This creates a dilemma. On one hand, this stringent standard requires averaging 
the data over a large sample. To reach the required integrity level, at least 10’ samples are 
needed, provided that the system performs up to the standard. For the WAAS signal with 
5 samples a second, that means at least 2x10* seconds are needed at the minimum. That 
is more than 555 hours and dilutes the approach, which lasts only minutes. On the other 
hand, if  we choose to compute the availability over the final approach, which makes 
sense, the integrity will not be achieved within the precision demanded by the MOPS.
The best precision for a 3-minute final approach integrity computation is 1.1x10“  ^ per 
approach, which is not o f sufficient precision for the MOPS.
Today, availability is a concept that ideally needs to be calculated over an infinite 
number o f samples. It is misleading that this quantity needs to be computed over an 
infinitely long period of time since this is the only way that a large number o f samples 
can be accumulated. Instead, availability at any moment needs to be calculated based on 
an infinitesimal time interval over an infinitely large ensemble o f data points with 
equivalent circumstance. In other words, this requirement is hypothetical and applies to a 
hypothetical collection of users who are all under equivalently identical conditions. By 
using equivalence, we stress the overall conditions that might affect the outcome o f the 
system. For instance, the whole ensemble needs to be under identical ionospheric and 
tropospheric conditions, needs to have identical satellite constellation and configuration, 
needs to have the same clock error, needs to have identical noise features and multipath, 
and so on. This is practically impossible due to the fact that satellite navigation systems
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and their associated errors are inherently non-stationary. Any true ensemble would 
average over unlimited different conditions, combining users with high and low risk. 
Thus, an ensemble o f users must be imagined, for each point in space and time, whose 
errors follow probability distributions specific to that point. For an aircraft on approach, 
there is only one actual user at a given point in space and time. That user will experience 
a specific set o f errors that combine to create the position error. These errors can be 
broken into deterministic and stochastic components. The distinction is that if  we could 
replicate the conditions and environment for the user, the deterministic components 
would be completely repeatable. Thus, these errors would be common mode; all users in 
our ensemble would suffer them to the same degree. On the other hand, stochastic errors 
such as thermal noise would be different for each user in the ensemble. Overall, these 
components combine to form a range o f possible errors whose magnitudes have differing 
probabilities. When we look at a very large number (approaching infinity) o f hypothetical 
users in the ensemble, some will have errors that exceed the protection level while most 
will not. The fraction o f users that exceed the Protection Level (PL) can be used to 
determine the probability o f an integrity failure under those conditions.
The aviation integrity requirement o f 1-2 x 10'  ^per approach applies in principle 
to each and every approach. It is not an ensemble average over all conditions. This 
integrity requirement has to be met at every point in the Continental United States 
(CONUS) at any given moment, instead o f being averaged out through time or space.
This makes computing the performance metrics, the availability and integrity, a little 
tricky. As previously discussed, the availability is a concept that in principle needs to be 
calculated over an infinite ensemble o f data. Since that is practically impossible, this
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study uses a circular buffer with a buffer size o f 900 (3 minutes) to calculate a moving- 
averaging availability. This is not the availability in the true definition. However, one can 
agree that if  the true availability is high enough, this Moving-Averaged Availability 
(MAA) certainly will hold high enough as well. The choice of 3 minutes is due to the 
mean time a typical final approach takes. MAA is an indicator o f how the true availability 
performs and is diluted as the averaging window widens. Since MAA is the only way we 
can measure real system performance, we will simply call it WAAS SIS availability.
3.4 WAAS Signal in Space (SIS) general performance
To attack the problem o f lower-than-needed-availability that is currently faced by 
the WAAS system, it is best to start by characterizing as many as possible o f the 
contributing factors. We need to understand how the WAAS SIS performs, what seems to 
be the root o f the problem, and what could be the best way to solve, or at least improve it. 
Fig. 3 .3 -3 .13  below illustrate performances from data files containing 11 days o f WAAS 
data picked from the data collection we have accumulated from 1999 to 2003. These 
figures demonstrate the consistency o f the stochastic features o f the WAAS system over 
time, and specifically, over the entire lifetime o f WAAS. These specific days were picked 
to represent the overall data we have collected. Indeed they include basically all types of 
days we can expect. These days include the ordinary days when the performance falls 
into the expected type; or better days when the performance is more ideal than WAAS 
was designed for. And there are worse days when the system performs poorly. The data 
sets are picked from different years to demonstrate the consistency o f the WAAS 
performance over time. Although these days weren’t picked randomly, they still represent
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all data types in the data collection. We have chosen to investigate these specific days as 
they are representative of most o f the characteristics o f the data archive. They don’t, 
however, represent the data types evenly.
It is o f interest to look into the performance over time to be sure o f the statistical 
consistency over time. Therefore, a quick look at the GPS-time versus Altitude, Latitude 
and Longitude errors will help us learn about the WAAS SIS behavior in each selected 
sample. The VPL-versus-VPE (Vertical Position Error) curve shows how the integrity 
monitoring system works in each selected day.
A few observations on how the overall characteristic behavior o f the WAAS 
Signal in Space (SIS) looks and on classification o f data type are presented next.
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Figure 3 .3  WAAS performance on 12/01/99.
Better days are when the data points all fall into the upper left part in the triangle
chart Fig. 3.3 d and 3.3 d, i.e. VPL is always greater than or equal to VPE. At the same
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time, both VPE and VPL are well bounded within the Vertieal Alarm Limit (VAL), such 
as 12 meters for CAT I precision approach and 20 meters for IPV operation. VPL should 
mimic VPE closely and therefore in an ideal day the VPL-VPE triangle chart will have 
all the data points located above the VPL = VPE diagonal line and cramped into the 
lower part o f the up triangle (preferably under the VAL line o f the application, such as 
the 12 meter for CAT I precision approach).
On Dec. L‘, 1999 WAAS recorded one o f the common days. It can be considered 
a good day. As shown in Fig. 3.3 all o f the altitude, latitude and longitude data behaved 
fairly well except some spikes, i.e. excessively large errors. The width o f each spike 
varies from a single data point to minutes, mostly in tens o f seconds. We need to keep in 
mind that the data spans over 24 hours and that there are 5 samples every second. These 
bad spikes are not frequent compared to the better part o f the data. The frequency and 
reason that these spikes occur need further investigation. The integrity monitoring system 
works perfectly since there is not one single HMI case. However, as can be seen from the 
altitude-time chart and the VPL-VPE triangle chart, the VPE is within the five meter limit 
most o f the time, while the VPL is spread over 6 to 50 meters and beyond. The 
congregated dots along VPL = 50 meters only indicate there are points with VPL greater 
than 50 meters, which is understandable considering the spikes. The statistics needs 
further analysis and will be presented in the chapter 4.
This day is typical o f what WAAS users can expect. The system performs 
reasonably well. The errors are limited to reasonable values. The integrity-monitoring 
works. The only concern is that the VPL is not mimicking the VPE very well since VPL 
is spread too wide while VPE is not. For category I precision landing purpose, which has
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a VAL of 12 meters, there is a significant amount o f data falling out o f the available area. 
The number or percentage o f cases that are not within the CAT I or IPV operation 
requirement needs additional analysis. The original WAAS project performance o f more 
than 99.9% availability for CAT I precision landing is not met. The over­
conservativeness o f current WAAS integrity algorithm is to blame for at least part o f this.
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Figure 3 .4  WAAS performance on 04/28/00.
A similar day is April 28*’’, 2000, as shown in Fig. 3.4, which incidentally was a 
couple o f days before Selective Availability (SA) was turned off per president Clinton’s 
presidential order [4]. Again the WAAS SIS works well, limiting errors to meters. As in 
the 12/01/1999 case in Fig. 3.3, spikes again appear, which was expected. This day shows 
better data than those o f 12/01/1999, since the majority o f data points falls below a VPL 
o f 20 meters, which is the VAL for IPV operation. This shows that the VPL algorithm is 
doing a better job this day relating to the VPE. However, there are integrity breaches
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which are not allowed by the WAAS system design. These are data points with vertical 
error larger than their bounding limit, VPL. Since a pilot has no access to the real time 
error information, he can only depend on the system-provided VPL as the upper bound of 
the estimate o f VPE. Since the VPL is less than according VPE, the pilot can make an 
incorrect assessment o f the altitude o f the airplane.
It was not a good performance day for WAAS SIS due to these integrity breaches. 
However the number o f these HMIs is limited and very small compared to the quantity o f 
acquired data in a 24-hour span. These breaches also appear to be independent and 
isolated cases. Further research needs to be done to determine the causes o f these 
integrity breaches.
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Figure 3. 5 WAAS performance on 11/27/00.
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The 11/27/2000 data in Fig. 3.5 is after the SA was turned off. It can be easily 
seen that the error performance gets better since the errors are smaller. Other than that, on 
this day WAAS SIS performs a lot like 12/01/1999 in Fig. 3.3. This data day represents a 
good solid day with integrity monitoring working well, but the availability is not up to the 
WAAS initial project requirement.
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Figure 3 .6  WAAS performance on 05/01/01.
The data for day 05/01/2001, shown in Fig. 3.6, shows again that after SA was 
switched off, the overall error performance improved. There are fewer spikes and the 
spike values are less significant. By now the benefit o f switching off SA can be seen. 
WAAS is capable o f removing the positioning error introduced by SA, which can be 
attested by noticing overall smaller errors all around, and also by noticing the smaller 
number and lower magnitude o f spikes. In the VPL-VPE chart, we notice a higher
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concentration o f data points in below the VPL 20 meter line. This says that the integrity 
monitoring system is doing a better job without the interference o f SA. Therefore, this 
can he classified as a better day in the data collection.
!aiC(WM»rtAl.TITUCe V* TIME o f illlK »  CaMwnlATITJOE v t TME <M>ni20i
G PS (SECONDS)
Cl C tm m  lONCMTuaF v f  TtWE on» ! 13)1
O PS TIME (SECONDS)
Id) Carton VPE v t VPL oni 11201
77  2 1  7 * Î »  7 »
ALTITUDE ERROmVPEl iMETEWSl
Figure 3. 7 WAAS performance on 11/12/01.
Data from 11/12/2001 is shown in Fig. 3.7. Statistically, this is a repeat o f 
05/01/2001 as shown in Fig. 3.6. No major change occurred in any meaningful category. 
Errors are limited and spikes did not occur as frequently. The system integrity monitoring 
mechanism worked very well. This also can be treated as a better day.
WAAS data for 05/02/2002, as given in Fig. 3.8, shows major WAAS problems. 
Not much information can be gained by checking the error performance charts due to the 
fact that the overly large magnitude o f the spikes overwhelms the baseline error values. 
Also, instead o f the spikes usually expected, the sustained high value o f errors raises
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concern. A closer look is needed to evaluate the error performance. The large magnitude 
o f the errors is a bad problem, indicating that the WAAS failed to provide a timely and 
accurate positioning solution to the users. On the other hand, it is a blessing in disguise 
since the overly large magnitude of errors makes them easy to pick out from normal data 
due to their nature. It is relatively straightforward for the users to threshold and identify 
the problem data points. And then these problem data points can be separated, and the 
system performance integrity can be protected.
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Figure 3. 8 WAAS performance on 05/02/02.
In Fig. 3.8 (d), the VPE-VPL triangle chart shows a series o f HMIs that seem to
be time-correlated. Considering the error performance we have on that day this is not
surprising. The small number of HMIs make this day a suitable day to study the cause of
them happening. More discussions on this will be done in Section 4.5.
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Figure 3. 9 WAAS performance on 10/12/02.
Data for 10/12/2002 is shown in Fig.3.9, and this is a similar day to 05/02/2002 as
shown in Fig. 3.8, except that the number o f HMIs is far more than that o f 05/02/2002
(Fig. 3.8). The error performance is better than the integrity breach and seems more
severe with a higher number o f HMIs. This is a very bad WAAS day.
The first glimpse of 12/28/2002 given in Fig. 3.10 shows promise without the
sustained high towers o f error values. Only isolated spikes are present. The overall error
performance is not too bad. But, observing the VPL-VPE chart, we seem to have a
problem with a large number o f HMI incidents. This is a very bad WAAS day.
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Figure 3.11 WAAS performance on 03/14/03.
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Data from 03/14/2003 shown in Fig. 3.11 demonstrates that this is an exceptional 
day for WAAS performance. All data fall into the expected performance standards. Data 
clusters in the VPL-VPE chart are compact and not spread all over. Still, this day is not 
good enough for the original specification for CAT I precision approach. It is a very good 
WAAS day.
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Figure 3.12 WAAS performance on 05/29/03.
Data from 05/28/2003 shown in Fig. 3.12 represents another bad day due to the 
sustained high towers o f errors and the HMIs.
1 have chosen more than a fair share of bad WAAS days for WAAS SIS. The 
reason behind this is to have sufficient data types to gauge how the new VPL algorithm 
will behave. When the current integrity monitoring mechanism is working great it might
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be hard to appreciate the improvement the new algorithm makes. When the system is not 
working as it is supposed to, is when the new algorithm shines.
3.5 VPL and VPE (Vertical Position Error) performance over time 
comparison
I have presented the general performance charts on the days I have chosen to be 
representative o f all the data over time since WAAS was established. From good days 
and bad days we can see the validity o f the integrity algorithm. Most o f the time the 
system performs well and the protection level (PL) guards against bad data being used in 
the aviation system. I have identified the problem with current HPL and VPL algorithm, 
specifically the over-conservative nature o f the current integrity algorithm. There still 
could be false alarms since, from the figures in Section 3.4, we have no way to determine 
the nature o f the malfunction o f the integrity monitoring system. This could be caused by 
insufficient number o f GPS satellites or just because the Sun Spot activity is very high. 
Therefore, we don’t know for sure that these problems actually exist, nor do we know 
how serious they are, if  they do exist, since in the triangle charts Fig. 3.3 (d) through Fig. 
3.12 (d) all the data points are cut off at VAL = 50 meters. To investigate more 
thoroughly we have to look at a group o f charts o f VPE and VPL performance over time. 
This dissertation only concerns itself with the vertical part of the system performance, i.e. 
the VPL versus VPE (vertical position error). This is not to underplay the importance o f 
the horizontal facet o f the WAAS system. It is only because the horizontal and vertical 
parts o f WAAS are independent o f each other [14] and behave very similar to one
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another. Therefore, once the VPL is understood and improved, the horizontal counterpart 
HPL versus horizontal error can be similarly improved.
In Section 3.4, inter-relation performance o f VPL-VPE was demonstrated. The 
next logical question to ask is how they behave over time and what the temporal 
correlation is between excessively large errors and VPLs. Again, the same data files 
chosen in 3.4 are used to show how VPL and VPE vary over the course o f a day. 
Consistency o f the stochastic features o f the WAAS system over this period o f time was 
confirmed. And since WAAS was officially commissioned early in 2003 [29], it is 
unlikely to change very much in the near future. This means the statistic measures of 
WAAS will, more than likely, stay where they are unless major changes are to be made in 
the system.
In a quick look at the VPL-versus-VPE (Vertical Position Error) characteristics 
given in Fig. 3.13 through Fig. 3.22 I observe the following;
1. The VPE (Represented as the Red dots) is bounded by the VPL (Green dots) for the 
majority o f time;
2. When there are sustained bad data with excessive large value o f VPE the VPL 
algorithm usually gets into trouble.
3. There is an upper bound o f how high the VPL can go, around 3500 meter, probably 
assigned by system for unavailable situations.
4. HMIs happen occasionally and need to be further studied.
5. The VPL behaves like an amplified version of VPE, with distortion.
6. When the VPL algorithm is working there is a consistent bias between VPL and VPE 
that can be taken advantage o f to improve the system availability.
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7. More information is needed to help VPL mimic VPE better, i.e. a better model for the 
VPE with less chance of HMIs is needed. The information needed could be 
range/correction information, or satellites in view information, or a wide variety of 
physical limitation to receiving the signal.
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Figure 3.13 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 12/01/99.
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Figure 3 .14 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 04/28/00.
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In Fig. 3.13 and 3.14 the baseline VPEs are overwhelmed by the large value o f the 
VPLs. It is hard to tell if  the VPE actually jumped the VPL, which happens when HMl 
appears, due to the afore-mentioned fact. One can zoom in along the baseline to see or 
simply return to Fig. 3.3 to know that in the Fig. 3.13 some VPEs do jump VPLs.
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Figure 3.15 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 11/27/00.
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Figure 3 .16  VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 05/01/01.
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Figure 3 .17 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 11/12/01.
Fig. 3.15 to 3.17 look better due to the lower spike rate making the baseline 
features more observable. These are three good days for WAAS integrity monitoring 
since there is no occurrence of VPE crossing VPL to generate HMI. Also we can easily 
identify the action VPL takes when VPE has a significant upward turn, which shows how 
well the VPL algorithm is mimicking the vertical error. The consistent gap between VPL 
and VPE also catches our eye. This is the potential space we can tap into to improve the 
tightness o f the VPL algorithm.
From Fig. 3.18 to 3.22, a wide range of performance shows up. More sustained 
spans o f VPE are present. During those spans the integrity monitoring system has a hard 
time to contain the VPE and thus large portion o f data are either unavailable or HMIs. 
Closer investigation will prove it can be improved by implementing fault detection in our 
new VPL algorithm.
62
E C N  V P E -V P L  o n 0 5 0 2 0 2
4.1  4 .2  4 .3 4 .4  4 .5  4 .6
GPS Time
Figure 3 .18 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 05/02/02.
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Figure 3.19  VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 10/12/02,
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Figure 3. 20 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 10/28/02,
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Figure 3. 21 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 03/14/03.
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Figure 3. 22 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 05/29/03.
These graphs help us understand the performance o f VPE and VPL better. 
However, as seen from Fig. 3.13 to 3.22, there is still more to be desired. This kind of 
graphing doesn’t help us at coming into the new VPL algorithm too much. To have a 
more intuitively perceptive way o f reading information from data, a new metric o f VPL 
and VPE can be introduced. That will be in Section 3.6.
3.6 A new and better metric of VPL and its performance
By looking at Fig. 3.13 through 3.22, it is hard to draw any clear-cut conclusion 
on how VPL and VPE relate. VPLs are usually much larger than the VPE and thus make 
VPE look like background noise. To see more details o f the comparison one needs a 
better way to look at them. One easy way is to zoom in around the baseline, but that 
leaves the bigger picture out. Noticing that the VPL and VPE have peaks o f no more than 
tens o f thousand, one wonders if using logarithmic scale would be beneficial. In the 
following graphs from Fig. 3.23 to 3.32, LogiVPL-vV) vs. Log(FP£'+ 1)are shown. The
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new scale transformation converts even the highest VPL and VPE into more modest 
values. The constant number 1 is for avoiding the singularity at 0 which could happen for 
VPE, and still not being a factor for VPL since it is relatively small. The difference 
between these charts and those in Section 3.5 are very noticeable. Now we can view the 
details o f the VPE and VPL performance. The striking point o f the observation is the 
resemblance between the two envelopes. The VPL envelope follows the VPE envelope 
quite closely with a comfortable cushion in majority o f “LFP” time. There are exceptions 
when the whole picture look like totally messed up, such as in Fig. 3.28, 3.29, 3.32, 
where the sustained span o f excessively large value o f VPE present problems to the 
system.
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Figure 3. 23 12/01/99 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
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Figure 3. 24 04/28/00 Log(VFE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
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Figure 3. 25 11/27/00 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
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Figure 3. 26 05/01/01 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
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Figure 3. 27 11/12/01 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
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Figure 3. 28 05/02/02 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
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Figure 3. 29 10/12/02 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
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Figure 3 .30  10/28/02 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
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Figure 3. 31 03/14/03 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
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Figure 3. 32 05/29/03 Log(VPE+l) vs. Log(VPL+l).
In all, we can agree that the logarithmic scale represents the inter-correlation 
between VPL and VPE better and give more insight to the solution to improve the 
WAAS VPL’s lack of availability through the Fig. 3.23 to Fig. 3.32. The reverse process 
is trivial. We might need to pay attention to the attrition during processing due to limited 
storage precision while computing is carried on. It turned out it is o f non-major concern 
in this regard.
The new VPL algorithm can now be developed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Algorithm to improve WAAS based navigation modeling
This chapter presents a new algorithm to improve the HPL and VPL. The 
algorithm will be developed and it will be performance tested to show its effectiveness 
compared to present methods.
From its concept, the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) was hailed to be 
a revolution to navigation industry. Since then WAAS deployment has suffered more 
than its fair share o f delays and budget overruns. The reason for these deployment 
misfortunes lies in the demanding mandates on the performance o f the WAAS system. 
The critical performance metrics for WAAS include accuracy, integrity, availability and 
continuity, from which, in the long process o f getting the WAAS commissioned, the 
availability has always been the feature that holds back the system from its promised 
capability. To date, WAAS performs well, but not well enough to meet its original 
objectives. The inherent contradiction between integrity and availability is the major 
reason that the VPL and HPL algorithms need to be improved.
The integrity algorithms are well defined in WAAS Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards (MOPS). However, through our study, it is clear that the MOPS 
VPL and HPL algorithms are over-conservative. This, on one hand, makes confidence 
bounds sufficiently large to cover the correction error and hence to some extent 
guarantees the integrity. On the other hand, however, this lack o f compactness from the 
MOPS introduces the unnecessary epochs of system being unavailable. Methods to 
improve upon this setback are proposed by different authors. Mainly and intuitively all
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are trying to solve this in range/correction domain [30], [31]. In this dissertation, an 
alternative algorithm in position domain is presented to improve the MOPS integrity 
algorithms in hope o f improving the overall system performance. All the information that 
is needed is already in the WAAS messages. Therefore, this alternative algorithm will not 
require any change o f existing correction messaging.
A pseudo-VPL, (similarly a pseudo-HPL algorithm can be devised) is presented 
in this dissertation. It is based on the MOPS algorithms and improves upon them. The 
pseudo-VPL and pseudo-HPL algorithms are developed by taking advantage o f the 
WAAS correction error’s stochastic characteristics and Kalman filtering. The algorithm 
is tested by real static data collected by Enhanced Miniature Advanced GPS Receiver 
(EMAGR) and shows improvement over the MOPS algorithms. It improves the system 
availability and continuity while, to a satisfactory extent, keeping the integrity from 
suffering.
The following sections describe in detail the progression o f the development of 
this new VPL algorithm.
4.1 Chaotic nature of WAAS VPL and VPE
According to the WAAS Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) 
[3], the formation o f WAAS integrity monitoring systems is quite definitive. The MOPS 
specifies how users combine error confidences from the different sources to form a 
position bound. The service provider guarantees that the error at any user location is 
smaller than the respective bound with a sufficiently high confidence.
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Simple as it seems, it is naive to think the system is definitive, since WAAS is 
inherently a non-stationary system. WAAS relies on satellites that are constantly in 
motion and that may change their characteristics. Additionally, the propagation of the 
satellite signals varies with local conditions; thus, the system has differing properties over 
time and space. By now it is very clear that the WAAS SIS integrity is by no means 
simple. The WAAS integrity algorithm currently in use is well defined in Chapter 2 of 
the published MOPS [3]. In Section 4.2 below, I will analyze the formulas given in [3] 
for calculating the VPL and HPL. One has to wonder though, for two or more locations in 
a relatively large area, if the integrity will be almost the same as long as the locations are 
within the same grid zone defined in MOPS. This is an important question to examine 
even in the absence o f obviously localized effects such as weather and multipath.
If  one wishes to solve the VPL in closed form, which would have been the best 
thing for this space based augmentation system, he or she finds out it will cost an 
enormous amount o f energy and computing time to even get close. It quickly becomes 
clear that the Navigation error and VPL system can be likened to a chaotic system, as 
described in [33]. Chaos theory studies the interdependence of things in a far-ffom- 
equilibrium state. Every open nonlinear dissipative system has some relationship to 
another open system and their operations will intersect, overlap and converge. I f  the state 
trajectories are sensitive to the initial conditions, then these systems are potentially 
chaotic. Even for systems that are not, strictly speaking, chaotic, imperfections in the 
system model or incomplete knowledge of the dynamics generally leads to uncertainty in 
the state trajectories. I f  such systems are perturbed either internally or externally, they 
can display chaotic behavior and this behavior will be amplified microscopically and
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macroscopically. The WAAS system resembles a chaotic system, to a high degree. By 
nature we shouldn’t try to solve the integrity in closed form because that can’t be done 
for a chaotic system. We can, however, try to understand how the system behaves under 
different condition and circumstance o f which to take advantage and improve the overall 
system performance.
In [28], the validation o f the MOPS integrity equation is described. Actual data 
from the National Satellite Test Bed (NSTB), a prototype for WAAS, is compared side- 
by-side to simulated data. The difference between actual and expected performance is 
investigated in detail. It was shown that compared to the real data, the assumptions used 
in the integrity equation are conservative. Integrity is maintained both in the simulated 
data and in the live data. The comparison o f the two data sets provides insights into the 
actual probability distribution o f the errors in the live data and into the correlations 
between different error components. This knowledge helps to ensure that the full integrity 
requirements are always met. It may also be possible to utilize this information to 
increase the availability of the system.
My objective is to take advantage of the overly-conservative nature o f the MOPS 
integrity algorithm. The integrity performance o f the WAAS system was studied by 
collecting and analyzing real WAAS data. Out o f these observations, insight was 
developed to improve the integrity algorithm. As stated in the [28], stringent 
requirements are already met by the MOPS integrity algorithm. We need to improve the 
availability to improve the overall system performance.
From VPL and VPE performance graphs in Section 3.6, there is certainly some 
inter-correlation between the two functions o f VPL and VPE. For the sake o f simplicity.
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the functions o f VPL and VPE will be called LVPL and LVPE, the added L in front 
indicating logarithmic function relation between them:
LVPL = f{LVPE)  . (4.1)
With the chaos background in mind and the observations made in the figures o f Sections 
3.5 and 3.6, we can linearly model the LVPL as LVPE with certain stochastic noise 
characteristics, plus a bias, which was introduced intentionally to safe guard the integrity:
L VPL -  L VPE + + bias , (4.2)
where » is the central focus o f this dissertation. Once one understands the way this noise
characteristic works, one can easily establish an algorithm to de-noise VPL so that it will
better track the VPE, and thereby reduce the conservativeness o f the MOPS VPL 
algorithm. This in turn increases the system availability.
4.2 Rationale for Multiplicative modeling of the VPL
The most widely used noise model is Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN). 
AWGN models are commonly used in virtually all branches o f signal processing. In the 
LVPL VPL modeling problem, however, I will argue that a multiplicative noise model is 
more appropriate. It should be noted that multiplicative models can be transformed into 
additive models by applying a homomorphic approach.
From all the articles regarding the WAAS error sources up to today, it has always 
been assumed that the different noise sources are combined additively [4, appendix J]. It 
has also been assumed that the additive model leads to the most conservative bound and 
therefore satisfies the requirement o f the integrity algorithm. This is intuitive and simple. 
Even though it is unlikely that worst case errors and different error sources combining
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constructively to cause a failure of the WAAS system, it has been proved by simulation 
and real WAAS test bed that the bounds based on MOPS are almost always too 
conservative [28]. Without progress on the fundamental understanding o f each and every 
error threat model, this situation cannot be changed with the current approach. This 
makes a new alternative approach desirable.
The essential point o f the new algorithm is that o f modeling VPL as a noise 
stained version o f VPE. The threat model for VPE is an additive model with clock error, 
ephemeris error, ionospheric error and tropospheric error all combining additively. But 
that doesn’t address the second-order relationship between the VPL and VPE, which still 
needs to be investigated. In the development o f the MOPS VPL algorithm, there are 
different error source estimates contributing to the total error bound, which is the VPL [3], 
[26], [28]. The upper bounds as these estimates are combined in a worst case scenario 
that is very unlikely to occur in practice. After that, the VPL has to be large enough to 
ensure that the probability o f VPE exceeding VPL is extremely small. Therefore, 
assuming a Gaussian distribution, one can use a constant K to generate a 3-Sigma bound, 
which ensures a probability o f less than 10"^. This constant K is inherently over-designed 
due to the steps taken before its evaluation and the use o f the assumption o f Gaussian 
Noise.
Given an initial estimate for position and an estimate for the weighting matrix, the 
weighted least squares inverse of (2.18) improves our position estimate. The solution is 
Hsx = {G'^-W-G)-' ■G'^  - W - à y ^ K - à y  , (4.3)
where K is defined as
K  = {G^ - W - G y '  -G^ - W . (4.4)
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The VPL equation
PPL, =«r(Pr) (T,, (4.5)
was also given in Chapter 2. Along the vertical direction,
VPL^^ , (4.6)
where
O y = j ( g ^ - w - g Y (4.7)
33
Equations (4.3) to (4.7) have already appeared in Chapter 2. For instance, the VPL 
equation (2.22) is repeated here as (4.6) for convenience. &"(Pr) is a PDF and integrity 
requirement dependant constant. /r(Pr) can be determined by the PDF integration over 
the tails. For instance, in the current WAAS integrity model, with the Gaussian 
distribution and the requirement o f the integrity o f better than 10“’ , the constant «r(Pr) is
determined to be 5.33, the point from which integrating the PDF to infinity produces 10”’ . 
As mentioned before, the tails are cut off to some degree due to the fault detection and 
error correction mechanism implemented in the integrity algorithm. This alone certifies 
the over-conservativeness o f the MOPS algorithm.
The worst case combination rarely happens. Also, the individual error models are 
loosely established and therefore conservative in the first place. The Gaussian Noise 
assumption is not accurate at least due to the implementation o f the error correction and 
fault detection mechanism, which clips off the tails o f the Gaussian curve. Therefore, 
there is room for the MOPS VPL algorithm to be relaxed. An improved algorithm can be 
established through the use of real world data. After testing the new algorithm in
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sufficiently diversified data types and getting satisfactory results, it can be claimed this 
real-data-based algorithm will work in general cases.
From the figures in Section 3.6, it is apparent that {LVPL-LVPE) is more linear 
than iyPL -  VPE) . Indeed, a few simple tests based on the data sets that have been 
chosen below will show that this observation is valid. In Fig. 4.1 through 4.6 below, it 
can be seen that, with the nonlinearity criteria defined in equation (4.8), {LVPL-LVPE) 
does indeed have a better linearity than the {VPL -  VPE) relation. In these figures the 
nonlinearity o f random variable X is defined as the standard deviation o f X divided by 
the expected value o f X;
NonLinearity{X) = ■
< ^ >
(4.8)
This makes it a fair metric for comparing different random variables since it is unified, as 
long as the expected value o f X is non-zero, which is true in my proposed algorithm.
% 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3 7 3.8 3.9
Sample iram  s ta r t  of recording
4.1 4.2
X 10®
Figure 4.1 (12/01/99) NonLinearity{VPL -  VPE) = 7.43221.
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Figure 4. 2 (12/01/99) NonLinearity{LVPL-LVPE) = ^*21141,
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Figure4 .4  (11/27/00) NonLinearity{LVPL-LVPE) = ^,'^^112.
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Figure 4. 5 NonLinearity{VPL -  VPE) = 0.46412.
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Figure 4. 6 (05/01/01) NonLinearity{LVPL -  LVPE) = 0.2S392.
These illustrations are just some examples to show that the logarithmic based 
function o f VPL and VPE is a better fit to use as the basis to improve the WAAS SIS 
performance. We now can utilize the LVPL-LVPE linearity to simplify the filtering 
process in the De-Noising process in the new methodology. This makes good sense in 
view o f the inherent overdesign o f the overvalued 3-Sigma bound. By assuming a bias 
between LVPL and LVPE, we can rid the VPL of the averaging factor in the over­
estimated error sources combination. This has the added benefit o f simultaneously 
reducing the bias and thereby the 3-Sigma constant bound.
From analysis o f the actual WAAS data that have been collected since year 1999, 
it becomes clear that the current algorithm used by the integrity model to calculate the 
VPL and HPL is over-conservative. Using the LVPL-LVPE it is straightforward to 
estimate the bias between the current model and the real data. The actual number used to 
reduce the bias will be determined experimentally to a satisfactory degree. The reduction 
o f the bias between VPL and VPE results in higher availability, fewer constraints on
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structures around the airports, higher availability for a pilot in flight, and therefore higher 
success rates o f on-time arrival and safer landings.
Considering the path that GPS signal takes from the GPS SVs to the receiver, one 
can see that there is uncertainty along the way. Errors are added in sequentially and result 
in the inaccuracy o f the final GPS solution. If one can better model the process by which 
the errors accumulate, then one can be better equipped to remove them automatically in 
the augmentation system. It then becomes a tremendously complicated system due to the 
complex nature the signal interactions with the medium along its path o f travel. It is 
reminiscent o f the AM-FM modulation in wireless communication. The AM part can be 
neglected for our purpose, since we don’t care too much here about the receiver 
sensitivity. The FM part is what needs investigation. How the signal is changed due to the 
FM modulation can shed some light on the error generating process in the GPS system.
4.3 Position Domain Approach to improve the WAAS availability 
performance
It has been suggested that the improvement o f WAAS integrity, availability and 
continuity needs to be done in the range/correction domain [30]. This suggestion has 
merit. In order to improve the system performance, a better error model and better 
understanding o f the threat model is needed, i.e. there is a need for more information 
about the nature o f all error sources and the threats that WAAS faces. This is very 
difficult due to the stochastic nature o f these error and threat sources. It can be argued 
that it is impossible to convince a real skeptic o f the feasibility o f an effective integrity 
algorithm [28]. On the other hand, it is obvious that improvement in the range/correction
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domain alone is not sufficient. For the receiver, a position domain solution can 
alternatively be used to improve the system performance to some extent. It is known that 
the HMI requirement is specified in the position domain, yet WAAS broadcasts values in 
the range/correction domain. WAAS receivers combine the corrections and confidences 
with their geometry to form the position solution and protection level. Depending on 
individual circumstances, each receiver determines which corrections and satellites are 
used. The WAAS SIS is not directly used as input in these decisions. Therefore, how the 
position error builds up for one specific receiver depends on the residual errors, and is 
known only to this receiver. A combination o f position domain and range/correction 
domain monitoring should be more effective. This is most clearly demonstrated by a real 
example. As shown in [33], a close-to-real example can be set up for specific user 
geometry by using Stanford’s Matlab Algorithm Availability Simulation Tool (MAAST) 
[34], which can be used to simulate WAAS performance. In this example, the eight 
satellites are in view as shown in Table 4.3.1. The standard skyplot o f the satellites are 
shown in Fig. 4.7 with their elevation and azimuth values and PRN numbers listed.
Table 4 .1  Satellite elevation and azimuth angles, confidence bounds and projection matrix values 
both for the all-in-view solution and for a solution without PRN 8.
PRN EL AZ without PRN 8
2 45.8° -32.3° 2.34 m 0.595 0.451
5 11.2° -76.8° 10.1 m 0.258 0.437
6 36jT 48.4° 2.32 m 0.162 2.005
8 9.98° 73.0° 3.74 m 1.000 N/A
9 61.4° 28.5° 2.03 m -1.928 -3.087
15 32.8° 151.0° 6.89 m -0.015 0.174
21 42.3° -136.0° 4.83 m 0.066 -0.003
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Table 4.1 also shows the PRN, elevation, azimuth, and one-sigma confidence 
bound (cTi). In addition, the fifth column shows the dependence o f the vertical error on 
a pseudorange error associated with each SV. K  is the projection matrix and is defined as 
equation (2.18), K  = (G^fVG) ' G^W , where K  is the geometry matrix and W is the 
weighting matrix, [4 Appendix]. The term multiplying the pseudorange error 
determines the contribution o f this error to the overall vertical error. Thus a 1 m ranging 
error on PRN 2 would create a positive 59.5 cm vertical error for the user with this 
combination o f satellites and weights. The last column in Table 4.3.1 is the case when the 
most-likely-to-lose satellite, which in this setup is the SV with the lowest elevation angle, 
is dropped from view sight.
30°
30°
•9
122
120 °240'
150“210’
Figure 4. 7 Satellite elevation and azimuth values for a standard skyplot. PRN 8 Is a low elevation 
satellite that If not Included In the solution dramatically changes the Influence of PRN 6.
After PRN 8 no longer contributes to the solution, the projection matrix values 
change accordingly. Note that the value of changes significantly after PRN 8 is
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dropped. Most noticeably, the o f PRN 6 changes from 0.162 to 2.005, an increase of
more than 1000%. What does this mean? In a perfect world, this may not matter too 
much. In real world, however, as could be simulated in MAASR, with the all-in-view 
solution, the user has a VPL o f 33.3 m (HPL = 20.4 m). When PRN 8 is dropped, the 
VPL increases to 48.6 m (HPL = 20.5 m). This seems acceptable since both values are 
below the 50 m Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) for LPV [35]. Either solution could be used 
for vertical guidance. However, if the ephemeris data for the SV positions contain errors, 
the relative minor change o f constellation has an immediate impact on the WAAS 
solution. Notice that the vertical error dependency changes dramatically with the loss of 
PRN 8. In particular, PRN 6 had little influence over the all-SVs-included solution. After 
PRN 8’s drop fi'om view, PRN 6 has a very strong impact on the new solution. Also 
notice that the other values change as well. PRNs 2, 21, and 122 lose influence while 
PRNs 5 ,6 ,9  and 15 become more important. More surprisingly, the influences o f PRNs 
15,21, and 122 change sign; therefore, what was a positive error for the all-in-view 
solution becomes a negative error for this particular subset.
The changes in the K^ - values with subset or superset position solutions limit the
ability to verify performance exclusively in the position domain. For example, if  PRN 6 
had a 25 m bias on its pseudorange, it would lead to a vertical error o f greater than 50 m 
with PRN 8 missing, but just over 4 m for the all-in-view solution. A position domain 
check with all satellites would not be concerned with a 4 m bias compared to a 33.3 m 
VPL. Thus, one would be inclined to think that all was well. However, the user 
unfortunate enough to lose PRN 8 would suffer a 50 m bias, large enough to cause harm. 
A 25 m bias would be more than a ten-sigma error in the range domain and thus would be
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easily detectable. Therefore, it is the combination o f range and position domain checks 
that protects users with different combinations o f satellites.
There is nothing unique about this particular geometry. In fact, by setting 
MAAST to look for subset solutions that had very different values in its subset 
solutions, one finds that similar situations are not rare [32]. For instance, a search 
restricted to geometries that had VPLs below 40 m for all-in-view and investigated 
subsets with VPLs below 50 m showed that, o f the 3726 geometries investigated, 
the/Cji values changed by more than 40% or less in only two cases. To better illustrate
this effect, biases were placed on the satellite with the largest change for the remaining 
3724 geometries. Each bias was chosen such that it would lead to a 50 m positioning bias 
in the subset solution (a 25 m bias on PRN 6 in the example above). Each pseudorange 
was also assigned a zero-mean Gaussian error with a standard deviation o f one half o f its 
one-sigma confidence bound (column four o f Table 4.3.1). The broadcast WAAS 
confidence bounds are approximately three times larger than the nominal no-fault values 
(this inflation is necessary to protect against fault modes). Calculated position errors and 
VPLs for both the all-in-view and subset solutions are needed. The results are plotted in 
standard triangle charts. Fig. 4.8 and 4.9. Fig. 4.8 is similar in appearance to a nominal 
triangle chart except the VPLs are clipped at 40 m due to the special geometry selection 
process and the position errors are worse than normal due to the injected error on the 
single satellite. However, the position errors are all below the VPL and the aggregate is 
not obviously biased. An observer might be inclined to declare that the system is 
functioning safely based on this chart. However, Fig. 4.9 shows that with the same errors 
and biases, but a slightly different geometry, this is not true. The subset solution removes
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satellites that were masking the bias for each case. The result is an obviously faulted 
triangle chart. Thus, a triangle chart without obvious faults, such as the one shown in Fig. 
4.8, is no guarantee o f a safe system, as evidenced by Fig. 4.9.
All in View PoaMon So^tfâon with Biased SVs (3726 epochs) 
CONÙS Ldc^ions detected w th Aii in v# w  VPL < 40 f "
Syaism iMavaHeDte 
Aittrm Epochs: 0
« * +Ti fW
V ertical Errcw (m)
Figure 4. 8 The triangle plot for ali-in-view solutions ineluding one biased satellite in each is shown. 
Here each bias is de-weighted by the other satellites. No obvious problems are evident in this chart
[32].
Subset Position Sok^wn vsnth Biased SVs (3724 epochs)
System LMavawaWe 
Alarm Epochs; 0
LF^
Subsetei clxHsen such that ■ 
VPL < 50 m, but removal o1 
one sateiliie would cause  ihe 
SV to creKte s  50 m 
posltiDnlfra error
V e r t ic a l  E r ro r  (m )
Figure 4. 9 The triangle plot for the subset solutions that expose each biased satellite is shown. Here 
the biases are exposed as being hazardous for the user. This demonstrates the importance of 
checking each subset or in the range domain [32].
This simulation was pessimistic in its construction since the minimum 
unacceptable error was placed on the most sensitive satellite, which is PRN 6 in the 
example. Here the minimum unacceptable error means this intentionally introduced error 
doesn’t change system performance so much in the all-in-view solution that the WAAS 
system becomes unavailable. This introduced error only becomes unacceptable after the 
constellation change and the most sensitive satellite contributes heavily to the subset 
solution. On the other hand, the geometries were chosen at random and do not have any 
unique subset characteristics. It is quite disenchanting that such radically different 
triangle charts can be created from the same pseudorange errors and one biased satellite 
simply by looking at subsets. Making the situation even worse is the fact that two or more 
pseudoranges can be corrupted to create arbitrarily large errors in the subset solution and 
zero error for the all-in-view solution. It has not previously been realized how well single 
errors could be hidden. The lesson is that it is not sufficient to observe a particular set of 
position solutions. The most effective method is to combine position domain monitoring 
with range domain monitoring.
4.4 Kalman Filter smoothing
It would be desirable to “smooth out” the LVPL so that it doesn’t have the 
choppiness demonstrated by much o f the data set, e.g. in Fig. 3.28 and 3.30. Also, using 
Kalman filtering retains the localized flavor o f the WAAS performance to a certain 
degree. During a span o f time without violent thunderstorms, sunspot activity, or other 
adverse conditions, one expects the WAAS solution to be virtually continuous. However, 
as was demonstrated in the time-VPL-VPE charts o f sections 3.5 and 3.6, due to various
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reasons choppy gaps do exist and generate HMIs. Since these gaps represent faulty 
solutions o f the WAAS, they can be deemed as gaps in the valid data that could be 
disoccluded (filled in) by appropriate interpolation or smoothing.
4.4.1 The discret Kalman filter introduction and notation to be used
From the historical 1960 work o f R. E. Kalman [36] describing a recursive 
solution o f the discrete-data linear filtering problem, advances in technology and 
computer science have made Kalman Filter widespread in many real-time applications, 
including GPS signal processing. In this section I will introduce the discrete kalman 
Filter and clarify the notation that will be used.
In order to apply the Kalman Filtering framework, it is necessary to assume that 
the ransom process to be estimated can be adquately described by a finite dimensional 
state space model Assuming a random process to be estimated can be modeled in the 
form:
+ > (4 8)
and the observation or measurement, must be an affine function o f the state with additive 
uncorrelated noise known as the measurement noise. The measurement noise must also 
be uncorrelated with the input process. The measurement equation is given by
(4.9)
where
1) is the « X 1 state vector at time 4 ;
2) is the « X  « state transition matric relating and in the absence o f any 
forcing function;
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3) Wj is the « X 1 input signal which must be an uncorrelated stochastic process 
(white noise) with known covariance structure;
4) Zjj is the m X 1 measurement vector at time ;
5) is the AW X AM observation matrix connecting measurement and state vector at 
time ;
6) Mj is the AM X 1 measurement error vector, assumed to be a white noise sequence 
with known covariance structure and zero crosscorrelation with .
The covariance structures for and m^  are given by
, (4.10)
[0, i ^ k
«[".« ,']  = ' " * = W 1  , (4.11)[0, A # K
where S[k] is the Knudea delta. The crosscorrelation between and must be
zero:
E[w^n] ] = 0, (for all k and i). (4 .12)
The a priori estimate o f the state vector at time given measurements only up 
through time will be denoted . The error on this estimate is given by = x^-x^ , 
and has associated error covariance matrix
f)- = _ ;c;)(z, - j î ; ) ' ]  . (4.13)
The new information provided by the measurement is used to update the a 
priori estimate Jcj according to
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â* = â ;+ a : ; ( z .  , (4.i4)
where is the Kalman gain sequence which will be developed below.
Similar to we can define , the error covariance matrix associated with the 
updated (or a posteriori) estimate:
4 ] = E[(x, - X,)(x*
= {X* - x ;+ K , ( z ,  - / f * x ; ) r  ] (4.15)
To obtain for the minimum mean square error the Kalman gainK^ can be solved
as [3]
. (4.16)
The error covariance matrix associated with the optimal a posteriori state vector 
estimate is then given by
P ,= (I -K ,H ^ )P ;:  . (4.17)
The updated state vector estimate can then be projected ahead to obtain a now a 
priori estimate for the state vector at timet^^, :
xl^=A^k  ■ (4-18)
The error covariance matrix associated with x is
*+l
^t+l  ~  ^[^i+l^l t+l  ] “  ^[(-' ' i+l  “ “  • i^+l )  ]
= + ^ k f ]  (4.19)
The whole recursion can be summarized as shown in Fig. 4.10.
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Figure 4 .10 Kalman filter block diagram. 
4.4.2 Using a-/3  Kalman filter to filter VPL
In this research project WAAS static data is the object o f study and all the 
algorithm development was done on this data. In essence the VPL is a modeled version of 
VPE, which in turn is the result o f numerous contributing error sources. By central limit 
theorem VPE is a Gaussian like random process. In [37] how WAAS combines all 
different message types to arrive to the correction information is described in details. This 
demonstrates that the VPE can be modeled as a Brownian Motion process,
Its discrete state model is
at
(4.20)
ÿ '1  a ' y o'
+ u.
V 0  1 V 1
X  =
y
V
(4.21)
(4.22)
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Recall that from Section 3.6 and 4.2 it is concluded that LVPL is a better metric 
than VPL, and can be modeled as a random process. Therefore define
lP T 4 = ;,,= lo g ,o ( l + KP4) , (4.23)
where y,^  is a random process as well. From analysis and data presented in Chapter 3, it 
seems reasonable to cast the problem of smoothing/interpolating as a 1-D target
problem with noisy measurements. A simple yet fitting model would be the 
a - P tracking filter.
An a -  p  tracking filter is a two-state version o f the Kalman filter, i.e. a special 
case o f Kalman Filter. Basically, it is a minimum mean-square error (MMSE) solution o f 
the problem given the statistical measurements.
In this solution, it is assumed that the quantity o f interest in this case) has a
first derivative (or “velocity”) that changes only slightly from one measurement time to 
the next. Thus it is assumed that the first derivative may be modeled as a constant plus a 
small additive noise or “drift”. For this reason, the a - p  filter is also sometimes called a 
“constant velocity” tracker. As can be seen from the VPL data presented in Section 3.4 
the constant velocity model is applicable to as given in (4.23).There are 5 samples per 
second in the WAAS signal. The position o f target at the time o f the {k -t- \)th 
measurement can be written as
ykM=yk+^ k^ > (4.24)
where A is the time between successive measurements, which is 0.2 seconds in this case.
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As stated above, it is unlikely that over a long period o f time the velocity remains truly 
constant. A small “velocity drift” from measurement to measurement will now be 
allowed
(4.25)
where is modeled as a white “velocity drift” noise with the statistics of
where S^ _. is defines as
£ '[w j = 0, 
^ K h ', ]  = 0-X_; ,
j l  whenk = i 
10 other
(4.26)
(4.27)
For the measurement noise the symbol will be used and is also a white noise process, 
with
E[n^]^0,  
E[n^n,] = ,
(4.28)
and E[w^n.] = 0 . The observation is then given by
(4.29)
By combining the above equations the system model can be written in matrix form:
'1 A ' 'o '
=
.0 K
+
*^=(0 1)
Compare these equations to the equations (4.8) through (4.19), we have
(4.30)
(4.31)
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1 A '
.0 K
, -
w.
fc\ \
And covariance structures
\
m y
0 0
To initialize this recursion, at A: = -2  , the measurement is
Z_2 = y_2 + ^ -2 ’ 
and at = - 1, the measurement is
z _ ,  .
(4.32)
(4.33)
(4.34)
(4.35)
(4.36)
(4.37)
(4.38)
(4.39)
Take j)_, = z_,, and v_, = — — — . It is worth pointing out that the averaging reduces the
effects o f the measurement noise .
This leads to
m y
•^-1 -^2 (4.40)
Then
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=r ry _^
vv^-i y
y. y-
-1 y
/j)  \V
v' -^i y y
y,, r, A-y - i y -.-)" -, (4.41)
Now,
y., - y ^ , = y - , -  z_, = -  (y_, +«_,) = -n_, (4.42)
■ = v_, - (7-1 + « - i ) - ( 7 - 2 + « - 2 )
( 7 - 1 - 7 - 2 )  +  ( » -1 ~ » -2 )  [(7-2 +  Av_2 ) -  7-2 ] +  («-1 -  »-2 )
■ =  V (4.43)
- 2  - 2 /  ^  A
To compute P , the following quantities are needed;
^ [ ( 7 - , - 7 - ,y ]  = ^ ( - » _ ,) ']  = o-^ (4.44)
and
A A A
(4.45)
-  w _ 2  ] + E [ ^ ]  -  E [ ^ ]  = E [ ^ ]  = ^
A A
Using symmetry the following is shown:
A A
m v . ,  -v_.)(7-i-7-,)] = ^[(7-,-7-,Xv-i - V - , ) ]  =  - f -  . (4.46)
The last term in P , is
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‘- 2  \ 2
2
=  E [ ( w \ ^  -  —  ( w _ 2 « _ ,  -  W _ 2 « _ 2  )  +
2
in_j-n,2Ÿ
A'
1
= E[w _2] -  — £■[w _ 2« _ , ] + — Æ'[w_2«_2] + - j E [ n  _^ ]
1 1
Combine all four components,
_
A
^  (1 + ^ K2A'
The initial a priori estimate may now be developed according to
X q =  =
and
'1 A^ ' 2z_,+z_2'
.0 V Z_1 -  Z_2< A J
/ 2
f l A^
+Ô-1 =
.0 K ^ (1 + -< A
3(rfrj - + A ct
A
A 1
O' '0 0 '
+
K <0
(4.47)
(4.48)
(4.49)
(4.50)
^  + Acr; 2Æ  + CT;)
V A A
With these initial conditions one can enter the Kalman filtering loop shown in Fig. 4.10 
and see how the general Kalman filter reduces to t h e a - j 0  filter. Begin with
. (4.51)
For the a - j f f  filter, this becomes
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r A i
/  A _ \
A
v “
V * /
+ K , { z , - [ \  0]
VV * y
) -
yk
VV ‘ y
+ - j^ t)  • (4.52)
Denote = to obtain scalar equations for the updated estimates o f the state vector
y
entries:
[A
The update equation for the predicted state vector is
k^+\ ~^k^k •
For our “constant velocity” model this gives
V vO ly
yk
K^ky V
In scalar form, we have that
Combinng these results we arrive in the classical a - p  filter equations:
Tw -  A + A v ,
=Vi
(4.53)
(4.54)
(4.55)
(4.56)
(4.57)
So far everything is available except the so-called “Kalman Gain” and , 
From the derivation above:
1) The Kalman gains depend on the predicted state vector error covariance 
matrix, but not directly on the observations.
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2) The predicted state vector error covariance matrix ^  depends on the filtered state 
vector error covariance matrix, but not directly on the observations.
3) The filtered state vector error covariance matrix , depends on the predicted
state vector error covariance matrix and on the Kalman gains, but not directly on 
the observations.
4) The starting “seed” doesn’t depend on observation .
Therefore, all the Kalman gains can be pre-computed and stored in a file. 
Implementation o f the Kalman filter is then reduced to processing the measurements , 
which in my research comes with the observed VPL over time. The initial conditions are 
given by:
-^1 =_ -^1 ~ ^ -2
“-I
) -^ 0 ~
A ;
^1
,0  ly
(4.58)
To pre-compute the Kalman gains and , let
Pk - (4.59)
and
Pk =
^7^-(l,l) 7^(1,2)^ 
^/]^-(2,l) 7i^-(2,2X
(4.60)
Then (4.16) can be rewritten as
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\HkJ
"4(1,1) /^(l,2)' (1
^4(2,1) 4(2,2), lo
r 4"(i,i) 1
^(1,1)+
4"(2,1)
t^4-(l,l) + (T^ j
(1 0 )
;)-(2,2X
\ - i
vOy
+  cr„
I.e.
a .
A  =
The filtered state vector error covariance matrix in (4.17) is then given by
f f 1 0"| (a , ^
VvO ly ;^-(2,l) ^ -(2 ,2 )
(1 0)
(l-orj;i^-(l,l) ( l- c r j ;r ( l ,2)
(l-«J/i^-(l,2) /i -^(2,2)- ,^;] -^(l,2)
The a priori state vector error covariance matrix in (4.19) can be written as
=
1 A 
0 1
4(1,1) 4 (1 ,2 )k  V^> ^  k
4 (2,1) 4 (2,2)
(\ O' "0 0 ^
+
.A 1, .0
In other words, we have the scalar relations:
4:,(1,1) = 4(1,1) + 2A4(1,2) + A:4(2,2) ,
4;,(1,2) = 4(1,2) + A4(2,2) ,
4;,(2,1) = 4(2,1) + A4(2,2) = 4(1,2) + A4(2,2) , 
4;,(2,2) = 4(2,2) + (rJ .
(4.61)
(4.62)
(4.63)
(4.64)
(4.65)
The pre-computation o f the Kalman Gains (a^ and/0^ ) is summarized in the following 
steps:
1) Begin with Pq” as given;
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2) k = 0;
3) Compute and using (4.58) and (4.59);
4) Compute using (4.60);
5) Compute , using (4.62)
6) Let k = k+1
7) Go loop back to step 3.
Typically the Kalman gains converge to asymptotic values. From what has been observed 
about my Kalman Filter implementation on the pseudo-VPL, this is certainly true. The 
overall Kalman iteration is now:
1) Initialize (Po’ )"' and ;
2) k = 0;
3)
4)
• I T j T  D-1 i
has been computed and stored in a file
\ P k j  
6)
7) = <!>kPk<fk + Qk
8) Let k = k+1
9) Loop back to step 3.
Now all that is needed is to specify the initialization and some parameters. From 
the graphs in Chapter 3 it can be easily estimated the range for these parameters. It turned 
out that the filtering process converged fairly quick, making this a moot point. Assume
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the Noise to VPL and VPL itself are pseudo random processes. They are independent 
and are covariance stationary. Fig. 4.11 below is the initialization section o f the filter 
written in MatLab for the or -  filter in this dissertation. As mentioned above, the initial 
sigma_vpl_2 and sigma measure !  turned out to be not very sensitive.
delta=0,2; % Frame seperation, which in WAAS is 0.2 second 
delta2 = delta * delta; % (Frame seperation) squared 
1 = [1 0 
0 1];
Ph i k  -  [1 delta
0 1 ]; % Conversion Matrix
H_k = [1 0]; “/oMeasurement matrix
%THe initializition: Determine the stochastic properties of the random process; L VPL 
sigma_vpl_2 = 0.8; % 2 at the end stands for --Squared, sigma vpl 2 is the auto covariance of L VPL,
% Another thing that has to be taken into account is the VPL is studied through L vpMlog 10( 1+VPL) 
sigma_measure_2 = 0.4; % 2 at the end stands -Squared,
Figure 4.11 Initialization of the a  — Kalman filter.
4.5 Fault prevention and error correction in this VPL algorithm
The basic idea behind fault prevention and error correction is that the GPS and 
WAAS system is a physical system. This means that the observations concerning GPS 
and WAAS have to follow physics rules. An easy example is that there will not be things 
flying faster than the speed o f light. Closer to reality, if  the system indicates that speed of 
the user changes at a rate beyond reasonable possibility, for instance, at a rate exceeding
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what is possible even for the best fighter jets, then it ean be safely concluded that a fault 
is present. From the historical data archive, the following conclusions could be drawn.
1. When there are only 4 SVs, the HPL and VPL tend to suffer the most and are 
often significantly degraded.
2. The more SVs are in sight, the better are the HPL and VPL that can be expected.
3. To calibrate the VPL performance. Metrics L _  VPL = Logl 0(1 + VPL) and
L _  VPE = Logl 0(1 + VPE) are used to transform the possible multiplative noise 
factors into additive ones, in which the bias 1 was added to remove singularity of 
logarithmic function at zero since VPE and VPL can reach this magnitude.
4.6 Fault-proofing the VPE solution
Merely dealing with VPL, which is what has been done thus far, will not help the 
integrity. If  anything, it ean hurt the VPL since the pseudo-VPL generally reduces the 
value o f the VPL and doesn’t affect the error performance. Ideally one wants to move the 
HMI points in the lower-right part o f the upper triangle charts to the available part o f the 
triangle charts, which is in the upper-left area. Therefore, to increase the integrity 
performance, the VPE has to be processed accordingly to be reduced.
From the Section 4.3 example one can see a bogus bias caused by change o f SVs. 
When one low satellite moves out of view it may cause all the bias in the remaining 
satellites be magnified under certain circumstances. This could cause otherwise perfectly 
good data points to fall into the dangerous HMI region and would hence degrade the 
performance of the WAAS system. By using post analysis one can assess the seriousness 
o f this problem and hopefully formulate a way to compensate for it.
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In Section 4.5, by modeling VPL as a function o f VPE with multiplicative noise 
and using Kalman Filtering to smooth abrupt changes (which don’t make physical sense), 
one is able to move the data cluster downward, i.e. to increase the system availability 
under a specific VAL. This algorithm doesn’t affect the VPE and therefore will not 
improve the integrity performance. The best scenario is when all the Kalman Filtering 
and following processing doesn’t make the VPL envelope cross the VPE spikes, i.e. 
doesn’t create new hazards. In that case this unchanged integrity performance is the best 
one can wish for. From the triangle charts shown in Section 4.3 example, data cluster will 
only move downward but not leftward, which is our ideal WAAS performance.
Because the VPE moves around zero and doesn’t have a large envelope one is 
better off to filter the altitude directly and not some function of the altitude, as was done 
for the VPL. Other than these differences the whole problem is identical to that o f the 
VPL problem. This time only a windowed low pass filter to de-spike the VPE solution is 
used. After that, a similar fault prevention as used in VPL case is implemented.
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Chapter 5 
Results and Conclusions
5.1 Results of the pseudo-VPL algorithm
After the respective filtering processes o f VPL and VPE a straightforward result 
comparison is shown. Again, plots o f the triangle charts before and after the filtering 
processes to see obvious result o f the algorithm. Take notice that this is only a qualitative 
assessment o f the performance o f the new algorithm since it is impossible to tell the 
density of data points at certain position by just looking at the triangle charts. These 
charts do give us some useful information about how the majority o f data points behave 
after the new algorithm is carried out. Triangle charts o f all 10 cases we have selected 
from our data archive will be presented to show how the algorithm performs under 
different situations.
As discussed in Section 4. 6, merely dealing with VPL will not help the integrity. 
If  anything it can hurt the VPL since the pseudo- VPL generally reduces the value o f VPL 
and doesn’t affect the error performance. To improve the integrity performance it is 
necessary to reduce. The error needs to be reduced while maintaining VPL. Altitude 
solution filtering helps this cause, as mentioned in Section 4.6. The improvement this 
action brings into the WAAS system is also shown in the following triangle charts.
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Case 1: 12/01/1999: Before and after filtering
WAAS data collected on December 1, 999 is shown in Fig. 5.1. Vertical 
performance using the MOPS specified algorithm is shown in the upper plot. The result 
after using the new pseudo- VPL algorithm is shown in the lower plot. Here we see that 
the entire locus o f data points is translated down as a result of filtering, providing an 
obvious improvement in the availability. This improvement comes at the price o f 
additional MI and HMI occurrences being generated. In the next section I will investigate 
the implications and seriousness o f these extra MI and HMI events.
VPE (Meter)
VPE (Meter)
Figure 5.1 Case 1:12/01/1999; Before and after Filtering.
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Case 2: 04/28/2000: Before and after filtering
In case 2 WAAS data collected on April 28, 2000 is shown in Fig. 5.2. Vertical 
performance using the MOPS specified algorithm is shown in the upper plot. The result 
after using the new pseudo- VPL algorithm is shown in the lower plot. Here we see the 
performance o f the WAAS SIS is not very good due to the MI and HMI occurrences. 
After appling the pseudo- VPL algorithm, the entire locus o f data points is translated down 
and the availability is improved. At the same time, however, additional MI and HMI 
occurrences are generated. The implications and seriousness o f these extra MI and HMI 
events are to be investigated in the next section.
VPE (Meter)
I  3 0
V P e (Meter)
Figure 5 .2  Case 2: 04/28/2000: Before and after filtering.
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Case 3:11/27/2000: Before and after filtering
20 25 30 35 40
VPE (Meter)
15 20 25 30
VPE (Meter)
Figure 5 .3  Case 3:11/27/2000: Before and after filtering.
On November 27^, 2000, WAAS SIS performance is good as shown in upper part 
o f Fig. 5.3. There is no NI or HMI in the original triangle chart. An excellent 
performance improvement is achieved after the pseudo- VPL algorithm is applied. The 
system availability is improved without generating additional M l or HMI event as 
demonstrated in the lower part of Fig. 5.3. Most data points are squeezed into the lower 
part o f the upper half o f the triangle chart and there is no HMI present before and after 
the algorithm is applied. The system availability is improved and yet the integrity is not 
compromised. Thus, the research goal has clearly been achieved in this case.
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Case 4: 05/01/2001: Before and after filtering
20 25 30
VPE (Meter)
Figure 5 .4  Case 4: 05/01/2001: Before and after the filtering.
May 2001 recorded an excellent data set as shown in upper part o f Fig. 5.4. 
The pseudo- VPL algorithm shows that it works perfectly as shown in the lower half o f 
Fig. 5.4. From case 1 to case 4 it can be observed that there is a possible pattern that the 
pseudo- VPL algorithm works well on good data sets, while less perfectly on days with 
significant MI and HMI occurrences.
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Case 5:11/12/2001: Before and after filtering
VRE (Meter)
35 A O  A O  50
VPE (Meter)
Figure 5. 5 Case 5:11/12/2001: Before and after filtering.
A good WAAS data set was recorded on November 12'*’, 2001 as shown in upper 
half of Fig. 5.5. The pseudo- VPL algorithm works very well to improve the system 
availability while without generating extra MI or HMI event as illustrated in the lower 
half o f Fig. 5.5. This confirms the observation made in case 4 about how the pseudo- 
VPL algorithm works better on good data sets.
I l l
Case 6: 05/02/2002: Before and after filtering
10 15 2 0  25 30 35 40 45 50
VPE (Meter)
VPE (Meter)
Figure S. 6 Case 6: 05/02/2002: Before and after filtering.
On May 2"^, 2002 a less-than-desired WAAS data set is observed as shown in the 
upper part o f Fig. 5.6. There are MI events and some data points close to the borderline. 
The pseudo- VPL algorithm performs with mixed results. The system availability is 
improved as the locus of data points are translated downwards as shown in the lower half 
of Fig. 5.6. At the same time, the system integrity performance is mixed as well. Some 
previously non-existed MI was generated while some previously existed MI events are 
removed.
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Case 7:10/12/2002: Before and after filtering
10 15 20 25 30
VPE (Meter)
35 40 45 50
5 10  15 20 25 30
VPE (Meter)
35 40 45 50
Figure 5. 7 Case 7:10/12/2002: Before and after Altering.
On October 12^ % 2002 the WAAS performance is again very poor as shown in the 
upper part o f Fig. 5.7. Consistent MI and HMI events are present. The pseudo- 
VPL algorithm doesn’t help in term o f integrity although the system availability seems to 
be improved as shown in the lower part o f Fig. 5.7. Details about the tradeoff between the 
Integrity and Availability performance will be investigated in the next section.
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Case 8:10/28/2002: Before and after filtering
\/F»E (Meter)
à
VPE (Meter)
Figure 5. 8 Case 8:10/28/2002: Before and after filtering.
WAAS data recorded on 10/28/2002 shown in upper Fig. 5.8 is an example of 
poor WAAS performance. As the lower part o f Fig. 5.8 shows, the performance o f the 
pseudo- VPL algorithm is not very good. Although the system availability seems to be 
improved, the integrity of the system is sacrificed since there seem to be more MI and 
HMI occurrences as shown in the lower Fig. 5.8. As in Fig. 5.6 and 5.7, the seriousness 
o f the integrity sacrifice needs further study in the next section.
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Case 9: 03/14/2003: Before and after filtering
20 25 30
VPE (Meter)
35 40 45 50
Figure 5 ,9  Case 9: 03/14/2003: Before and after filtering.
March 2003 witnessed a day o f quality WAAS data as illustrated in upper 
part o f Fig. 5.9. There is no MI or HMI and the data cluster is away from the borderline 
VPL = VPE, which is desired of the system integrity monitoring algorithm. In the lower 
part o f Fig. 5.9, the pseudo- VPL algorithm performs consistently well like the cases 
presented previously on days with good WAAS data. The locus o f data is translated 
downwards and compressed. Therefore, the system availability is improved while the 
integrity is kept intact.
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Case 10: 05/29/2003: Before and after filtering
VPE (Meter)
VPE (Meter)
Figure 5.10 Case 10: 05/29/2003: Before and after filtering.
May 29*'', 2003 is yet another example o f bad WAAS performance. Considerable 
amount o f MI and HMI occurrences results as shown in the triangle chart in upper Fig. 
5.10. The pseudo- VPL algorithm again seems to improve the system availability. 
However, the change on system integrity is inconclusive from the lower half o f Fig. 5.10. 
More investigation in the next section is needed to gauge how the integrity in this case 
performs under the pseudo- VPL algorithm.
Using the pseudo- VPL algorithm proposed in this dissertation and demonstrated 
in the previous examples, one can see the improvements in system availability by simply
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looking at Fig. 5.1 through 5.10. Even without quantitative analysis to back up yet, it can 
be concluded that the system availability performance is improved.
Understandably, with the Kalman filtering and bias reduction one can lower the 
VPL significantly and therefore increase the system availability. This process essentially 
translates the whole data set cluster downward by a bias-reduction size, which is a trial- 
and-readjustment process. For Z, FPL, this bias-reduction size is determined, by 
experiment, to be 0.15, which is a compromise value to maximize the pseudo- 
VPL algorithm’s ability o f increasing system availability and to minimize the chance o f 
generating additional MI or HMI occurrences. This improvement corresponds to a 3dB 
decrease in VPL magnitude. For the bias reduction, however, it seems the pseudo- 
VPL algorithm does not work well. Some VPE filtering and/or range-correction domain 
solution is needed for improvement o f the bogus bias reducing demonstrated in Section 
4.3.
5.2 Performance of the pseudo- VPL algorithm after altitude 
smoothing
In the Section 5.1 only VPL is filtered. The results have shown promise. 
Improvement on availability has been observed. However, the algorithm can still be 
improved, as evidenced in Section 4.3. Efforts to remove the bogus bias in the WAAS 
SIS will be presented in this section. To ensure consistency throughout this dissertation, 
the same cases presented in Section 5.1 will be treated in this section. I have generated 
tables based on these same data sets to demonstrate the performance improvement o f the
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pseudo- VPL algorithm over the present algorithm. Each table lists the averaged system 
performance after the combined VPL and VPE filtering is applied.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the performance metrics are defined in a statistical 
sense. Since it is impossible to have the performance metrics as strictly defined in the 
WAAS MOPS, the averaging-over-certain-period-of-time performance is used. For each 
case there is about 24 hours worth o f data. I used a time interval o f 30 minutes to do the 
averaging. This 30-minute interval was chosen so that for each case reasonable-sized 
tables could be generated and the reported performance could remain close to the strictly 
defined one. There are 9000 data samples for each interval. Thus, these data sets are large 
enough to ensure that the calculated performance is close to the actual performance.
For every case there are four tables that present the following performance 
metrics: CAT I Availability, CAT I Un-Availability, CAT I Misleading Information (MI) 
and CAT I Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI). These metrics are defined in the 
seven-section triangle chart in Fig. 3.1 as area 1 (CAT I Availability), area 3 (Un- 
Availability), area 4+5+6 (Misleading Information (MI)), and area 7 (Hazardously 
Misleading Information (HMI)). Area 2 is not directly related to CAT I precision 
approach thus is not listed here. Each table contains three columns that present:
1. Performance before the pseudo- VPL algorithm is applied;
2. Performance after the pseudo-FPL algorithm is applied;
3. Relative change between the before and after performance. Defined as
_ , .  Column 2 - Column 1 .
Column 3 = -----------------------------  (5.1)
Column 1
In certain cases, column three has no physical meanings because datum in column 
one is nearly zero. When this happens, column three has a value o f NaN, which stands for
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“Not a Number” and is the result o f zero divided by zero or infinity divided by infinity. 
Although this NaN doesn’t provide much information for us except that there is not much 
change before and after the pseudo- VPL algorithm is applied, I kept them in for the 
reason o f keeping the tables in each case to appear consistent. In the majority o f the cases 
from our WAAS data archive, this problem does not occur and one can get some insight 
into the averaged system performance.
Case 1: Dec. 1*‘, 1999
1 S 2 2.5
Sample from Start of Record
Figure 5.11 Case 1 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .1  Case 1 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
CAT I Aval 
Before
0.996256705
0.921588889
0.957779012
0.354298148
0.615676543
0.67725
0.582081481
0.698658025
0.711151852
0.6961
0.687915432
0.66947716
0.694453704
CAT I Aval 
After
1
0.999559259
0.998216049
0.91470679
0.987851728
0.93260321
0.991814321
0.992561975
1
1
1
1
1
Rela. Change
0.00375736
0.084604286
0.04221959
1.581743074
0.604497913
0.377044238
0.703909766
0.420669255
0.406169438
0.436575205
0.453667055
0.493702936
0.4399808
CAT I Aval 
Before
0.547908025
0.548482716
0.550003086
0.550437654
0.55102284
0.54931358
0.549038272
0.549243827
0.549900617
0.549995679
0.549946296
0.549646914
0.549762963
CAT I Aval 
After
0.88982716
0.547012222
0.768648025
0.768872222
0.768888889
0.768742593
0.768272099
0.768660988
0.769810617
0.77
0.77
0.769992593
0.77
Rela. Change
0.624044767
-0.002681021
0.397534021
0.396837982
0.395384789
0.399460382
0.399305182
0.399489534
0.399908625
0.400010999
0.400136714
0.400885866
0.400603627
119
0.712092593 1 0.404311757 0.55 0.77 0.4
0.645302469 0.958790617 0.485800323 0.55 0.77 0.4
0.547777778 0.999425185 0.824508452 0.54997284 0.77 0.400069139
0.537940741 0.99518716 0.849994033 0.549843827 0.769998765 0.400395398
0.536723457 1 0.863156878 0.549504321 0.769938272 0.401150532
0.539337654 1 0.85412608 0.55007284 0.769991605 0.399799353
0.520590123 1 0.920896988 0.550812346 0.769941481 0.39782902
0.541741975 0.994235432 0.835256409 0.550924074 0.77 0.397651757
0.547617284 0.997824691 0.822120522 0.54952963 0.768910247 0.399215266
0.548691358 0.999673704 0.821923544 0.548969753 0.76881284 0.400464844
0.548706173 1 0.822469018 0.548956173 0.769381605 0.401535574
■g
¥ .03
.02
O
Sample from Start of Record
Figure 5.12 Case 1 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .2  Case 1 Un-Availablllty Performance comparison.
Un-Aval
Before
0
0.000071303
0.003412969
0.00650164
0.011038605
0.010378936
0.009015992
0.00854104
0.00784432
0.00784432
0.00784432
0.00784432
0.00784432
0.00784432
0.00740024
0.005673047
0.005620071
0.005301434
0.005301434
Un-Aval After
0
0
0
0
0
0.000107989
0.000121004
0.00013642
0.000227114
0.000227114
0.000227114
0.000227114
0.000227114
0.000227114
0.000227114
0.000227114
0.000214706
0.000135933
0.000135933
Rela. Change
NaN
-1
-1
-1
-1
-0.989595349
-0.986578975
-0.984027672
-0.971047277
-0.971047277
-0.971047277
-0.971047277
-0.971047277
-0.971047277
-0.969309855
-0.95996606
-0.961796525
-0.974359149
-0.974359149
Un-Aval
Before
0.005071189
0.015447453
0.027044918
0.027502228
0.027502228
0.025854269
0.03757498
0.043611045
0.045588818
0.04557011
0.04557011
0.04557011
0.04557011
0.04557011
0.04557011
0.04557011
0.04557011
0.040006867
0.03485013
Un-Aval After
0.000365102
0.000542958
0.006312627
0.00640025
0.00640025
0.005987797
0.02170263
0.028734915
0.031277971
0.031487384
0.031487384
0.031487384
0.031487384
0.031487384
0.031487384
0.031487384
0.031487384
0.031487384
0.029400171
Rela. Change
-0.92800458
-0.964851309
-0.766587308
-0.76728247
-0.76728247
-0.768402009
-0.422418044
-0.341109225
-0.313911344
-0.309034276
-0.309034276
-0.309034276
-0.309034276
-0.309034276
-0.309034276
-0.309034276
-0.309034276
-0.212950516
-0.156382746
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0.005016394
0.004622827
0.004767023
0.004782475
0.000135933
0.000135933
0.000135933
0.000337256
0.000365102
-0.974359149
-0.972902192
-0.970595206
-0.92925234
-0.923658269
0.034486479
0.034486479
0.032704208
0.035358208
0.05022525
0.023748868
0.023748868
0.023170374
0.024166032
0.033629982
-0.311357124
-0.311357124
-0.291517053
-0.316536858
-0.330416834
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Figure 5 .13 Case 1 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.
Table 5 .3  Case I Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison.
Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.000440741 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.001783951 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.000556173 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.002175309 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5 .14 Case 1 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Table S. 4 Case 1 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.001001111 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Case 2: Apr. 28th, 2000
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Figure 5 .15 Case 2 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5. 5 Case 2 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
CAT I Aval 
Before
1
0.894822222
0.57270716
0.745559506
0.931216049
0.933333333
0.929945679
0.931639506
0.933333333
0.933333333
0.933333333
0.932937654
0.933333333
0.933333333
0.933333333
0.933333333
0.933333333
0.917397531
0.843115062
0.754520741
0.755544444
0.755546296
0.755530247
0.755555556
CAT I Aval 
After
1
0.96095963
0.947777778
0.948676667
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888642
0.948887037
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.949181235
0.948888889
0.948877901
0.948881358
0.948888889
0.948888889
Rela. Change
0
0.073911226
0.654908203
0.27243588
0.018978238
0.016666667
0.020370233
0.018515083
0.016666667
0.016666667
0.016666402
0.017095872
0.016666667
0.016666667
0.016666667
0.016666667
0.016666667
0.03432684
0.125802726
0.257604778
0.255886279
0.255887776
0.255924422
0.255882353
CAT I Aval 
Before
0.755554074
0.755555556
0.755555556
0.755555556
0.755555556
0.755548765
0.755555556
0.756247654
0.756666667
0.756662963
0.756666049
0.756666667
0.75658642
0.757582469
0.757775309
0.757777778
0.757437901
0.756661728
0.756641975
0.756666667
0.75600679
0.755554938
0.755326173
0.75555037
0.75555
CAT I Aval 
After
0.948886667
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.94888716
0.948888889
0.948885309
0.948888889
0.948884568
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888642
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948878272
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948872346
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
0.948888889
Rela. Change
0.255881874
0.255882353
0.255882353
0.255880065
0.255882353
0.255888901
0.255882353
0.254727287
0.254038179
0.254044317
0.254039202
0.254037853
0.254171188
0.252522237
0.252203494
0.252199413
0.252747281
0.254046363
0.254079102
0.254038179
0.255110877
0.255883379
0.256263748
0.255890972
0.255891587
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Figure 5 .16 Case 2 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .6  Case 2 Un-Availability Performance comparison.
Un-Avai
Before
0
0.002134355
0,010283627
0.010033374
0.008568127
0.008568127
0.008568127
0.008568127
0.008568127
0.008568127
0.005558282
0.002971327
0.002971327
0.002971327
0.002971327
0.002971327
0.003161229
0.003193115
0.005939411
0.026914759
0.03281279
0.031402745
0.030912428
0.030912428
Un-Avai After
0
0.00024567
0.07926888
0.30127053
0.30641049
0.30641049
0.30641049
0.30641049
0.30641049
0.30641049
0.183382171
0.077499714
0.077499714
0.077499714
0.077499714
0.077499714
0.053224794
0.053176382
0.049963786
0.076546623
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
Rela. Change 
NaN 
-0.884897276 
6.708260879 
29.02684103
34.76166708
34.76166708
34.76166708
34.76166708
34.76166708
34.76166708 
31.99259989
25.08252885
25.08252885
25.08252885
25.08252885
25.08252885 
15.83674003 
15.65345192 
7.412245385 
1.844038935 
1.771259471 
1.895694483
1.941624496
1.941624496
Un-Aval
Before
0.030912428
0.030912428
0.030912428
0.027762394
0.02395428
0.023439149
0.022372155
0.021740894
0.021371986
0.021371986
0.021371986
0.021371986
0.021371986
0.018595505
0.018037172
0.018037172
0.017621971
0.016680894
0.016680894
0.016680894
0.016048799
0.015622063
0.015622063
0.015622063
0.015622063
Un-Avai After
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
0.090932756
Rela. Change
1.941624496
1.941624496
1.941624496 
2.275393213 
2.796096468 
2.879524692 
3.064550616 
3.182567401
3.254764043
3.254764043
3.254764043
3.254764043
3.254764043 
3.890039575
4.041408591
4.041408591 
4.160192219
4.451311882
4.451311882
4.451311882 
4.666016164
4.820790381
4.820790381
4.820790381
4.820790381
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Figure 5 .17 Case 2 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.
Table 5 .7  Case 2 Misleading Information (MI) Performanee comparison.
Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0.000001481 0.000002222 -0.999997778
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000001728 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000002963 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000004321 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.000000247 NaN 0 0 NaN
0.000395679 0.000001852 -0.999998148 0 0.000000247 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000002469 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.000010988 NaN 0 0.000008765 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN
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Figure 5 .18 Case 2 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Table 5. 8 Case 2 Hazardonsly Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000000123 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000003086 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN
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Figure 5 .19 Case 3 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5. 9 Case 3 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
itT 1 Aval CAT 1 Avai CAT 1 Aval CAT 1 Aval
»fore After Rela. Change Before After Rela. Change
1 1 0 0.339505556 0.84111 1.477455777
0.989432716 1 0.010680144 0.339741852 0.84105321 1.475565507
1 1 0 0.341111111 0.841111111 1.465798046
0.987293827 0.969521728 -0.01800082 0.341111111 0.841111111 1.465798046
1 1 0 0.341412222 0.841470247 1.464675229
1 1 0 0.342216049 0.842222222 1.461083353
0.976654938 1 0.023903081 0.342222222 0.842222222 1.461038961
0.612639012 1 0.6322826 0.341708148 0.842222222 1.464741408
0.289430864 0.87715963 2.030636114 0.341540741 0.842222222 1.46594951
0.287777778 0.901060741 2.131099099 0.341965309 0.842222222 1.462887904
0.766593704 1 0.304471971 0.342118025 0.842222222 1.46178851
0.806055556 1 0.240609277 0.341687531 0.842041235 1.464360442
0.779080864 1 0.283563807 0.342222222 0.842142346 1.460805556
0.833333333 1 0.2 0.343025185 0.84323284 1.458224282
0.371467284 0.844653457 1.273830007 0.343298765 0.843333333 1.456558014
0.338888889 0.840670617 1.480667395 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0.339151852 0.841111111 1.480042808 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0.338907407 0.841111111 1.481831594 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0.339935679 0.841111111 1.4743243 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0.340804815 0.840965309 1.467586349 0.343042593 0.843332346 1.458389611
0.341195062 0.840328889 1.462898744 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0.341885185 0.841096173 1.460171453 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0.340647654 0.841093333 1.469100617 0.343035309 0.842599753 1.456306193
0.34 0.841111111 1.473856209 0.343198025 0.842222222 1.454041578
0.339916667 0.841111111 1.474462695 0.343717778 0.841835432 1.449205385
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Figure 5. 20 Case 3 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .10 Case 3 Un-Availability Performance comparison.
Un-Avai
Before
1
0.989432716
1
0.987293827
1
1
0.976654938
0.612639012
0.289430864
0.287777778
0.766593704
0.806055556
0.779080864
0.833333333
0.371467284
0.338888889
0.339151852
0.338907407
0.339935679
0.340804815
0.341195062
0.341885185
0.340647654
0.34
0.339916667
Un-Aval After
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.000321017
0.000443088
0.000443088
0.000443088
0.000443088
0.01660538
0.052166726
0.05263197
0.05263197
0.05263197
0.051369131
0.044470955
0.044468237
0.041887423
0.039821414
0.039821414
Rela. Change
NaN
NaN
NaN
-0.932955913
-0.912143248
-0.912143248
-0.912143248
-0.912143248
-0.255289158
-0.178349896
-0.176800242
-0.176800242
-0.176800242
-0.061352998
-0.387583637
-0.447201436
-0.442074048
-0.462390851
- 0.462390851
Un-Aval
Before
0.339505556
0.339741852
0.341111111
0.341111111
0.341412222
0.342216049
0.342222222
0.341708148
0.341540741
0.341965309
0.342118025
0.341687531
0.342222222
0.343025185
0.343298765
0.343333333
0.343333333
0.343333333
0.343333333
0.343042593
0.343333333
0.343333333
0.343035309
0.343198025
0.343717778
Un-Aval After
0.039821414
0.038048735
0.033429586
0.033429586
0.031600987
0.030142574
0.030142574
0.030142574
0.030142574
0.030142574
0.030142574
0.030142574
0.030142574
0.023980034
0.023601039
0.023601039
0.023601039
0.023601039
0.023601039
0.023601039
0.023601039
0.023601039
0.022099327
0.021844002
0.021530718
Rela. Change
-0.425984745
-0.404215262
-0.466446536
-0.466446536
-0.464024243
-0.471209823
-0.471209823
-0.471209823
-0.462970585
-0.396008996
-0.396008996
-0.368450246
-0.358918079
-0.469175429
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.454594976
-0.44223263
- 0.441245768
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Figure 5. 21 Case 3 CAT I FA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.
Table 5. II Case 3 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison.
Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5 .22 Case 3 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Table 5.12 Case 3 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Case 4: May. 1st, 2001
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Figure 5. 23 Case 4 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5.13 Case 4 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
CAT I Avai 
Before
0.409457831
0.892427878
1
0.99999321
0.999378272
0.998888889
0.999640864
1
0.999989506
0.999858642
1
0.999080741
0.999702469
0.99959321
0.998888889
0.99924642
0.999957407
0.999636296
0.999924815
0.999980864
0.999990741
0.999723333
0.998982099
0.998888889
0.998888889
CAT I Aval 
After
0.721177912
0.902281358
0.932222222
0.932222222
0.922961481
0.927429383
0.932222222
0.932222222
0.931816049
0.932222222
0.932222222
0.926910247
0.915534198
0.925463086
0.921058642
0.922857407
0.925555556
0.925891728
0.926666667
0.926590123
0.926666667
0.926666667
0.926592593
0.926415062
0.926458025
Rela. Change
0.761299596
0.011041205
-0.067777778
-0.067771448
-0.07646433
-0.071538994
-0.067442863
-0.067777778
-0.068174172
-0.067645982
-0.067777778
-0.072236898
-0.084193322
-0.074160291
-0.077916821
-0.076446621
-0.074405021
-0.073771399
-0.073263656
-0.073392145
-0.073324753
-0.073076885
-0.072463267
-0.072554443
-0.072511432
CAT I Aval 
Before
0.99906
0.999994444
0.999930864
0.999106667
0.998888889
0.99958284
0.999983951
0.999932716
0.998971481
0.998888889
0.999197037
0.99937037
0.999868395
0.999209259
0.999466667
0.99890679
0.998888889
0.999008642
0.998888889
0.999011728
0.343333333
0.343333333
0.343035309
0.343198025
0.343717778
CAT I Aval 
After
0.926666667
0.926666667
0.926666667
0.926666667
0.926663457
0.926666667
0.926658272
0.926666667
0.926553951
0.926666667
0.926666667
0.926666667
0.926666667
0.926666667
0.926666667
0.926576914
0.926280123
0.926623951
0.926357037
0.926666667
0.843333333
0.843333333
0.842599753
0.842222222
0.841835432
Rela. Change
-0.072461447
-0.073328185
-0.073269263
-0.072504771
-0.072305772
-0.072946603
-0.073326856
-0.073270979
-0.07249209
-0.072302558
-0.072588656
-0.072749509
-0.073211363
-0.0726
-0.072838847
-0.072409035
-0.072689532
-0.072456522
-0.072612532
-0.072416629
1.45631068
1.45631068 
1.456306193 
1.454041578 
1.449205385
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Figure 5. 24 Case 4 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5.14 Case 4 Un-Availability Performance comparison.
Un-Avai
Before
1
0,276481225
0,286429143
0,286429143
0.286429143
0,092892453
0,067634553
0,067634553
0,065811379
0,037868454
0,037868454
0,037868454
0,029245927
0,026263971
0,025525822
0,025525822
0,025525822
0,027646888
0,032278981
0,032139373
0,032118125
0,032118125
0,031928243
0,03408043
0,036794301
Un-Aval After Rela. Change
1
0,133600023
0,108297583
0,108297583
0,108297583
0,108297583
0,108297583
0,108297583
0,102538477
0,013899895
0,013899895
0,013899895
0,010808347
0,009873793
0,009680351
0,009680351
0,009680351
0.013888562
0,020402137
0,020402137
0,020402137
0,020402137
0.020402137
0,020296889
0,015970258
0
-0,516784467
-0,621904455
-0,621904455
-0,621904455
0,165838339
0,601216816
0,601216816
0,558066065
-0,632942641
-0,632942641
-0,632942641
-0,630432397
-0,624055577
-0,620762405
-0,620762405
-0,620762405
-0,49764464
-0,367943596
-0,365198045
-0,364778089
-0,364778089
-0,361000332
-0,404441541
- 0,565958389
Un-Avai
Before
0,036904056
0,036904056
0,036904056
0,036904056
0,036904056
0,036904056
0,036904056
0,036904056
0,03420468
0,028490671
0,028490671
0.028490671
0,028490671
0,028490671
0,028490671
0,026792355
0,02405613
0,023724746
0,023309322
0,023128519
0,045179546
0.045179546
0,040519112
0,039163285
0,038533431
Un-Avai After
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0.015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,015970412
0,023601039
0,023601039
0,022099327
0,021844002
0 ,021530718
Rela. Change
-0,567245077
-0,567245077
-0,567245077
-0,567245077
-0,567245077
-0,567245077
-0,567245077
-0,567245077
-0,533092789
-0,439451187
-0.439451187
-0,439451187
-0,439451187
-0.439451187
-0,439451187
-0,403919068
-0,336118817
-0.326845824
-0,31484872
-0,309492677
-0,477616727
-0.477616727
-0,454594976
-0,44223263
- 0,441245768
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Figure 5. 25 Case 4 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.
Tabie 5.15 Case 4 Misieading Information (MI) Performance comparison.
Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5. 26 Case 4 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Tabie 5 .16 Case 4 Hazardously Misieading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5. 27 Case 5 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .17 Case 5 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
CAT 1 Avai CAT 1 Avai CAT 1 Avai CAT 1 Avai
Before After Rela. Change Before After Reia. Change
0.418901742 0 0.999548765 0
0.935483951 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
0.989988889 0 1 0
0.985662963 0 1 0
0.995564815 0 1 0
0.987672222 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
0.96567037 0 0.998453086 0
0.716904938 0 0.675561235 0
1 0 0.438767284 0
0.878761728 0 0.946107284 0
0.984917284 0 0.61424642 0
0.536017407 0 0.36685 0.14010037 -0.618099031
0.847797407 0 0.787567778 0
0.91258284 0 0.904274074 0
0.950109753 0 0.998888889 0.926280123 -0.072689532
0.858035926 0.006422593 -0.992514774 0.999008642 0.926623951 -0.072456522
0.297256667 0.131253827 -0.558449509 0 998888889 0.926357037 -0.072612532
0.999514815 0 0.999011728 0.926666667 -0.072416629
1 0 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0.966157407 0 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
1 0 0.343035309 0.842599753 1.456306193
0.775574074 0 0.343198025 0.842222222 1.454041578
0.915330247 0 0.343717778 0.841835432 1.449205385
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Figure 5. 28 Case 5 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .18 Case 5 Un-Availability Performance comparison.
Un-Avai
Before
1
1
1
1
0.217116546
0.038621661
0.035909695
0.023191145
0.023191145
0.023191145
0.023191145
0.014219288
0.013962358
0.013962358
0.013962358
0.013962358
0.013962358
0.013962358
0.013962358
0.011348876
0.007962703
0.007962703
0.007962703
0.007962703
0.007962703
Un-Avai After Rela. Change
0 
0 
0 
0
3.60582124 
24.89220564 
22.17837968 
-0.050854186 
-0.050854186 
-0.050854186 
-0.050854186 
0.548022562 
0.576508705 
0.576508705 
0.576508705 
0.576508705 
0.576508705 
0.576508705 
0.576508705 
0.730249102
1.56844053
1.56844053
1.56844053
1.56844053
1.56844053
0.83232855
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.022011778
0.019636383
0.02045173
0.02045173
0.02045173
0.02045173
0.02045173
Un-Aval
Before
0.007423421
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.006537026
0.02405613
0.023724746
0.023309322
0.023128519
0.045179546
0.045179546
0.040519112
0.039163285
0.038533431
Un-Aval After
0.018849051 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0.016195271 
0 016195271 
0.016194585 
0.015970412 
0.015970412 
0.015970412 
0.015970412 
0.023601039 
0.023601039 
0.022099327 
0.021844002
0 .021530718
Rela. Change
1.539132665
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477467674
1.477362779
-0.336116817
-0.326845824
-0.31484872
-0.309492677
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.454594976
-0.44223263
- 0.441245768
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Figure 5 .29 Case 5 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green) 
processing.
Table 5 .19 Case 5 Misleading Information (Ml) Performance comparison.
Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change
0 0.467404812 NaN 0 0.990984974 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.988782999 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.986533492 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.988379542 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.764760776 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.984677443 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.859846208 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.991100036 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5 .30 Case 5 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Table 5.20 Case 5 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5.31 Case 6 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5.21 Case 6 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
CAT I Avai 
Before
CAT 1 Aval CAT 1 Aval CAT 1 Aval
After Rela. Change Before After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.125387189 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0.506277778 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.777144568 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0.11904284 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.000224074 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0.000301728 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0.001060988 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0.000162222 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.000018765 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0.000611728 Inf 0.904274074 0 -1
0 0.00007716 Inf 0.998888889 0.926280123 -0.072689532
0 0 NaN 0.999008642 0.926623951 -0.072456522
0 0 NaN 0.998888889 0.926357037 -0.072612532
0 0 NaN 0.999011728 0.926666667 -0.072416629
0 0 NaN 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0 0 NaN 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0 0 NaN 0.343035309 0.842599753 1.456306193
0 0 NaN 0.343198025 0.842222222 1.454041578
0 0 NaN 0.343717778 0.841835432 1.449205385
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Figure 5.32 Case 6 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5.22 Case 6 Un-Availability Performance comparison.
Un-Avai
Before
1
1
0.97087911 
0.926477208 
0.940845875 
0.901061513 
0.746992253 
0.738278349 
0.758802507 
0.756515802 
0.726017765 
0.647313054 
0.671124928 
0.695864952 
0.708809711 
0.688358582 
0.641519592 
0.660092941 
0.678670235 
0.695321682 
0.710332051 
0.723932596 
0.73631306 
0.747630599 
0.758016482
Un-Aval After
0.66967657
0.934497963
0.95053148
0.95053148
0.95053148
0.95053148
0.638208233
0.282932975
0.298762067
0.30500703
0.309014599
0.287075414
0.306602526
0.356845038
0.369077921
0.354512155
0.313485322
0.300107571
0.292810255
0.317654735
0.339832507
0.337573875
0.365936735
0.393150959
0.418124917
Rela. Change
-0.33032343
-0.065502037
-0.020957944
0.025963155
0.010294571
0.054901876
-0.145629382
-0.616766529
-0.60627164
-0.596826623
-0.574370472
-0.556512243
-0.543151338
-0.487192109
-0.479299006
-0.484989126
-0.511339442
-0.545355582
-0.568552973
-0.54315428
-0.52158641
-0.533694328
-0.503014744
-0.474137416
- 0 .448396008
Un-Aval
Before
0.766879408
0.756788635
0.755400075
0.729945261
0.726280627
0.72667017
0.72667017
0.6889281
0.669136528
0.669136528
0.633282437
0.601578118
0.599031741
0.573139956
0.565736424
0.006537026
0.02405613
0.023724746
0.023309322
0.023128519
0.045179546
0.045179546
0.040519112
0.039163285
0.038533431
Un-Aval After
0.439436765 
0.439047145 
0.439126563 
0.435211705 
0.41149171 
0.411559857 
0.411559857 
0.387814353 
0.375362444 
0.375362444 
0.375362444 
0.343824275 
0.33665632 
0.321961363 
0.321961363 
0.016194585 
0 015970412 
0.015970412 
0.015970412 
0.015970412 
0.023601039 
0.023601039 
0.022099327 
0.021844002 
0 .021530718
Rela. Change
-0.426980617
-0.419854997
-0.418683453
-0.403774874
-0.433426014
-0.433635955
-0.433635955
-0.437075722
-0.439034594
-0.439034594
-0.407274823
-0.428462797
-0.437999196
-0.438250012
-0.430898649
1.477362779
-0.336118817
-0.326845824
-0.31484872
-0.309492677
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.454594976
-0.44223263
- 0.441245768
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Figure 5.33 Case 6 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.
Tabie S. 23 Case 6 Misieading Information (MI) Performance comparison.
Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000021358 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001099506 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000804691 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0,001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0.000719877 0.001743827 998256173 0.
0 0 NaN 0 0.991100036 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5.34 Case 6 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Table S. 24 Case 6 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000000247 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000011605 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.00030642 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000032716 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 Inf
0 0 NaN 0.000318519 0.000478395 501937984
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5 .35 Case 7 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5. 25 Case 7 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
CAT I Avai 
Before
CAT 1 Aval 
After Rela. Change
CAT 1 Aval 
Before
CAT 1 Aval 
After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0.728603457 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.219577037 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.010678519 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.342277778 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.849012469 Inf 0 0.728510617 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.728232222 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.727883704 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.728736173 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.728314444 Inf
0 0.728066914 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.727778272 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.727777778 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0 0.728555556 Inf
0 0.727777778 Inf 0.999011728 0.926666667 -0.072416629
0 0.728223827 Inf 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0 0.728654815 Inf 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0 0.727777778 Inf 0.343035309 0.842599753 1.456306193
0 0.728609877 Inf 0.343198025 0.842222222 1.454041578
0 0.728888889 Inf 0.343717778 0.841835432 1.449205385
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Figure 5 .36 Case 7 CAT 1 PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .26 Case 7 Un-Availability Performance comparison.
Un-Avai
Before
1
1
0.914260821
0.784946674
0.823119376
0.734285328
0.721827238
0.760780369
0.790152159
0.813093108
0.814930878
0.788104309
0.778783597
0.795602037
0.810042863
0.822577143
0.81992402
0.801375121
0.796418436
0.70641739
0.710028423
0.701459275
0.667774365
0.673905019
0.673905019
Un-Avai After Reia. Change
1
0.995494665
0.992384481
0.992384481
0.992384481
0.516544837
0.283680774
0.327880928
0.376370083
0.376130862
0.330004368
0.328427808
0.288923147
0.287678829
0.255401014
0.24684578
0.26736213
0.261195856
0.261195856
0.261195856
0.261195856
0.261195856
0.237865264
0.196733898
0.196733898
0
-0.004505335
0.08545008
0.264269935
0.205638587
-0.296533899
-0.606996302
-0.569020257
-0.523673917
-0.53740739
-0.595052321
-0.583268605
-0.629007149
-0.63841366
-0.68470679
-0.699911696
-0.673918408
-0.674065429
-0.672036904
-0.630252794
-0.632133239
-0.627639315
-0.643793957
-0.708068804
- 0.708068804
Un-Avai
Before
0.636982318
0.608665834
0.623074236
0.636459212
0.648798657
0.647796972
0.636204693
0.627956458
0.63807207
0.636418371
0.621723964
0.613533085
0.623932648
0.632651671
0.635987887
0.638227848
0.644449752
0.65288263
0.660924738
0.023128519
0.045179546
0.045179546
0.040519112
0.039163285
0.038533431
Un-Avai After
0.196733898
0.196733898
0.178071728
0.203561341
0.224105099
0.225191264
0.225191264
0.217011878
0.235110282
0.236360826
0.229654116
0.223047834
0.223047834
0.215533258
0.214732324
0.214732324
0.207080912
0.204560412
0.210795756
0.015970412
0.023601039
0.023601039
0.022099327
0.021844002
0.021530718
Reia. Change
-0.691147002 
-0 676778476 
-0.714204636 
-0.680165928 
-0.654584521 
-0.652373701 
-0.646039606 
-0.654415724 
-0.631530209 
-0.628607789 
-0.630617237 
-0.636453453 
-0.642512962 
-0.65931765 
-0.662364129 
-0.663549115 
-0.678670197 
-0.686681185 
-0.681059364 
-0.309492677 
-0.477616727 
-0.477616727 
-0.454594976 
-0.44223263 
-0.441245768
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Figure 5 .37  Case 7 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.
Table 5.27 Case 7 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison.
Ml Before
0
Ml After
0
Rela. Change
NaN
Ml Before
0.001111
Ml After
11 0
Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0 0 NaN 0.001111 11 0 -1
0.000785 85 0.000667407 -0.999332593 0.001111 11 0 -1
0.001111 11 0.001111111 -0.998888889 0.001111 11 0 -1
0.001111 11 0.000396049 -0.999603951 0.001111 11 0 -1
0.001111 11 0.000076049 -0.999923951 0 0 NaN
0.001111 11 0 0 0 NaN
0.001111 11 0 0 0 NaN
0.001111 11 0 0 0 NaN
0.001111 11 0 0 0 NaN
0.001111 11 0 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5 .38  Case 7 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Table S. 28 Case 7 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0.000207778 0.00000037 -0.998217469 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0.000715062 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0.000198148 Inf 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure S. 39 Case 8 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .29 Case 8 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
CAT I Avai 
Before
CAT 1 Aval CAT 1 Aval CAT 1 Aval
After Rela. Change Before After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0.002222222 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.002222222 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.002871605 Inf
0 0.00097716 Inf 0 0.002227778 Inf
0 0.002091852 Inf 0 0.002222222 Inf
0 0.002222222 Inf 0 0.002222222 Inf
0 0.002222222 Inf 0 0.002222222 Inf
0 0.002222222 Inf 0 0.002222222 Inf
0 0.002222222 Inf 0 0.002222222 Inf
0 0.002222222 Inf 0 0.002013086 Inf
0 0.002222222 Inf 0 0.001111111 Inf
0 0.002771481 Inf 0 0.001111111 Inf
0 0.002518272 Inf 0 0.00140358 Inf
0 0.002289877 Inf 0 0.002222222 Inf
0 0.002920494 Inf 0 0.00209716 Inf
0 0.002925309 Inf 0 0.001111111 Inf
0 0.003326173 Inf 0 0.001111111 Inf
0 0.003333333 Inf 0 0.001772593 Inf
0 0.002484568 Inf 0 0.728555556 Inf
0 0.002222222 Inf 0.999011728 0.926666667 -0.072416629
0 0.002222222 Inf 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0 0.00326716 Inf 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
22 0.003333333 2.293084523 0.343035309 0.842599753 1.456306193
06 0.003328395 54.47325103 0.343198025 0.842222222 1.454041578
0 0.002287037 Inf 0.343717778 0.841835432 1.449205385
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Figure 5 .40 Case 8 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .30 Case 8 Un-Availability Performance comparison.
Un-Avai
Before
1
0.996221274
0.947138739
0.926206616
0.720552481
0.741650782
0.784536033
0.815190076
0.83819836
0.856106802
0.87044308
0.851914951
0.801732383
0.797520412
0.775628991
0.775459404
0.775459404
0.775459404
0.61448929
0.616567128
0.635610777
0.642923099
0.642923099
0.642923099
0.560045126
Un-Aval After
0.234859299
0.73278756
0.757470923
0.708179759
0.52728654
0.4791235
0.402196316
0.463042269
0.442167531
0.465565874
0.516215586
0.527332432
0.527332432
0.440223996
0.43186511
0.43186511
0.43186511
0.43186511
0.43186511
0.331702315
0.315458446
0.318210165
0.318210165
0.318210165
0.283215026
Rela. Change
-0.765140701
-0.264432934
-0.200253467
-0.235397646
-0.268219104
-0.353976951
-0.487345005
-0.431982452
-0.47247865
-0.456182485
-0.406950784
-0.381003431
-0.342258785
-0.448009118
-0.443206591
-0.443084825
-0.443084825
-0.443084825
-0.297196686
-0.462017516
-0.503692421
-0.50505719
-0.50505719
-0.50505719
- 0.494299632
Un-Aval
Before
0.566553906
0.583194205
0.593804498
0.578741206
0.586743425
0.600496246
0.613262564
0.617961889
0.611245797
0.588747925
0.600417288
0.611501471
0.621502973
0.623932746
0.620081379
0.588641881
0.590986853
0.597425225
0.660924738
0.023128519
0.045179546
0.045179546
0.040519112
0.039163285
0.038533431
Un-Aval After
0.286771938 
0.298787644 
0.296356667 
0.296356667 
0.296356667 
0.293647781 
0.26796195 
0.289208135 
0.293448041 
0.293448041 
0.281303211 
0.279215538 
0.293261307 
0.293914007 
0.293914007 
0.293914007 
0.293914007 
0 293914007 
0.210795756 
0.015970412 
0.023601039 
0.023601039 
0.022099327 
0.021844002 
0.021530718
Rela. Change
-0.493831152
-0.487670418
-0.50091879
-0.487928863
-0.494912675
-0.510991479
-0.5630551
-0.531996811
-0.519918104
-0.501572696
-0.531487156
-0.543393515
-0.528141746
-0.528933192
-0.526007365
-0.50069131
-0.502672512
-0.508032144
-0.681059364
-0.309492677
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.454594976
-0.44223263
-0.441245768
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Figure 5.41 Case 8 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green) 
processing.
Table 5.31 Case 8 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison.
Ml Before
0
0,151888889
Ml After Rela. Change Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change
0 NaN 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 1 0 -1
0 0,001111111 0 -1
0 0 0 NaN
0 0 0 NaN
0 0 0 NaN
0 0 0 NaN
0 0 0 NaN
0 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5.42 Case 8 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Table 5.32 Case 8 Hazardously Misieading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
150
Case 9: Mar. 14th, 2003
1.S 2 2 5
S am p le  f ro m  S ta r t  erf R e c o rd
Figure 5. 43 Case 9 CAT I FA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Tabie 5.33 Case 9 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
CAT I Avai 
Before
CAT 1 Aval 
After Rela. Change
CAT 1 Aval 
Before
CAT 1 Aval 
After Rela. Change
0 0.998661974 Inf 0 0.825839259 Inf
0 0.580832099 Inf 0 0.826653827 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.826634938 Inf
0 0.235065802 Inf 0 0.826648519 Inf
0 0.876995185 Inf 0 0.826666667 Inf
16 0.885555556 4845.621622 0 0.826666667 Inf
0 0.884086543 Inf 0 0.82588284 Inf
0 0.65458 Inf 0 0.825688025 Inf
0 0.598867778 Inf 0 0.826666667 Inf
0 0.885555556 Inf 0.0001 0.826666667 8265.666667
0 0.878920617 Inf 0 0.826405185 Inf
0 0.20754 Inf 0 0.825577654 Inf
0 0.050725802 Inf 0 0.82587 Inf
0 0.219019136 Inf 0 0.82652963 Inf
0 0.775958765 Inf 0 0.826297037 Inf
0 0.826063086 Inf 0 0.825692716 Inf
0 0.826064198 Inf 0 0.825950247 Inf
0 0.825555556 Inf 0 0.826062963 Inf
0 0.825555556 Inf 0 0.728555556 Inf
0 0.825555556 Inf 0.999011728 0.926666667 -0.072416629
0 0.826045185 Inf 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0 0.826666667 Inf 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0 0.826361728 Inf 0.343035309 0.842599753 1.456306193
0 0.825555556 Inf 0.343198025 0.842222222 1.454041578
0 0.825555556 Inf 0.343717778 0.841835432 1.449205385
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Figure 5. 44 Case 9 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .34 Case 9 Un-Availability Performance comparison.
Un-Avai
Before
0
0.052630008
0.42630576
0.59021737
0.553920225
0.512489385
0.512489385
0.342534473
0.295369357
0.295369357
0.266154302
0.203498446
0.222265618
0.231256146
0.24343922
0.271921615
0.267180249
0.278373259
0.317703143
0.353790781
0.379332542
0.381089258
0.358947888
0.351030884
0.348423346
Un-Avai After
0
0
0.004170516
0.006494317
0.006494317
0.006494317
0.006494317
0.006494317
0.006494317
0.006494317
0.006494317
0.003354043
0.001629051
0.001629051
0.015354936
0.037866935
0.037866935
0.037752292
0.044348144
0.076965603
0.090687283
0.090687283
0.090687283
0.090687283
0.085412118
Rela. Change 
NaN
-1
-0.990217079
-0.988996736
-0.988275717
-0.987327899
-0.987327899
-0.981040397
-0.978012894
-0.978012894
-0.975599427
-0.983518093
-0.992670703
-0.992955644
-0.936924971
-0.860743195
-0.858271952
-0.864382475
-0.86041012
-0.78245447
-0.760929335
-0.762031385
-0.74735251
-0.741654404
-0.754861095
Un-Avai
Before
0.369264689
0.374741861
0.374741861
0.374741861
0.374741861
0.374741861
0.332258408
0.319533526
0.319915004
0.319915004
0.319915004
0.293123484
0.293720739
0.293211212
0.283753516
0.281706221
0.283010857
0.281420018
0.660924738
0.023128519
0.045179546
0.045179546
0.040519112
0.039163285
0.038533431
Un-Avai After
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.077359882
0.210795756
0.015970412
0.023601039
0.023601039
0.022099327
0.021844002
0.021530718
Rela. Change
-0.7905029
-0.793564879
-0.793564879
-0.793564879
-0.793564879
-0.793564879
-0.767169529
-0.757897449
-0.758186141
-0.758186141
-0.758186141
-0.736084327
-0.736620975
-0.73616329
-0.727369434
-0.725388096
-0.726654014
-0.725108817
-1.681059364
-0.309492677
-0.477616727
-0.477616727
-0.454594976
-0.44223263
-0.441245768
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Figure 5 .45  Case 9 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.
Table 5 .35  Case 9 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison.
Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0,001111111 0
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5. 46 Case 9 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Table 5 .36 Case 9 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5.47 Case 10 CAT I PA Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Table 5 .37 Case 10 Cat I Availability Performance comparison.
CAT I Avai 
Before
CAT I Aval CAT I Aval CAT I Aval
0
After
0
Rela. Change
NaN
Before
0
After
0
Rela. Change
NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000252222 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.000044568 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000138025 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000502716 Inf
0 0.00001716 Inf 0 0.000237778 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.000005556 Inf
0 0 NaN 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0 0.000000494 Inf 0.343035309 0.842599753 1.456306193
0 0 NaN 0.343198025 0.842222222 1.454041578
0 0 NaN 0.343717778 0.841835432 1.449205385
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Figure 5 .48 Case 10 CAT I PA Un-Availability before (red) and after (green) processing.
Tabie 5 .38 Case 10 Un-Avaiiability Performance comparison.
Un-Avai
Before
0.998181092
0.96714533
0.960370439
0.96227684
0.963811224
0.945810636
0.913111803
Un-Aval After Rela. Change
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0
-0.003805158 
-0.01341703 
-0.083487488 
-0.117981856 
-0.129065679 
-0.101117336 
-0.185627173 
-0.220606248 
-0.210006325 
-0.20343188 
- 0.189957783
0.996194842 
0.98658297 
0.916512512 
0.882018144 
0.869350172 
0.869350172 
0.78209959 
0.749992558 
0.76140477 
0.753402601 
0.73965911
Un-Aval
Before
0.912079047
0.915488258
0.918642918
0.921570514
0.924294239
0.924802923
0.895239324
0.895239387
0.841452597
0.83872087
0.83872087
0.797196666
0.749569707
0.738106943
0.744858246
0.745699556
0.743454166
0.748939606
0.754806615
0.760405662
0.760333447
0.045179546
0.040519112
0.039163285
0.038533431
Un-Avai After
0.723065637
0.676564686
0.673676308
0.685410527
0.696335694
0.701353757
0.701353757
0.701353757
0.638061277
0.634839007
0.634839007
0.634839007
0.634839007
0.555653809
0.562460401
0.564920841
0.558766208
0.539428802
0.544051751
0.534523522
0.532293963
0.023601039
0.022099327
0.021844002
0.021530718
Rela. Change
-0.207233585
-0.260979395
-0.266661403
-0.256258185
-0.246629845
-0.241618144
-0.216574007
-0.216574062
-0.241714531
-0.24308667
-0.24308667
-0.203660735
-0.153062082
-1.247190648
-1.244875916
-1.242428354
-1.248418754
-1.279743256
-1.279217033
-1.297054784
-1.299920363
-0.477616727
-0.454594976
-0.44223263
- 0.441245768
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Figure 5. 49 Case 10 CAT I PA Misleading Information (MI) before (red) and after (green)
processing.
Table S. 39 Case 10 Misleading Information (MI) Performance comparison.
Ml Before Mi After Rela. Change Ml Before Ml After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000020494 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000508148 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000883086 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.00103037 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.001111111 NaN
0 0 NaN 0.002269753 0.000858519 -0.99914148
0 0 NaN 0.007777778 0 -
0 0 NaN 0.007777778 0 -
0 0 NaN 0.007777778 0 -
0 0 NaN 0.007777778 0 -
0 0 NaN 0.007777778 0 -
0 0 NaN 0.007777778 0 -
0 0 NaN 0.007777778 0 -
0 0 NaN 0.007777778 0 -
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
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Figure 5. 50 Case 10 CAT I PA Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) before (red) and after
(green) processing.
Table S. 40 Case 10 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) Performance comparison.
HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change HMI Before HMI After Rela. Change
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0.000000123 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.000602963 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.000228025 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0.000080741 Inf
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0.000045432 0.00000037 -0.991847826
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
0 0 NaN 0 0 NaN
In Case 1, table 5.1 shows a significant improvement o f CAT I availability, 
ranging from 8% to 160% over the un-processed data. The median is about at 60%. This
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is a significant increase. For Un-Availability, it decreases on average by around 50%, 
which is also very good. MI and HMI performances are not bad either, each having a 
couple o f low spikes and not much change.
In Case 2, CAT I availability improves by a median o f about 20%. This is again a 
good increase. The Un-Availability actually increases, which is not good. Thankfully, the 
increase is quite small and could most likely be tolerated. MI and HMI perform OK, each 
having a couple o f low spikes.
In Case 3, on a good day, a significant improvement o f CAT I availability o f 
about 130% occurs. Un-Availability on average decreases by around 40%, which is also 
very good. MI and HMI performances are perfect.
In Case 4, CAT I availability increases sometimes and decreases at other times. 
Un-Availability on average decreases by around 50%. MI and HMI performances are 
perfect again.
In Case 5, Improvement o f CAT I availability is not noticeable. Un-Availability 
performance is poor and increases at low levels. MI performance is also poor. Luckily the 
HMI performance, which is o f more importance, is very good.
In Case 6, Shown in Table 5.21, CAT I availability I slightly improved. The Un- 
Availability on average decreases by around 50%, which is also very good. MI and HMI 
performances are not too bad either, varying at low levels.
In Case 7, shown in Table 5.25, we see a huge improvement o f CAT I availability. 
The Un-Availability on average decreases by around 50%, which again is solid. MI 
decreases and that is very nice to have. HMI performance has good and bad moments.
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In Case 8, CAT I availability improves immensely. Un-Availability decreases by 
around 50%, which is also very good. MI is decreased by 100% and that is great. HMI is 
perfect.
In Case 9, CAT I availability is again dramatically increased. The Un-Availability 
decreases by around 70%, which is very good. MI and HMI performances are simply 
perfect.
In Case 10, CAT I availability performance is just Okay because o f the data type 
on that specific day. Un-Availability on average decreases by around 40%, which is not 
bad. MI wavers but does have some bursty regions where MI is decreased by 100%. HMI 
has a small spike.
5.3 Conclusions
This research has developed a new algorithm to tighten up the overly conservative 
VPL specification. This new algorithm is called the pseudo- VPL. In ordinary cases, the 
pseudo- VPL reduces the VPL magnitude by 3dB, which is significant. This helps 
increase the system availability a tremendous amount. This can be shown by an example: 
A VPL at 18 meters is not good for CAT I precision approach. With a 3dB improvement, 
the new pseudo- VPL becomes less than 12 meters, good enough for CAT I precision 
approach. VPE filtering helps reduce invalid bias, but to a lesser reliability.
This pseudo- VPL algorithm alone will improve the compactness o f the VPL data 
footprint. However, it doesn’t improve the integrity, which is o f crucial importance. As a 
mater o f fact, the pseudo- VPL algorithm can potentially generate additional HMIs if  no 
other action is taken since the new pseudo- VPL moves the data cluster downward
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without interfering with actual system error. This can move data points above the 
diagonal line under it, hence creating new HMIs. My solution to this is to apply Kalman 
filtering to the actual altitude data so that the VPE is as small as possible, i.e. is as far 
away from the diagonal line as possible. This, combined with a similar fault detection and 
error correction mechanism similar to those in pseudo- VPL, delivers a higher system 
availability for WAAS without penalizing system integrity monitoring capability.
With the new pseudo- VPL algorithm, on good days, which can be expected more 
than 95% of the time when GPS and WAAS are up, one can improve the CAT I 
availability by at least 70 to 100%. Simultaneously, the Un-Availability is decreased by 
at least 50%. At the same time, the integrity is maintained intact, and sometimes even 
improved.
The performance o f the pseudo- VPL algorithm does depend on the data type it is 
applied to. With a diffuse data locus (“peppered” data points), it can induce extra MI or 
even HMI. The good news is that this kind o f hazard is not evidenced by our tables from 
real data. But it is still a concern. With future planned upgrades o f  the GPS and WAAS 
systems, hopefully this kind o f poor data will be eliminated.
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Chapter 6 
Lessons learned and Future Research
WAAS is a well defined space based augmentation system. However, there is still 
a long way to go before WAAS can be utilized as a primary source for various types and 
stages o f flight navigation, especially for precision approach.
The approach that has been taken in this dissertation is position domain based.
The advantages o f this approach include low computational overhead, less interference 
with the current messaging structure and reliable improvement on system availability. 
While the availability can be improved through our algorithm, the integrity has to be 
sacrificed to some degree due to the nature o f the SIS. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the 
sacrifice depends on the WAAS SIS data quality situation. On normal days when the data 
can be classified as good or better, the new algorithm works very well. However, when 
the data points are scattered, even when it is good data according to the criterion 
VPL > VPE , the algorithm performs less than perfectly. This in principle is intolerable. 
More information is needed than mere position-domain information to correct this 
shortcoming.
The easiest way to improve the new algorithm is to include the range/correction 
domain based solution. As demonstrated in the altitude filtering section in Chapter 4 and 
its results in Section 5.2, the position domain solution alone suffers from an integrity 
breach in certain types of data sets under some special satellite configurations. Although 
this will not happen in the majority o f days, this is still a serious problem since it is an 
aviation use. It is recommended to use either range/correction information or the position
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solution to identify the aetual “bogus” points where cases such as those in Section 4.2 
arise. A new problem will be faced with this approach. This approach requires 
significantly more computation than the position domain solution. To avoid this 
undesirable overhead, the messaging structure would have to be modified, which would 
require a significantly long process for approval and certification. Most likely the best 
approach lies somewhere between. The best solution will be some sort o f combination of 
position domain and range/correction domain solutions. Using the new algorithm 
presented in this dissertation as the backbone and the range/correction domain methods as 
a backup to detect false alarms and correct the hard-to-detect biases could be an attractive 
method.
Further research needs to be carried out to leam how best to combine the position 
domain algorithm and the range/correction domain method. Since the range/correction 
domain method usually requires a lot more computation, more need to be learned to have 
these two approaches complement each other in an effective and efficient way.
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Appendix A:
A new position domain algorithm to improve WAAS availability and 
continuity while maintaining integrity
Guangwei Mu, Joebob P. Havlicek, John Fagan, Univ. o f  Oklahoma
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ABSTRACT
The integrity algorithms are well defined in the Wide Area 
Augmentation System (WAAS) Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards (MOPS) [I]. However, our 
experimental data clearly indicate that the MOPS VPL and 
HPL algorithms are over-conservative, at least from a practical 
point of view. As a result, the confidence bounds are 
sufficiently large to cover the correction error and hence to 
some extent guarantees the integrity. However, this lack of 
compactness from the MOPS introduces unnecessary epochs of 
the system being unavailable. To improve the system 
performance, the intuitive approach is through the 
range/correction domain since these factors can be observed, 
controlled and manipulated to improve the system performance 
in individual cases. However, we need a better error model and 
better understanding of the threat model, i.e. we need to know 
more about the nature of all error sources and the threats the 
WAAS faces, which is very difficult due to the stochastic 
natures of these sources, to accomplish this. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that a range/correction domain solution can be applied 
to wide range of applications while having significant 
improvement for the system performance. Besides, it is still 
subject to the hindrance that the WAAS message structure 
might need to be changed or adjusted to take advantage of the 
new development.
In this article, we present a new position domain algorithm to 
improve the MOPS integrity methodology in hopes of 
improving the overall system performance. The information 
needed to do this is already in the WAAS messages. Therefore, 
this new algorithm will not require any change of the existing 
correction messaging structure. We introduce pseudo-VPL and 
pseudo-HPL measures in this paper to facilitate the 
development of the new algorithm, which we will call as the 
pseudo-VPL algorithm for the vertical part of WAAS 
improvement. It is based on the currently used MOPS 
algorithms and improves upon them. The new VPL and HPL 
algorithms are developed by taking advantage of the WAAS 
correction error’s stochastic characteristics and a 1-Dimention 
tracking Kalman filtering. The algorithm has been tested using 
real static and dynamic data collected by our Enhanced 
Miniature Advanced GPS Receiver (EMAGR) used in 
conjunction with the OU flight test program. This methodology 
shows significant improvement over the standardized MOPS 
algorithms. It improves the system availability and continuity 
without penalizing integrity.
INTRODUCTION
WAAS is a GPS based navigation system developed and being 
tested in the United States by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). WAAS provides correction signals and 
integrity monitoring messages to aviation users equipped with a 
WAAS-capable GPS receiver. The WAAS correction signal 
improves the positioning solution by supplying more accurate 
GPS clock, satellite ephemeris, and delay times for the WAAS 
receivers as GPS signal suffers various errors as it travels. 
These corrections are broadcast for use by virtually all users 
with WAAS capability in North America via geostationary 
satellites. A master station and a network of monitoring ground 
stations are needed to collect information, generate correction 
messages and upload them to the geo-synchronized WAAS 
satellite. WAAS provides improvements in four metrics over 
standard GPS: accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity. 
From its initial conception to deployment, WAAS has been 
hailed as revolutionary for the navigation industry. However, 
the WAAS deployment effort has suffered significant delays 
and budget overruns. The reason for these misfortunes lies in 
the demanding mandates on the performance of the WAAS 
system, especially integrity and availability. In the long process 
of getting WAAS commissioned, availability has always been 
the metric that holds the system back from achieving the 
promised capability. To date WAAS performs well, but not 
well enough to meet its original objectives. The inherent 
tradeoff between integrity and availability is the major reason 
that the VPL and HPL algorithms need to be improved.
For applications using the satellite based navigation system 
such as WAAS the integrity is of the uttermost importance
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since human life is involved. The requirement for the integrity 
has to be extremely stringent. This, however causes the 
achievable availability of the system suffer. For a certain type 
of service compromise has to be made in the middle ground. In 
this paper the Cat I precision approach will be used as the 
example to demonstrate the performance of the pseudo-PL 
algorithm. For this type of service the requirement for the 
guaranteed final position solution is that the Probability of 
Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) must be less than 
10 ’ per approach, while the availability requirement specifying 
that the system must be available at least 99,9% of the time. 
The current integrity algorithm is devised to achieve this goal
[2].
However, according to our observation these requirements have 
not been met consistently. In our data collection covering 
almost the whole WAAS lifetime we have observed the over­
conservativeness of the current WAAS integrity algorithm and 
concluded that the overall performance is not satisfactory. 
Although it is impossible to realize the probability of the HMI 
in the sense of strict definition, we will demonstrate that even 
with a loosened standard the integrity performance is still not 
satisfactory, i.e. there is space for improvement.
Only the vertical part of the WAAS is discussed in this paper, 
i.e. only the improvement of VPL performance is presented. 
This is simply because the vertical part and the horizontal part 
of the WAAS performance are similar in nature and 
independent of one another [3], Doing so enables us to focus 
more on developing and evaluating the new algorithm.
From observation of our data collection it is obvious that there 
is a discrepancy between the Vertical Position Error (VPE) and 
Vertical Protection Level (VPL), best estimation of VPE by 
WAAS integrity monitoring. The difference between them 
behaves nonlinearly which is not ideal for filtering. The object 
of this paper is to reduce this discrepancy as much as possible. 
To achieve this goal, a transformation is introduced to linearize 
the envelope of this difference, so that it can be better modeled 
and hence reduced. This transformation generates what we call 
pseudo-VPL, The new metric pseudo-VPL shows better 
linearity and is a better pseudo-measurement for modeling and 
filtering for the WAAS performance improvement.
In this paper we present a new and improved position domain 
algorithm based on pseudo-VPL, This pseudo-VPL algorithm 
takes advantage of the newly found linearity of the pseudo-VPL, 
combined with the modeling of the discrepancy of the VPE and 
VPL as a I-dimension tracking problem, and the false alarm 
and error prevention. After these steps and the final reverse 
conversion to the original VPL the new algorithm is established 
and the performance is compared based on the real static data 
collected at the University of Oklahoma,
DATA COLLECTION
Real WAAS data is used in developing and 
validating the new pseudo-VPL algorithm. The GPS research 
group at the University of Oklahoma has been taking 
observations of the WAAS signal in both static and dynamic 
settings. The devices used include the Rockwell EMAGR 
(Enhanced Miniature Aviation GPS Receiver) WAAS capable 
GPS receiver, the Ashtech Z12 GPS receiver, Rockwell 
software BBCOM and post processing software, and the 
Ashtech post processing software Prism, The research effort 
uses a second redundant EMAGR WAAS receiver to make sure 
that any unexpected results are not due to malfunctioning on 
WAAS receiver’s part [3], It was concluded that the observed 
errors originate from the quality of the Signal In Space (SIS) 
and this is a presumption in this paper.
Analysis of this research focuses on WAAS static data. Static 
Data is a good starting point for the ease of getting the ground 
truth. For moving aircraft, only small adjustments need to be 
made. Ground truth is obtained by performing a series of 
surveys to determine the true positions of a few stable sites that 
have good satellite visibility and relatively easy access for 
installation of antennae. Two antennae were installed on the 
roofs of buildings at the University of Oklahoma (OU). One is 
on building 210 of the OU north research campus, located 
coincidentally with Max Westheimer Airport, The other is on 
the Carson Engineering Center building on the main OU 
campus. Both antenna sites were accurately surveyed in 
longitude, latitude and altitude. In addition, both are maintained 
to ensure quality of satellite signal reception,
CLASSIFICATION OF DATA TYPE
This paper deals with the WAAS navigation system 
performance, especially integrity and availability. Therefore the 
navigation requirements have to be understood to do a good job 
of upgrading the system integrity and availability. For a 
navigation system to provide specific capability, which is 
usually set by government agency after extensive research on 
safety and economy, some system performance metrics are to 
be set as the standard. Minimum system performance has to be 
at least on par with the standards, i.e. the accuracy, integrity, 
availability and continuity needs to perform at or above a set 
standard. These standard can be devised in different ways, 
according to different agencies and different purposes. Most 
notably in the list above is the integrity requirement of less tan 
10 ’ chance of receiving HMI per approach, and the availability 
requirement of that the system should be usable in more than 
99,9% of the time. For the requirement for Category I (CAT I) 
and instrument approach with vertical guidance (IPV) airplane 
Precision Approach (PA), the vertical standard for 
classification of the data points is shown in triangle charts 
figure 1, CAT I and IPV have Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) of 12 
and 20 meters respectively. Based on the navigation
requirements, the whole absolute VPL-VPE space can be 
broken into the 7 color-coded areas:
1, VPL > VPE; VPL <= 12; Available, suit for CAT I 
operation,
2, VPL > VPE; VPL <=I9; Available, suit for
instrument approach with vertical guidance (IPV) 
operation,
3, VPL > VPE; VPL > 19; System Unavailable,
4, VPL < VPE; VPL > 19; Misleading Information
(Ml-1).
5, VPL < VPE; 12 < VPL < 19, 12 < VPL < 19; 
Misleading Information (MI-2),
6, VPL < VPE; VPL < 12, VPE < 12; Misleading 
Information (MI-3),
7, VPL < VPE; all the remaining area; Hazardously 
Misleading Information (HMI),
Of these sections in the triangle charts. Case I represents the 
requirement for CAT I precision approach, with the Vertical 
Alert Limit (VAL) at 12 meters. Case 2 is for the requirement 
for IPV precision approach, with the Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) 
at 20 meters. Case 3 is the unavailable area where VPL is too 
large to support the desired navigation procedure. Case 4, 5 and 
6 are the cases when the error exceeds the VPL and provides 
Misleading Information (MI), Operationally, these regions are 
not hazardous as we notice they are different from HMI region. 
However, in normal operation mobile users do not have access 
to the actual error. They are trustingly dependent on the 
accuracy of VPL, the VPE estimate. Therefore, this definition 
only makes sense in post analysis of altitude data. An unsafe 
region where the VPL supports the operation but the error is 
large enough to create Hazardously Misleading Information
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(HMI), Case 7 is the part of the VPL-VPE space that we are 
most concerned about, since it indicates the system’s failure of 
informing the breach of integrity and therefore can potentially 
cause fatal eonsequence. Thus all data points ideally should fall 
above the diagonal line in the triangle charts and concentrate at 
the lower left comer, i.e. the lower part of case 1.
WAAS day. The VPL-VPE discrepancy is about 15 meters 
with a higher VPL centering.
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ASSESSMENT OF OVER-CONSERVATÏVENESS OF 
WAAS SOLUTION
A quick look at the VPL-VPE performance triangle charts 
shows the area we need to work on. From our data eollection 
we use the following 2 days as example to demonstrate the 
development of our new algorithm. These days are 
representative of the normal data types we have witnessed 
throughout our observation and therefore will be used to 
demonstrate how normal day’s WAAS data responds to the 
new algorithm. Figure 2 and 3 shows the VPE-VPL 
performance of these data days. Later on the results of the new 
algorithm will be compared with these original plots.
Figure 2 11/27/2000 WAAS performance
The 11/27/2000 data in figure 2 represents a good solid day 
with integrity monitoring working well, but the availability is 
not up to the WAAS initial project requirement. There is a 
discrepancy of about 10 meters between VPL and VPE since 
VPL is centered around 15 meters while VPE is limited to less 
than 5 meters most of time.
03/14/2003, figure 3 is an exceptional day for WAAS 
performance too. Things fall into the expected performance 
standards. Data clusters in the VPL-VPE chart are compact and 
not spread all over. Still, it is not good enough for the original 
specification for CAT 1 precision approach. It is a very good
Figure 3 03/14/03 WAAS performance
To have a better insight into the temporal behavior of VPL and 
VPE, we plot VPL and VPE performances along the GPS time 
on 11/27/00 as an example, shown in figure 4. We can vaguely 
identify the action VPL takes when VPE has a significant turn, 
which shows how well the VPL algorithm is mimicking the 
vertical error. The consistent gap between VPL and VPE also 
catches our eyes. This is the potential space we can tap into to 
improve the tightness of the current VPL algorithm. These 
charts help us understand the performance of VPE and VPL 
better. However, there is still more to be desired. This kind of 
graphing doesn’t help us at coming into the new VPL algorithm 
too much since the VPL is by far larger than VPE and basically 
overwhelms VPE. To have a more intuitively perceptive way of 
reading information from data, a new metric of VPL and VPE 
is needed. Obviously the relationship between VPL and VPE is 
not linear. Same VPE might have a varied VPL due to different 
circumstances. However the envelopes of the VPL and VPE are 
relatively consistent. Therefore when a position domain 
algorithm is proposed we intuitively consider to work on the 
envelopes of VPL and VPE.
Figure 4 VPE and VPL performance over GPS time on 11/27/00
TRANSFORMATION TO LINEARIZE WAAS VPL-VPE 
PERFORMANCE ENVOLOPE
By looking at the figure 2 through 4, it is hard to draw any 
clear-cut conclusion on how VPL and VPE relate. VPL is 
usually much larger than the VPE and thus makes VPE look 
like background noise. To see more details of the comparison 
one need a better way to look at them. One easy way is to zoom 
in around the baseline, but that leaves the bigger picture out.
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Noticing the VPL and VPE have peaks of no more than tens of 
thousand, one wonders if using logarithmic scale would be 
beneficial. In the following charts from figure 5 and 6, 
L o g iyP L  + 1) vs. Log(VPE + 1) are shown along GPS time.
Later In this paper these two metrics will simply be called 
LVPL and LVPE. This scale transformation makes even the 
highest VPL and VPE be converted into modest value. The 
constant number 1 is for avoiding the singularity at 0 which 
could happen for VPE, and still not being too much a factor for 
VPL since it is relatively small. The difference between these 
charts and figure 4 is very noticeable. Now we can view the 
details of the VPE and VPL temporal performance. The striking 
point off the observation is the resemblance between their 
envelopes. VPL envelope follows the VPE envelope quite 
closely with a comfortable cushion in majority of “UP” time. 
There are exceptions when the VPL shows spikes while VPE 
remains tame. These probably can be explained by the change 
of configuration the receiver is having. More discussion will 
follow.
By now we can agree on that the logarithmic scale better 
represents the inter-correlation between VPL and VPE and 
gives more insight to the solution to improve the WAAS VPL 
availability. After the LVPL and LVPE are processed the 
reverse process is necessary but trivial. We might need to pay 
attention to the round out error during processing due to limited 
storage precision while computing is carried on. It turned out it 
is of non-major concern in this regard.
According to the WAAS MOPS [I], the formation of WAAS 
integrity monitoring system is quite definitive. WAAS MOPS 
specifies how users combine error confidences from different 
sources to form a position bound. The service provider 
guarantees that the error at any user location is smaller than the 
respective bound with a sufficiently high confidence. Simple as 
it seems, it is deceiving to think the system is a definitive 
system since the WAAS is inherently a non-stationary system. 
WAAS relies on satellites that are constantly in motion and that 
may change their characteristics. Additionally, the propagation 
of the satellite signals varies with local conditions, thus, the 
system has differing properties over time and space. It is very 
clear that the WAAS SIS integrity is by no means a simple 
system [5]. From published in WAAS MOPS, the WAAS 
integrity algorithm currently in use is well defined. There are 
formulae to follow to come up with the VPL and HPL. One has 
to wonder though, for two or more locations in a relatively 
large area, the integrity will be almost the same as long as the 
locations are within the same grid zone defined in WAAS 
MOPS. This is despite of sometime significant localized 
difference, such as weather and multipath.
If one wishes to solve the VPL in closed form, which would 
have been the best thing for this space base augmentation 
system, he or she finds out it will cost enormous amount of 
energy and computing time to even get close. It quickly 
becomes clear that the Navigation error and VPL system can be 
assimilated to a Chaos system. Every open nonlinear dissipative 
system has some relationship to another open system and their 
operations will intersect, overlap and converge. If the systems 
are sensitive to the initial conditions as in WAAS’ case, we 
don’t know exactly in detail every little piece of information, 
and thus we have a potentially chaotic system. WAAS integrity 
and availability model has an indeterminate quality about itself 
and hence is unpredictable. If this system is perturbed either 
internally or externally, it will display chaotic behavior. And 
this behavior will be amplified microscopically and 
macroscopically. By nature we shouldn’t try to solve the 
integrity in closed form because that can’t be done for a chaotic 
system. We can, however, try to understand how the system
behaves under different condition and circumstance of which to 
take advantage and improve the overall system performance.
Figure 5 11/27/00 LVPE vs. LVPL
I
Figure 6 03/14/03 LVPE vj. LVPL
[6] describes the validation of the MOPS integrity equation. 
Actual data from the National Satellite Test Bed (NSTB), a 
prototype for WAAS, is compared side-by-side to simulated 
data. The difference between actual and expected performance 
is investigated in detail. It was shown that compared to the 
NTSB data, the assumptions used in the integrity equation are 
eonservative. Integrity is perfect in both the simulated and 
NTSB data. The comparison of the two data sets provides 
insights as to the actual probability distribution of the errors in 
the real data and about correlations between different error 
components. This knowledge helps to ensure that the integrity 
requirements are always met. However, this can potentially hurt 
the availability performance. It may be possible to utilize this 
information to improve the availability of the system. The 
objective of our game is to take advantage of the over­
conservativeness of the MOPS integrity algorithm. The 
performanee of real WAAS was studied by collecting and 
analyzing WAAS data. Out of these observations the insight to 
improve the integrity algorithm is realized. As stated in the 
above reference paper, the stringent requirements are already 
met by the MOPS integrity algorithm. We need to improve the 
availability to improve the overall system performance.
From LVPL and LVPE performance charts in figure 5 and 6 
there is certainly some inter-correlation between the two 
functions o f  LVPL and LVPE. W e can w rite a relation between
them simply as:
IP P L  = f{ L V P E )  (1)
With the chaos background in mind, and the observation made 
in charts in figure 5 and 6, we can linearly model the LVPL as 
VPE with certain stochastic noise characteristics, plus a bias, 
which was introduced intentionally to safe guard the integrity 
safety:
LVPL = L  VPE  -F n ,^  + bias (2)
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where M is the central part of this dissertation. Once one
understands the way this noise characteristics works one can 
easily establish an algorithm to de-noise VPL to make it better 
mimic the VPE, hence reduce the conservativeness of the 
MOPS VPL algorithm, and in turn increase the system 
availability.
JUSTIFYING MULTIPLCATIVE MODELING OF VPL
in the first place. The Gaussian Noise assumption is not 
accurate at least due to the implementation of error correction 
and fault detection mechanism, which cut the tail part of the 
Gaussian curve off. Therefore, there is room for the MOPS 
VPL algorithm to be relaxed. This algorithm can be established 
through the use of real world data. If after testing the new 
algorithm in sufficiently diversified data types and getting 
satisfactory result, it can be claimed this real-data-based 
algorithm will work in general cases.
Equations 1 and 2 indicate some multiplicative modeling 
between VPL and VPE. The most used noise model is the 
Gaussian Additive White Noise (AGWN) where the different 
contributions to the total noise are added up. It is very normal 
in signal processing. In this LVPL-LVPE modeling, however, 
one might ask, why additive? From all the articles regarding the 
WAAS error sources up to today, it has always been assumed 
that the different noise sources are combined in additive fashion
[1]. It is also assumed that the additive nature makes the most 
conservative bound therefore suffices the requirement of 
integrity algorithm. This is intuitive and easy to understand. 
However, it is unlikely that different error sources work 
together to get the WAAS into trouble. In other words, the 
bounds based on MOPS are almost always too conservative.
The essential point of the new algorithm is the modeling LVPL 
as a noise stained version of LVPE. The threat model for VPE 
is an additive model with clock error, ephemeris error, 
ionospheric and tropospheric errors working in additive way. 
But that doesn’t assimilate the relationship between the VPL 
and VPE. This is a whole new story. We still need to 
investigate through their behavior to determine what kind of 
nature the modeling noise works its way in, which is not 
necessarily additive. In the development of VPL algorithm 
there are different error source estimates contributing to the 
total error bound, which is the VPL [1] [6]. The error sources 
combine in a worst way, which is very unlikely in the real 
world. After that, VPL has to be large enough to ensure the 
probability of VPL being less than VPE to be extremely small. 
Therefore, assuming a Gaussian distribution, one can use a 
constant K to generate a 3-Sigma bound. This constant K has to 
have been over-bounded due to the steps taken before its 
evaluation and the use of the assumption of Gaussian Noise.
Given an initial estimate for position and an 
estimate for the weighting matrix, the position estimate solution 
is[l][2]:
AJc = (G ' W  C y ' - G "  W - A y  = K - A y
where K is defined as
K = (G' ■H' Gy' ■G’^ IV 
One step further, the VPL equations
V P L ^  = /c(P r)-cr. 
along the vertical direction,
VPL^ s  K -(P r) ■ er^
where
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
with the requirement of the integrity of better than 99.9%, the 
constant K  can be determined at 4.58 by the PDF integration 
over the tails. As mentioned before, the tail is cut off to some 
degree due to the fault detection and error correction 
mechanism implemented in the integrity algorithm. This alone 
certifies the over-conservativeness of the MOPS algorithm. The 
worst ease combination rarely happens. Also the individual 
error models are loosely established and therefore conservative
Figure 7 and 8 demonstrate that the LVPL minus LVPE, which
is the +  b i a s )  term, is more linear than VPL-VPE.
Indeed, a few simple tests based on the data set chosen shows 
this estimate is valid, we have an improvement of nonlinearity 
of (VPL-VPE) at 9.00821 to nonlinearity of (LVPL-LVPE) at
0.30773. In the following example in figure 7 and 8 it can be 
easily seen that with the nonlinearity criteria the (LVPL-LVPE) 
does indeed have a better linearity than the (VPL-VPE). This is 
very normal with all types of data sets.
These illustrations are just an example to show that the 
logarithmic based function of VPL and VPE is a better fit to 
use as the basis to improve the WAAS SIS performance. In 
conclusion one now can utilize the LVPL-LVPE linearity to 
simplify the filtering process in the De-Noising process in the 
followed modeling. The simplest model is a constant
-F b i a s )  model. Without more details for threat models
this is also the safest model. The actual value of this constant 
can be determined by trial and readjustment process. Therefore 
this algorithm is a pseudo-heuristic algorithm. This makes good 
sense with the 3-Sigma K overvalued. By subtract this constant
i^hpe "*■ between LVPL and LVPE, we can rid the VPL
of the averaging factor in the over-estimate of error sources 
combination. At the same time removing constant
4" b i a s )  also works on the correcting the 3-Sigma
constant K. Nice two birds with one stone.
*1,
Figure 7 (11/27/00) Nonllneurlty of (VPL -  VPE);
(Std(V Pl -  VPE)(Mc«ii(VPL -  VPE)) -  9.00S21
Observation of figure 5 and 6 also shows there are plenty of 
spikes for both LVPL and LVPE. LVPL needs to be “smoothed 
out” so that it doesn’t have the choppiness. Kalman Filter is our 
choice to achieve this. Using Kalman filtering retains the 
localized flavor of the WAAS performanee to certain degree. 
Also the computing cost is limited [7].
During a span of time without violent thunderstorm, sunspot 
activity or some other adverse condition, one should expect the 
WAAS solution close to be continuous. However, as been 
observed, in time-VPL-VPE charts in figure 6 and 7, due to
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various reasons choppy gaps do exist and generate HMIs. Since 
probable cause of these gaps is false alarm of the WAAS, they 
can be deemed as to-be-filtered-out gaps. We hope to smooth 
them out to reduce the probability of HMIs.
Figure 8 (11/27/00) Nonlinearity of (LVPL -  LVPE ): 
(Std(LVPL -  LVPE)/Mean(LVPL -  LVPE» -  0J0773
KALMAN FILTERING THE PESUDO-VPL SOLUTION
Using WAAS static data the initialization of Kalman filter can 
be done based on information after investigating the dynamics 
of the system.
x„-=0
(8)
The VPL can be modeled as a random process. Therefore 
denote
/■; = log,„(l + FPL) (9)
tj is LVPL, a random process as well. From what has been
seen in the preceding sections /, can be easily seen as a
random 1-Dimension tracking target, and hence this becomes a 
1-D tracking problem of LVPL. A simple yet fitting model 
would be a  &  tracking filter. OC &, P  tracking filter is a
simplified version of Kalman filter, i.e. a special case of 
Kalman filter. Basically saying, it is a least square root solution 
of the problem given the statistic measurements.
To simplify, we assume a constant velocity from frame to 
frame. This is close to truth from observation of the data. And 
deviation from that can be modeled by a white noise. Since 
there are 5 samples a second in WAAS signal, there are 5 
frames per second. The position of target at frame k+1 can be 
written as
( 10)
where A is the frame time, 0.2 seconds in this case, and is
the velocity. As stated above, it is unlikely that over a long 
period of time the velocity remain truly constant. Hence, a 
small “velocity drift” from frame to frame will now be allowed
\ . i  (II)
where is modeled as a white “velocity drift” noise with the 
statistics of
(12)
£[» ] = 0 
E [ u u ]  =  < j'S^
For the measurement noise the symbol will be used and 
«I is also a white noise process, with
E[n,] = 0 
E[n,n,] =
and E[Ui^n. ] =  0  . The observation is then given by
Z. = ( + " .  (14)
By combining the above equations the system model can be 
written in matrix form:
(13)
fc, ' fi A^
kO V
A .c \
z. =(0 0 h + n.
fo
K  (15)
(16)
To initialize, ai k  =  —2  , measurement
And at k = -1,
Taking / '  =  z  ,, and V , =  — '-------   leads to
and then
P , = B [ e / A = E { [ ( x - x J x - x J ] }
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
Now,
C  - 1  =  1-1 -  z_, =  c  -  ('-I + « - , )  =  (21)
V - v ^ v  =  w Z L C fk  (22)
‘ ' A A
To compute the following quantities are needed:
(23)
= £[(-«_, )(«_, -  = —  (24)
A A
Using symmetry the following is shown:
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The last term in P  , is
£ [ ( v .- v , / ] = £ [ ( « ,
A
Combine all four components 
Now one can have the iteration initial condition;
(25)
(26)
(27)
1 A 
.0 1 vv_,y
and
^ 2 2 2 3cr 2^
5 a + A a  —-+A a
1+0-,=
(28)
(29)
V A A y
With these initial conditions we can start the iteration of the 
specialized Kalman filter, a  — P  filter.
Use the Kalman filter notations the following is produced
(  1
, ^1 = (30)
, 0  i j
^ .= ( 0  1) 
Q.= 0 a d kj
(31)
(32)
(33)
Compare to the general Kalman filter derivation [7] the 
implementation of the Kalman filter is then reduced to
processing the observations , which in my research comes
with the observed VPL over time. Subject to the initial 
conditions:
A
= > x , =
\0 1/
V A y
(34)
V'-i.
The Kalman gains 
/gA
\ P k )
J p ^ 0 , l )  p o , 2 )
L^(^l) (^2.2),
 ^ ^(U)  ^
(^2.1)
AAA f  /
](o]
(1 0)
V V
/Tftl) ^(1,2)
, (^2.1) /r(2.2).
+a
l^(U)+a
(35)
Filtered state vector error covariance matrix: 
P.=0-K,H,)p;
^(l-a,)p ;(l,l) (1-a. )/’;((, 2) ^
,(l-aj;:-(1.2) /^-(2.2)-A/:-(l.2)_
(36)
(37)
(38)
And the filtered state vector error covariance matrix 
Hence
p ;., (1,1) = P, (1,1) + 2AP. (1,2) + (2,2)
P.:,(1,2) = P.(1,2) + AP.(2,2)
P .:, (2,1) = P, (2,1) + AP. (2 ,2) = P, (1,2) + AP. (2 ,2) 
[ ; ;; ,(2 ,2 )  = .f^(2.2)+(T;
The pre-computation of Kalman gains now can be calculated in 
the following iteration:
1) Begin with / J  as given; k = 0;
2) Compute and using (35);
3) Compute p  using (36);
4) Compute using (37) and (38)
5) Let k = k+1
6) Go loop back to step 3.
Typically the Kalman gains converge to asymptotic values. 
From what has been observed from my Kalman filter 
implementation on the pseudo-VPL, this is certainly true. The 
overall Kalman iteration is shown below:
Compute Kalman Gain
Update the 
estimate with 
measurement
Compute the error 
covariance for 
updated estimate;
Project ahead
Figure 9 Kalman filtering recursion.
FALSE ALARMS AND ERROR PREVENTION
170
It has been suggested that the improvement of WAAS integrity, 
availability and continuity need to be done on range/eorrection 
domain [5] [8]. There are merits in the suggestions. We have 
noticed there are mysterious spikes in WAAS position solution. 
Through further study most of them are associated with change 
of SV used by the receiver. In order to improve the system 
performance, a better error model and better understanding of 
the threat model is needed, i.e. we need to know more about the 
nature of all error sources and the threats the WAAS faces, 
which is very difficult due to the stochastic natures of these 
sources. Luckily when it comes to false alarm and error 
prevention, the position-domain solution shows its advantage 
and can be used to improve the system availability. It is known 
that the HMI requirement is specified in the position domain, 
yet WAAS broadcasts values in the range/correction domain. 
The uses of WAAS receivers combine the corrections and 
confidences with their geometry to form the position solution 
and protection level. Depending on individual circumstance, 
each receiver determines which corrections and satellites are 
used, with WAAS SIS having no direct input. Therefore, how 
the position error depends on the residual errors, and is known 
only to the users. This can cause unpredictable jump in the 
position solution. In [5] example for specific user geometry by 
using Stanford’s Matlab Algorithm Availability Simulation 
Tool (MAAST) [9], one can see the positioning solution can 
vary significantly when a seemingly insignificant SV drops out 
of the view sight. It is so serious that it can move a cluster of 
perfectly performing data points into the HMI area. Without 
detail of the cause of this sort o f incidents, the best we can do is 
to use a simple low-pass filter to filter the VPE solution to 
reduce the abrupt change of the position solution. This helps 
remove false alarms and hence reduces false HMIs. Combine 
this into the pseudo-VPL algorithm helps improve or maintain 
the integrity performance.
The more important part of the false alarm and error prevention 
lies in the PL processing. We introduce the SV factor into the 
Kalman filtered position solution. The LVPL is coasted for a 
period of time every time a suspect solution appears, which 
means the altitude jumps by more than a pre-set threshold and 
the corresponding number of SV changes. This is especially 
true when either the before or after of the SV number change is 
the minimum 4 satellites. Again determining of the threshold 
and the period of time are trial and readjustment process. This 
method helps increase the availability.
SUMMARY AND RESULTS OF THE PSEUDO-VPL 
ALGORITHM
Combine the preceding sections we can summarize the new 
pseudo-VPL algorithm as followed:
I. Use transformation of LVPL to transform the VPL
envelope to linearly mimic VPE envelope.
Kalman filtering LVPL.
False alarm and error prevention.
Translate LVPL by 3 dB. This is a trial and 
adjustment process. 3 dB proves to be a safe value 
for various type of data set.
Reverse step 1.
To show how the new algorithm works on the real data, the 
previously used two data sets are demonstrated. Since it is 
impossible to show strictly defined availability and integrity, 
we use moving past 3-minutes average on 
available/unavailable data points over total points ratio as the 
availability/Un-availability. Table 1.1 and 1.2 shows the 
availability and Un-availability performance comparison with 
the current VPL algorithm and the pseudo-VPL algorithm on 
the 11/27/2000 data set. Table 2.1 and 2.2 are for 03/14/2003 
data set.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
Case 1:11/27/2000: Before and after the filtering
Most data points are squeezed into the lower part of the upper 
half of the triangle chart and there is no HMI present before and 
after the algorithm is applied. The system availability is 
improved and yet the integrity is not compromised.
501 • ' ' ( f - I
I
Figure 10 11/27/2000: Before end after the filtering
In Case 3, CAT I availability increase sometime and decrease 
on other time, but mostly improving. Un-Availability it on 
average decreases by around 50. Ml and HMI performances are 
perfect again.
Table 1-1 Case 1 Cat 1 Availability Performance 
comparison for 11/27/2000 Data.
CATIAV.1 CATIAV.I
FMa. C hanot
CA T,A V I
Rala. Chanoa
0 0.339505556 0.84111 1.477455777
0.989432716 0.010680144 0 339741852 0.84105321 1.475565507
0 0.341111111 0.841111111 1485798046
0.987293627 0-969521728 •0.01800082 0.341111111 0.841111111 1.465796046
, 0 0.341412222 0.841470247 1.464675229
0 0342218049 0 842222222 1.461083353
0.976654938 0.023903081 0.342222222 0 842222222 1.461038961
0.612639012 0.6322826 0.341708148 0.842222222 1.464741408
0.289430864 0.87715963 2.030636114 0.341540741 0.842222232 1.46594951
0,287777778 0.901060741 2.131099099 0.341965309 0 842222222 1.462887904
0.766593704 0.304471971 0.342116025 0842222222 1.46178851
0.806055556 0.240609277 0.341667531 0.842041235 1.464360442
0.779080864 0.283563807 0.342222223 0.842142346 1.460805558
0.833333333 0.343025185 0.84323284 1.458224282
0,371467284 0.644653457 1.273830007 0.343298765 0.643333333 1.456558014
0.338888889 0.840670617 1.480667395 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0.339151852 0.841111111 1.480042808 0.343333333 0843333333 1,46631068
0.338907407 0.841111111 1.481831594 0.343333333 0.643333333 1.45631068
0.339935679 0.841111111 1.4743243 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45631068
0.340804815 0.840965309 1.467586349 0.343042593 0.843332346 1 458389611
0.341195062 0.840378889 1.462898744 0343333333 0.843333333 1.45631066
0 341885185 0.841096173 1.460171453 0.343333333 0.843333333 1.45831060
0.340847654 0.841093333 1.469100617 0 343035309 0.842599753 1.456306193
0.841111111 1.473656209 0.343198025 0.842222222 1.454041578
0.339916667 0.841111111 1.474462695 0.343717778 0.841835432 1.449205385
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Table 1- 2 Case 2 Un-Availability Performance comparison 
for 11/27/2000 Data.
Un-Av.l
Rala. Chanoa
Un-Aval U n^va,
Rala. Chanoa
0.339505556 0.039821414 •0.425964745
0.989432716 Q 0.339741852 0.038048735 •0.404215282
0 0.341111111 0.033429586 -0.466446536
0.987263827 Q 0.341111111 0.033429586 -0 466446536
0 0.341412222 0.031600967 -0.464024243
0 .1 0.342216049 0.030142574 •0.471209623
0.976654938 Q 0.342222222 0.030142574 •0.471209823
0.612639012 0 .1 0.341708148 0.030142574 -0.471209823
0.269430864 0 0.341540741 0.030142574 -0.462970585
0.287777778 0.000321017 •0.932955913 0.341965309 0.030142574 •0.396008996
0.768593704 0.000443088 •0.912143246 0.342118025 0.030142574 •0.396006996
0.806055556 0.000443088 •0.912143248 0.341687531 0.030142574 •0.368450248
0.779080664 0.000443088 -0.912143248 0.342222222 0.030142574 -0.358918079
0633333333 0.000443088 •0.912143248 0.343025185 0.023980034 •0.469175429
0.371467284 0.01660538 -0.255286158 0.343296765 0.023601039 -0.477518727
0.338888889 0.052166726 •0.178349898 0.343333333 0.023601039 •0.477616727
0.339151852 0.05263197 •0.176800242 0.343333333 0.023601039 -0.477616727
0.338907407 0.05263197 -0.176800242 0.343333333 0.023601036 -0.477616727
0.336935670 0.05263197 •0.176800242 0.343333333 0.023601039 •0.477816727
0.340604615 0.051369131 •0.061352998 0.343042*3 0.023601039 -0.477818727
0.341195062 0.044470955 -0.387583637 0.343333333 0.023601039 -0.477618727
0.341885185 0.044468237 -0.447201436 0.343333333 0.023601039 •0.477616727
0.340647654 0.041867423 •0.442074048 0.343035309 0.022099327 -0.454594976
0.030821414 •0.462390851 0.343198025 0.021844002 •0.44223263
0.339918667 0.039821414 -0.462390651 0.343717776 0.021530716 -0441245788
Case 2: 03/14/2003: Before and after the filtering
On a good quality day in ftgureS. 1.9 one has quality results 
again. Now it can be concluded that the pseudo-VPL-VPE 
algorithm performs quite consistently on normal days. Its 
correction capability, however, is at best a suspect.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 3S «  15 50
Figure 11 03/14/2003: Before and after the filtering
Table 2- 1 Case 2 Cat I Availability Performance 
comparison for 03/14/2003 Data.
Table 2- 2 Case 1 Un-Avaiiabiiity Performance comparison 
for 03/14/2003 Data.
CAT 1 Aval CATIAval CATIAval
Rala. Chanoa Rafa. Chanoa
Un.*vai
Aftar Rala. Chanoa
Un-Aval
Rala. Chanoa
Q NaN 0369264689 0.077359882 •0 7905029
0.052630008 Q 0.374741881 0.077359882 •0.793564879
0.42630576 0.004170516 -0.990217079 0.374741861 0.077358882 •0.793564879
0.59021737 0.008494317 •0.988996736 0.374741861 0.077359682 -0.793564879
0.553920225 0.006494317 •0.988275717 0.374741861 0.077359882 •0.793564879
0.512489385 0 006494317 -0.967327899 0.374741861 0.077359882 •0.793564879
0.512489385 0.006494317 •0.987327899 0 332258408 0.077359882 -0.767169529
0.342534473 0.006494317 •0.981040397 0319533526 0.077359882 -0.757897449
0.295369357 0.006494317 •0.978012894 0.319915004 0.077356882 -0.758186141
0.295389357 0.006494317 •0.978012894 0.319915004 0.077359882 -0.758188141
0.286154302 0.006494317 -0.975599427 0.316915004 0.077359882 •0.758185141
0.203498446 0.003354043 •0.983518093 0.293123484 0.077389662 -0.736064327
0.222265616 0.001629051 -0.992670703 0.293720739 0077359882 •0 736620975
0 231256146 0.001629051 -0.962955644 0293211212 0.077359882 •0.73616329
0.24343922 0.015354936 •0.936924971 0.263753518 0.077359882 ■0.727369434
0.271921615 0.037886935 •0.860743195 0.291706221 0.077359882 ■0.725388096
0.267180249 0.037866935 •0.858271952 0.283010857 0.077359882 •0.726654014
0.278373259 0.037752292 •0.864382475 0.281420018 0.077359882 •0.725108817
0.317703143 0.044348144 -0.86041012 0.660924738 0.210795756 -1 681059364
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■0.477616727
In Case 2, CAT I availability has a huge increase again. Un- 
Availability decreases by around 70%, which is very good. Ml 
and HMI performances are also perfect.
CONCLUSIONS
This research has developed a new algorithm to tighten up the 
VPL looseness. This new algorithm is called the pseudo-VPL- 
VPE. In ordinary cases the pseudo-VPL reduces the LVPL 
magnitude by 3dB, which is significant. This helps increase the 
system availability a tremendous amount. This can be shown by 
an example; A VPL at 18 meters is not good for CAT 1 
precision approach. With a 3dB improvement, the new pseudo- 
VPL becomes less than 12 meters, good enough for CAT 1 
precision approach. VPE filtering helps reduce invalid bias, but 
to a lesser reliability.
This pseudo-VPL-VPE algorithm alone will improve the 
compactness of the VPL structure. However, it doesn’t improve 
the integrity, which is of crucial importance. As a mater of fact, 
the pseudo-VPL algorithm can potentially generate additional 
HMIs if  no other action is taken since the new pseudo-VPL 
moves the data cluster downward without interfering with 
actual system error. This can move data points above the 
diagonal line under it, hence create new HMIs. Our solution to 
this is to Kalman filtering the actual altitude so that the VPE is 
as small as possible, i.e. as far away from the diagonal line as 
possible. This, combined with a similar fault detection and error 
correction mechanism similar to those in pseudo-VPL, A higher 
system availability for WAAS has been achieved without 
penalizing system integrity monitoring capability.
With the new pseudo-VPL-VPE algorithm, on good days, 
which can be expected from more than 95% of time when GPS 
and WAAS are up, can improve the CAT 1 Availability by at 
least 70 to 100%. Decrease the Un-Availability by at least 50%.
At the same time keeps the integrity intact, sometime even 
improving the integrity.
The performance of the pseudo-VPL-VPE algorithm does 
depend on the data type it is applied to. With peppered around 
data points it can intluce extra Ml or even HMI. Gotxl news is 
that this kind o f hazard is not evidenced by our tables from real 
data. But it is still a concern. With the upgrade on GPS and 
WAAS system, chances of this kind of poor data appearing will 
be reduced or eliminated.
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Appendix B: 
Acronyms Frequently used in Navigation Research
ACRONYM MEANING
AAAE American Association o f Airports Executives
ABAS Aircraft Based Augmentation System
AC Advisory Circular
ADO Airport District Office
ADS-B Automation Dependent Surveillance -  Broadcast
AEE Office of Environmental and Energy
APIS Automated Flight Inspection System
APS PAA Plight Standards Service
AGO Automatic Gain Control
AIP Airport Improvement Program
ALAs Approach-and-landing accidents
ALP Airport Layout Plan (5-20 Years out)
ALPA Air Line Pilots Association's
AMASS Airport Movement Area Safety System
AMD Airport Master Plan (5-20 Years out)
AMM Airborne Multipath Model
ANC Air Navigation Commission (An ICAO organization)
ANP Actual Navigation Performance.
ADA PAA Office o f the Administrator
AOA Airport Operations Area
APV Approach with Vertical Guidance
ARINC 424 The defined standard for aeronautical navigation data
ARSA Airport Radar Surveillance Area (Class C airspace)
ARSR-4 Air Route Surveillance Radar, Model 4
ARTC Air Route Traffic Control Center
ASDE Airport Surface Detection Equipment
ASDE-X Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance & Control System
ASOS Automated Surface Observing System
ASR Area Surveillance Radar
ATA Airline Transport Association
ATCBI Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator
ATCSCC Air Traffic Control System Command Center
ATCT Airport Traffic Control Tower
ATCU Air Traffic Control Unit
ATIDS Airport Traffic Identification Systems
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATM Air Traffic Management
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ACRONYM
ATOP
ATPAC
AVN
AVS
AWO
AWOHWG
AWOS
BFOT
BMNs
B-Spec
CA Code
CAA
CAASD
CAPA
CASA
CBA
CCB
CDI
CDR
CDRL
CDTI
CE
CF
CF/MOS
CFIT
CGSIC
Cl
CMN
CNS
CNS/ATM
CPDLC
CRAF
CRC
CRDA
CSCIs
CSER
CSPA
CTAF
CW
DA
DCIA
DER
DF
DGPS
DH
MEANING
Advanced Technology and Oceanic Procedures 
Air Traffic Procedures Advisory Committee 
Aviation System Standards 
Additional VDB Sub-System 
All Weather Ops guys
All Weather Operations Harmonization Working Group
Automated Weather Observing System
Backfill Overtime
Baseline Management Notices
Prime Item Development Specification
Course Acquisition Code
Cargo Airlines Association
Center for Advanced Aviation Systems Development
Coalition o f Airline Pilots Association
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Cost Benefits Analysis
Configuration Control Board
Course Deviation Indicator
Critical Design Review
Contract Data Requirements List
Cockpit Display o f Traffic Information
categorical exclusions
Course to Fix
Cost Functions/Measure o f Success 
controlled flight into terrain 
Civil GPS Service Interface Committee 
Configuration Items 
Control Motion Noise
Communications, Navigation and Surveillance
Communications, Navigation and Surveillance/ Air Traffic Management
Controller pilot data link communications
Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Cycle Redundancy Check
Converging Runway Display Aid
Computer Software Configuration Items
Contractor Site Engineering Report
Closely Spaced Parallel Approaches
Common Traffic Advisory Frequency
Continuous Wave
Decision Altitude
Dependent Converging Instrument Approaches 
Departure End O f Runway 
Direct to Fix
Differential Global Positioning System 
Decision Height. Old term. See DA above.
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ACRONYM
DH/DA
DME
DO-178B
DO-236
DO-245
DO-246
DO-253A
DP
DRVSM
D IED
D IG
DTOP
EA
EAP
ECAC
EDR
EGNOS
EGPWS
EHSI
EIS
EPU
ERP
EUROCAE
F&E
FANS
FBO
FCA
FD
FD
FDE
FHA
FHA
FMS
FONSI
FPAP
FRAC
FSD
FSF
FTP
GA
GAD
GBAS
GDP
GEOS
MEANING
Decision Height/Decision Altitude 
Distance Measuring Equipment
Software Consideration in Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certification
RNP RNAV MASPS
LAAS MASPS
RTCA LAAS Interface Control Document (ICD)
MOPS for GPS LAAS Airborne Equipment 
Departure Procedure
Domestic Reduced Vertical Separation Minima 
Digital Terrain Elevation Data 
Distance To Go
Displaced Threshold Operations
environmental assessments
Environmental Protection Agency
European Civil Aviation Conference
Eddy Dissipation Rate (Wind Sheer/Turbulence Term)
European Geo-stationary Navigation Overlay Service 
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 
Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator 
Environmental Impact Statement 
Estimated Position Uncertainty 
Effective Radiate Power
European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment
Facilities and Equipment
Future Air Navigation Systems
Fixed Base Operations or Fixed Base Operator
Functional Configuration Audit
Fault Detection
Fault Detection. Done in WAAS airborne receiver
Fault Detection and Exclusion. Done in WAAS airborne receiver
Functional Hazard Assessment
Functional Hazards Assessment/Analysis
Flight Management System
findings o f no significant impact
Flight Path Alignment Point
Final Review and Comment
Full Scale Development
Flight Safety Foundation
Fictitious Threshold Point
General Aviation
Ground Accuracy Designator (C-Curve)
Ground Based Augmentation System 
Ground Delay Program 
Geo-stationary Earth Orbit Satellite
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ACRONYM
GES
GLS
GMA
GNAS
GNDIR
GNSS
GNSSP
GNSSP
GNSSU
GOIWG
GOTS
GPA
GPWS
GQS
GRAS
GRAS
HAL
HMI
HPL
HPCL
HSI
lAPA
lAPs
lATA
ICAO
IDR
IGEB
ILS
IMG
IMLA
INAS
INAS
INMARSAT
lOD
ION
lOT&E
1RS
ISO
JAA
JPALS
JPO
JPO
JPO
JRC
MEANING
Ground Earth Station
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) or GPS Landing System 
Guided Missed Approaches 
General National Airspace System 
General Nav Direct
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (Such as GPS DGPS 
WAAS/LAAS)
Global Navigation Satellite System -  Panel 
Global Navigation Satellite System Panel 
Global Navigation Satellite Sensor Unit 
GNSS Operational Integration Working Group 
GPS Outage Terminal Simulator 
Glide Path Angle
Ground-Proximity Warning System
GS Qualification Surface
Ground Based Regional Augmentation System
Ground Based Regional Augmentation System
Horizontal Alert Limit
Human Machine Interface
Horizontal Protection Limit
Horizontal Polarization
Horizontal Situation Indicator
Instrument Approach Procedures Automation
Instrument Approach Procedures
International Air Transport Association
International Civil Aviation Organization
Integrity Design Review/Report
Interagency GPS Executive Board
Frequency Range 108 -  112 MHz
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
Integrated Multipath Limiting Antennas
International and National Airspace
International Airspace System
International Maritime Satellite Service Provider
GPS Issue of Data
Institute of Navigation
Independent Operational Test & Evaluation ATQ
Inertial Reference System
International Standards Organization
Joint Aviation Authorities
Joint Precision Approach Landing System
Joint Planning and Development Office
Joint Planning Office (FAA)
Joint Program Office (Military)
Joint Resources Council
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ACRONYM
JTIDS
KTA
LI
L2
L5
LAAS
LAHSO
LAL
LDA
LEAP
LGF
LIP
LIP
LLWAS
LNAV
LOCA
LPV
LRIP
LRR
LSP
LTP
LTP
LTP
MALSR
MASPS
MDE
MDT
MFD
MI
MIB
MIDS
MIL-STD-882
MLA
MMS
MOI
MOPS
MPAP
MVA
MVMC
NAAT
NAATS
NAPT
NAR
NASPAC
NATCA
MEANING
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
Key Technical Advisors
1575.42 Mhz
1227.60 Mhz
1176.45 MHz
Local Area Augmentation System 
Land and Hold Short Operations 
Lateral Alert Limit 
Localizer-type Directional Aid 
LAAS Equipage and Avionics Pathfinder 
LAAAS Ground Facility
LAAS Integrity Panel (may be replaced by IDR)
LAAS Integrity Panel (Group o f Program Offiee Personnel)
Low Level Wind Sheer Advisory System
Lateral Navigation
LGF Object Clearance Area
Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance
Low Rate Initial Production
Long Range Radar
Local Status Panel
LAAS Test Prototype
Landing Threshold Point
Landing Threshold Points
Medium Intensity Approach Light System with RAIL
Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards
Minimum Detectable Error
Maintenance Data Terminal
Multi-Functional Display
Misleading Information
Management Information Base
Multifunctional Information Distribution System
System Safety Requirement
Multipath Limiting Antenna
Maintenance Management System
Maintenance Operations Inspectors
Minimum Operational Performance Standards
Multiple Parallel Approach Program
Minimum Vectoring Altitude
Marginal VMC
North American Aviation Trilateral 
National Association of Air Traffic Specialists 
National Airspace Procedure Team 
National Airspace Redesign (1997)
NAS Performance Analysis Capability 
National Air Traffic Controllers Association
178
ACRONYM
NCP
NDGPS
NEPA
NEXTOR
NFDC
NFPO
NGS
NIMS
NIMS
NMI
NOTAMS
NPA
NSE
NTAP
NTE
NTZ
QBE
OOP
GDP
OEP
CFA
OFZ
GIT
OK City
PACS
PANS-GPS
PAPI
PARC
PART 121
Part 129
PART 135
PART 150
PART 91
PAT
PBARC
PGA
PGA
PCHs
PGR
PDA
PDR
PES
PFAF
PFE
PHA
MEANING
NAS Change Proposal 
Nationwide Differential GPS 
National Environmental Policy Act
National Center o f Excellence for Aviation Gperations Research
National Flight Data Center
National Flight Procedures Gffice
National Geodetic Service (Work for NGAA)
NAS Infrastructure Mgt System
NAS Infrastructure Management System
Nautical Mile
Notice to Airman
Non-Precision Approach
Navigation Sensor Error
Notices to Airmen Publication
Not To Exceed
No-Transgression Zone
Gvercome By Events
Gbstacle Clearance Panel
Gbstacle Departure Procedures
Gperational Evolution Plan
Gbject Free Areas
Gbstacle Free Zones
Gperational Integration Team
FAA’s Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, OK.
Primary Airport Control Stations
Procedures for Air Navigation Services-Gperations
Precision Approach Path Indicator
Performance Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee
Major Carriers and Cargo Carriers
Foreign Aircarriers and Foreign Gperator flying US registered aircraft
9 Passengers or less plus air taxi flights
Part 150, Airport Noise Compatibility Planning
General Aviation
Product Acceptance Team
Performance Based Rule Making Committee (Replace TAG ARC)
Physical Configuration Audit
Positive Controlled Airspace (Class A airspace)
Phase Center Heights 
Pseudorange Correction Rate 
Preferred Departure Route 
Preliminary Design Review 
Primary Equipment Shelter 
Precision Final Approach Fix 
Path Following Error 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
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ACRONYM
PIP 
PIP 
POI 
PRC —
PRN
PVS
Q Routes
RAA
RAAS
RAAS
RAIL
RAIM
RAPT
RF
RFO
RIPS
RIRP
RNAV
RNP
ROD
RPAT
RPDS
RPI
RR
RRA
RRS
RSA
RSP
RTA
RTCA
RVSM
SA
SAARS
SACS
SARPS
SBAS
SCAP
SCAT-1
SCIA
SDP
SDP
SIAP
SID
SIS
MEANING
Product Integration Plan 
Product Integration Plan 
Principal Operations Inspectors 
Pseudorange Correction 
Pseudorandom Number 
Primary VDB Sub-System
US and Canada use the term Q to refer to RNAV routes
Regional Airline Association
Remote altimeter setting sources
Remote Alternate Altimeter Setting
Runway Alignment Indicator Lights
Receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) is the satellite-based 
navigation community's term for fault detection (FD).
Regional Airspace Procedure Team 
Radius to Fix
Responsible Federal Official
Runway Incursion Prevention System (NASA) Program 
Runway Incursion Reduction Program 
Area Navigation (Free Flight)
Required Navigation Performance
Record o f Decision
RNP Parallel Approach Transition
Reference Path Data Selector
Reference Path Indicator
Reference Receiver
Reference Receiver Antenna
Reference Receiver Station
Runway Safety Areas
Remote Status Panel
Required Time o f Arrival
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Inc.
Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums (aircraft)
Selective Availability
Special Aircraft And Aircrew Authorization Required
Secondary Airport Control Stations
Standard and Recommended Practices (ICAO Term)
Satellite Based Augmentation System
Security Certification & Authorization Package
Special Category. Sometimes shown as SCAT I Approaches
Simultaneous Converging Instrument Approaches
Software Development Plan
Software Development Plan
Standard Instrument Approach Procedure
Standard Instrument Departure
Signal-in-Space
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ACRONYM
SMGCS
SNAPIT
SNI
SNMP
SOIA
SOIR
SPS
SQM
SRGPS
SRR
SSPP
SSR
SSS
STAR
STAR
STAR
STARS
STC
SWG
TAAM
TACAN
TAOA
TAOARC
TAP
TARGETS
TAWS
TBD
TBD
TCA
TCAS
TCH
TDMA
TECH Center
TERPS
TF
TIS
TLS
TNIFR
TOR
TRACON
TSO
TSO C-145A 
TSO-146A 
TSPI 
TTA
MEANING
Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (See A-SMGCS)
SatNav Automated Program Integration Tool
Simultaneous non-interfering
Simple Network Management Protocol
Simultaneous Offset Instrument Approach
Simultaneous Operations on Intersecting Runways
Standard Positioning Service. GPS provides a SPS
Signal Quality Manager
Ship Relative GPS
System Requirements Report
System Safety Program Plan
Secondary Surveillance Radar
System Segment Specification
Standard Terminal Arrivals
Standard Terminal Arrival Route
Standard Instrument Arrival Route
Standard Terminal Automated Radar System
Supplemental Type Certification
Siting Working Group for LAAS
Total Airspace & Airport Modeler
Tactical Air Navigation
Terminal Area Operational Applications
Terminal Area Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee
Terminal Area Path
Terminal Area Route Generation, Evaluation and Traffic Simulation 
Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
To Be Determined 
To Be Determined
Terminal Controlled Airspace (Class B airspace)
Traffic Collision and Avoidance System
Threshold Crossing Height
Time Division Multiple Access
The FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center
Terminal Area Procedure or Terminal Instmment Procedures
Track to Fix
Traffic Information Services 
Transponder Landing System 
Terminal NAV IFR 
Technical Onsite Representative 
Terminal Radar Approach Control 
Technical Standard Order 
Airborne Nav Sensors using WAAS 
Stand alone Nav Equip using WAAS 
Time Space Position Information System 
Time To Alarm
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ACRONYM
TWO
UDRE
UNICOM
UTC
VAL
VDB
VDI
VMC
VNAV
VPL
VPOL
VRTM
VSWR
WGS-84
Wx
MEANING
Technical Working Group 
User’s Differential Range Error
Uniform Communications: A non-government communication facility 
which may provide airport information at certain airports.
Coordinated Universal Time 
Vertical Alert Limit (See VPL below)
VHP Data Broadcaster 
Vertical Display Indicator 
Visual Meteorological Conditions 
Vertical Navigation
Vertical Protection Limit (See VAL above)
Vertical Polarization 
Verification Requirements Test Matrix 
Voltage Standing Wave Ratio 
World Geodetic Survey 1984 
Weather
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